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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Conflicts:
crypto/hmac/hmac.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/rsa/rsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
(cherry picked from commit 1d97c8435171a7af575f73c526d79e1ef0ee5960)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
crypto/engine/eng_all.c
crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
crypto/sha/sha.h
ssl/kssl.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb62ab4b17818fe66d2fed0a7fe71969131c811b)
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4c52816d35681c0533c25fdd3abb4b7c6962302d)
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By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 684400ce192dac51df3d3e92b61830a6ef90be3e)
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Check for NULL return from X509_NAME_ENTRY_new()
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2c60925d1ccc0b96287bdc9acb90198e7180d642)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated
types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of
these are received with a constructed encoding.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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i2d_re_X509_tbs re-encodes the TBS portion of the certificate.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 95b1752cc7531e4b609aea166f2db1c155ab5bdd)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f9fb43e176ad2a914108cd2b403425dc1ebc7262)
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- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.
CVE-2014-3508
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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(cherry picked from commit 55707a36cce3584457f687ff020842c079624ee8)
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Primitive encodings shouldn't use indefinite length constructed
form.
PR#2438 (partial).
(cherry picked from commit 398e99fe5e06edb11f55a39ce0883d9aa633ffa9)
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PR#3014
(cherry picked from commit 11da66f8b1fbe5777fe08cc6ace9e1f2c1576a50)
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PR#3403
(cherry picked from commit d2aea038297e0c64ca66e6844cbb37377365885e)
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(cherry picked from commit 3009244da47b989c4cc59ba02cf81a4e9d8f8431)
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Add additional check to catch this in ASN1_item_verify too.
(cherry picked from commit 66e8211c0b1347970096e04b18aa52567c325200)
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(cherry picked from commit 2b4ffc659eabec29f76821f0ac624a2b8c19e4c7)
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Add X9.42 DH KDF. Move sharedinfo generation code to CMS library as the
same structure is used by DH and ECDH.
Move ASN1_OBJECT typedef to ossl_typ.h so it can be picked up by dh headers
without the need to use ASN1.
(cherry picked from commit dc1ce3bc64845d16314af1f11acf5384e4ae9b34)
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Backport of ASN1_TIME_diff and OPENSSL_gmtime_diff functions from master
branch.
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If an ASN1_INTEGER structure is allocated but not explicitly set encode
it as zero: don't generate an invalid zero length INTEGER.
(cherry picked from commit 1643edc63c3e15b6db5a15a728bc288f2cc2bbc7)
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(backport from HEAD)
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Submitted by: Adam Langley
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Reported by: Constantine Sapuntzakis <csapuntz@gmail.com>
Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
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BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110)
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RFC5114 parameters and X9.42 DH public and private keys.
(backport from HEAD)
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PR: 2776
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Reported by: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
If resigning with detached content in CMS just copy data across.
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Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for reporting this bug.
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Reported by: Remi Gacogne <rgacogne-bugs@coredump.fr>
Preserve unused bits value in non-canonicalised ASN1_STRING structures
by using ASN1_STRING_copy which preseves flags.
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Submitted by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>
Tolerate bad MIME headers in parser.
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are passed zero-extended, not sign-extended [from HEAD].
PR: 2682
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PR: 2675
Submitted by: Annie Yousar
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