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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9848)
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This commit addresses multiple side-channel vulnerabilities present
during RSA key validation.
Private key parameters are re-computed using variable-time functions.
This issue was discovered and reported by the NISEC group at TAU Finland.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9779)
(cherry picked from commit 311e903d8468e2a380d371609a10eda71de16c0e)
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It turns out that the strictness that was implemented in
EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() (see Github openssl/openssl#6880) was badly placed
for some usages, and that it's better to do this check only when the
method is getting registered.
Fixes #7758
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7847)
(cherry picked from commit a86003162138031137727147c9b642d99db434b1)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6954)
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Since 0.9.7, all i2d_ functions were documented to allocate an output
buffer if the user didn't provide one, under these conditions (from
the 1.0.2 documentation):
For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be
allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this
case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the
data just written.
i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was found not to do this, and would crash if a NULL
output buffer was provided.
Fixes #6914
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6918)
(cherry picked from commit cba024dc685d13dbcbd0577bed028ee6b295b56a)
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Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6880)
(cherry picked from commit 38eca7fed09a57c1b7a05d651af2c667b3e87719)
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CRYPTO_atomic_add was assumed to return negative value on error, while
it returns 0.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6843)
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This reverts commit 24233a0f3c491919ee3a38e2567271ccc041ee1d.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6843)
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CRYPTO_atomic_add was assumed to return negative value on error, while
it returns 0.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 680b9d45b005c2d0a48fd574db903bf4486b49ae)
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Don't apply DNS name constraints to the subject CN when there's a
least one DNS-ID subjectAlternativeName.
Don't apply DNS name constraints to subject CN's that are sufficiently
unlike DNS names. Checked name must have at least two labels, with
all labels non-empty, no trailing '.' and all hyphens must be
internal in each label. In addition to the usual LDH characters,
we also allow "_", since some sites use these for hostnames despite
all the standards.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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which is used for ASN1_STRING_print_ex*() and X509_NAME_print_ex*().
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6117)
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5977)
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Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes
through a canonicalisation process first prior to signing or verifying a
signature. This process strips trailing space at the end of lines, converts
line terminators to CRLF and removes additional trailing line terminators
at the end of a file. A bug in the canonicalisation process meant that
some characters, such as form-feed, were incorrectly treated as whitespace
and removed. This is contrary to the specification (RFC5485). This fix
could mean that detached text data signed with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0 may fail to verify using the fixed version, or text data
signed with a fixed OpenSSL may fail to verify with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0. A workaround is to only verify the canonicalised text data
and use the "-binary" flag (for the "cms" command line application) or set
the SMIME_BINARY/PKCS7_BINARY/CMS_BINARY flags (if using CMS_verify()).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5791)
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If we don't have OID data for an object then we should fail if we
are asked to encode the ASN.1 for that OID.
Fixes #5723
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5725)
(cherry picked from commit 53c9818e970fc0c22d77e19fda3b3e6f6c9e759d)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in
PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
excessive recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth.
CVE-2018-0739
Credit to OSSFuzz for finding this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5142)
(cherry picked from commit a26dd465b21d8def440c16b6bd90227b03e12e02)
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EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() would search through standard asn1 methods
first, then those added by the application, which EVP_PKEY_asn1_find()
worked the other way around. Also, EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() didn't
handle aliases.
This change brings EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() closer to EVP_PKEY_asn1_find().
Fixes #5086
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5137)
(cherry picked from commit 3bf0c3fe31d5339524dae671064cc5fe9e4bda38)
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This reverts commit d85722d31ac9ff0dc54c06cdc8d125acf56ca27a.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5137)
(cherry picked from commit 7203c94e98c9fa76b0859c25b723b2bde4a9059b)
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Rename bio_info_cb to BIO_info_cb.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4943)
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Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4876)
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|flags| argument to do_esc_char was apparently truncated by implicit
cast. [Caught by VC warning subsytem.]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4721)
(cherry picked from commit 372463103917fcc2b68bd2ba3db55b29ce325705)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4600)
(cherry picked from commit a6f622bc99ffdc7b34199babb9d200b24a7a6431)
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No two public key ASN.1 methods with the same pkey_id can be
registered at the same time.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4620)
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asn1_item_embed_free() will try unlocking and fail in this case, and
since the new item was just allocated on the heap, free it directly
with OPENSSL_free() instead.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4579)
(cherry picked from commit fe6fcd31546db1ab019e55edd15c953c5b358559)
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The previous change with this intention didn't quite do it. An
embedded item must not be freed itself, but might potentially contain
non-embedded elements, which must be freed.
So instead of calling ASN1_item_ex_free(), where we can't pass the
embed flag, we call asn1_item_embed_free() directly.
This changes asn1_item_embed_free() from being a static function to
being a private non-static function.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4579)
(cherry picked from commit 03996c19c30575c48b254f10625d24f86058605b)
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An embedded item wasn't allocated separately on the heap, so don't
free it as if it was.
Issue discovered by Pavel Kopyl
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4572)
(cherry picked from commit 590bbdfdf43b97abf8817f506f8ab46687d1eadd)
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c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING takes length as a long but uses it as an int. Check
bounds before doing so. Previously, excessively large inputs to the
function could write a single byte outside the target buffer. (This is
unreachable as asn1_ex_c2i already uses int for the length.)
Thanks to NCC for finding this issue. Fix written by Martin Kreichgauer.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4385)
(cherry picked from commit 6b1c8204b33aaedb7df7a009c241412839aaf950)
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This is a vestige from pre-1.1.0 OpenSSL
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4256)
(cherry picked from commit b379fe6cd046b9dd8a62309dcbaded763e2d4187)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3934)
(cherry picked from commit 386e9169c35718436ba038dff93711d2db73fa6a)
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Fixes #1526
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3360)
(cherry picked from commit 9bfeeef8ee2220339e601a028fa991c30d296ed4)
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crypto/asn1/a_strex.c: Type of width variable in asn1_valid_host
function needs to be changed from char to signed char to avoid
build error due to '-Werror=type-limits'.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <psteuer@mail.de>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CLA: trivial
(cherry picked from commit 34657a8da2ead453460d668771984432cc767044)
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ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME and ASN1_UTCTIME may be specified using offsets,
even though that's not supported within certificates.
To convert the offset time back to GMT, the offsets are supposed to be
subtracted, not added. e.g. 1759-0500 == 2359+0100 == 2259Z.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3335)
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"Next" refers to negative minimum "next" to one presentable by given
number of bytes. For example, -128 is negative minimum presentable by
one byte, and -256 is "next" one.
Thanks to Kazuki Yamaguchi for report, GH#3339
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1e93d619b78832834ae32f5c0c1b0e466267f72d)
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Trouble was that integer negation wasn't producing *formally* correct
result in platform-neutral sense. Formally correct thing to do is
-(int64_t)u, but this triggers undefined behaviour for one value that
would still be representable in ASN.1. The trigger was masked with
(int64_t)(0-u), but this is formally inappropriate for values other
than the problematic one. [Also reorder branches to favour most-likely
paths and harmonize asn1_string_set_int64 with asn1_get_int64].]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3231)
(cherry picked from commit 786b6a45fbecc068d0fb8b05252a9228e0661c63)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3192)
(cherry picked from commit b997adb3a518b065240e70acf38ec5f77a937f53)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3192)
(cherry picked from commit 6d4321fc242829490e1e7a36358eb12874c9b9e0)
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i.e. reduce amount of branches and favour likely ones.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3192)
(cherry picked from commit a3ea6bf0ef703b38a656245931979c7e53c410b7)
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EV Guidelines section 9.2.5 says jurisdictionCountryName follows the
same ASN.1 encoding rules as countryName.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3284)
(cherry picked from commit e8d542121b10158c1bdd5fbe02e0d17c59470cae)
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Fixes #3191
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3200)
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Also, when "allocating" or "deallocating" an embedded item, never call
prim_new() or prim_free(). Call prim_clear() instead.
Fixes #3191
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3200)
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Clearing a misunderstanding. The routines c2i_uint64_int() and
i2c_uint64_int() expect to receive that internal values are absolute
and with a separate sign flag, and the x_int64.c code handles values
that aren't absolute and have the sign bit embedded. We therefore
need to convert between absolute and non-absolute values for the
encoding of negative values to be correct.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3160)
(cherry picked from commit 429223d198aabacd129cf6dde5a4203b5af41737)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3159)
(cherry picked from commit 0856e3f167964f58c26796331eab9d8b0a883921)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3152)
(cherry picked from commit e128f891de71bbdba8391355af8d6d47d20b1969)
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PRIu64 is error-prone with BIO_printf, so introduce and stick to custom
platform-neutral macro. 'll' allows to print 64-bit values on *all*
supported platforms, but it's problematic with -Wformat -Werror. Hence
use 'l' in identifiable LP64 cases.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3148)
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Bug uncovered by test
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3120)
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Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding this.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3120)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3120)
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Also Z varieties.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3120)
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Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3066)
(cherry picked from commit a6ac1ed686346d2164c16446624c973e51d3ae92)
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