Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays.
Bug discovered and fixed by Miod Vallat from the OpenBSD team.
PR#3375
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This reverts commit def1490717c091c6ef669da9fc5ea4c8b2a4d776.
Incorrect attribution
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Allow CCS after finished has been sent by client: at this point
keys have been correctly set up so it is OK to accept CCS from
server. Without this renegotiation can sometimes fail.
PR#3400
(cherry picked from commit 99cd6a91fcb0931feaebbb4832681d40a66fad41)
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In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays.
PR#3375
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(Backported as a result of PR#3377 reported by Rainer Jung <rainer.jung@kippdata.de>)
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PR#3394
(cherry picked from commit 7a9d59c148b773f59a41f8697eeecf369a0974c2)
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The object file bn_lib.o is excluded from FIPS builds which causes
a linker error for BN_consttime_swap. So move definition from bn_lib.c
to bn_gf2m.c
This change is *only* needed for OpenSSL 0.9.8 which uses the 1.2
FIPS module.
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Check session_cert is not NULL before dereferencing it.
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Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to
crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion.
Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
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Return a fatal error if an attempt is made to use a zero length
master secret.
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Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.
Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
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A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
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PR#3286
(cherry picked from commit 71e95000afb2227fe5cac1c79ae884338bcd8d0b)
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PR: 2678
Submitted by: Annie Yousar
(cherry picked from commit d572544a2cccc9dad7afcef24de11232e5506c99)
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PR#3302
(cherry picked from commit 9717f01951f976f76dd40a38d9fc7307057fa4c4)
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(cherry picked from commit 3009244da47b989c4cc59ba02cf81a4e9d8f8431)
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Make sure there is an extra 4 bytes for server done message when
NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG is defined.
PR#3361
(cherry picked from commit 673c42b2380c34e7500f05e7f00c674cc677a065)
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(cherry picked from commit 989d87cb1a174a951efd829ff6b2f68a322f9df8)
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PR#3249
(cherry picked from commit 8909bf20269035d295743fca559207ef2eb84eb3)
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PR#3278
(cherry picked from commit de56fe797081fc09ebd1add06d6e2df42a324fd5)
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Use triple DES for certificate encryption if no-rc2 is
specified.
PR#3357
(cherry picked from commit 03b5b78c09fb10839a565f341cdc527c675e89ce)
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PR#3357
(cherry picked from commit ca3ffd9670f2b589bf8cc04923f953e06d6fbc58)
Conflicts:
doc/apps/smime.pod
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wrong branch
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PR: 3317
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If the key type does not match any CMS recipient type return
an error instead of using a random key (MMA mitigation). This
does not leak any useful information to an attacker.
PR#3348
(cherry picked from commit 83a3182e0560f76548f4378325393461f6275493)
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This patch resolves RT ticket #2608.
Thanks to Robert Dugal for originally spotting this, and to David
Ramos for noticing that the ball had been dropped.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
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The lazy-initialisation of BN_MONT_CTX was serialising all threads, as
noted by Daniel Sands and co at Sandia. This was to handle the case that
2 or more threads race to lazy-init the same context, but stunted all
scalability in the case where 2 or more threads are doing unrelated
things! We favour the latter case by punishing the former. The init work
gets done by each thread that finds the context to be uninitialised, and
we then lock the "set" logic after that work is done - the winning
thread's work gets used, the losing threads throw away what they've done.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
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PR#3289
PR#3345
(cherry picked from commit 3ba1e406c2309adb427ced9815ebf05f5b58d155)
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(cherry picked from commit 9c5d953a07f472452ae2cb578e39eddea2de2b9c)
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(cherry picked from commit 351f0a124bffaa94d2a8abdec2e7dde5ae9c457d)
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(cherry picked from commit 3143a332e8f2f5ca1a6f0262a1a1a66103f2adf7)
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Keep copy of any host, path and port values allocated by
OCSP_parse_url and free as necessary.
(cherry picked from commit 5219d3dd350cc74498dd49daef5e6ee8c34d9857)
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(cherry picked from commit 6cc0068430d0a4abdef0b466d422e6a4d154a5fe)
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Use bufsiz - 1 not BUFSIZ - 1 when prompting for a password in
the openssl utility.
Thanks to Rob Mackinnon, Leviathan Security for reporting this issue.
(cherry picked from commit 7ba08a4d73c1bdfd3aced09a628b1d7d7747cdca)
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