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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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The OTC voted today that the release branch for OpenSSL 3.0 should be
openssl-3.0 rather than openssl-3.0.x. The release script is changed
accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16481)
(cherry picked from commit 8e706c8ae5d6abf69b1b0aa0c4ab3517607522d0)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16534)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16533)
(cherry picked from commit 95a444c9adcad04035704ab3b5d749a185ef0960)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16528)
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6882652e65d39310c98ba506ceb55a87c702d419
CLA:trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16502)
(cherry picked from commit 6d55d27b2da7a84c9f4b872060be979b5f64af2c)
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9067cf6ccdce0a73922f06937e54c2fce2752038
CLA:trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16502)
(cherry picked from commit 48b3ad05680ba3e3668bcb6491bf4447033464ed)
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CLA:trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16502)
(cherry picked from commit b9f96f30eea550650a8d9f8000cea940c6ee8150)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16522)
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The text in CHANGES.md got fleshed out a bit more as well.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16522)
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This affects test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_scrypt.txt and
test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_kdf_scrypt.txt, where the "Out
of memory" stanza weren't up to the task, as they didn't hit the
default scrypt memory limit like they did in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
We solve this by setting the |n| value to the next power of two, and
correcting the expected result.
Fixes #16519
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16521)
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In one spot, files aren't properly closed, so the sub-process program
that's supposed to read them can't, because it's locked out.
In another spot, srctop_file() was used where srctop_dir() should be
used to properly format a directory specification.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16518)
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OpenVMS for x86_64 is currently out on a field test. Building
programs for it is currently done with cross compilation on Itanium.
The cross compilation tools are made available by running a script,
which makes cross-compilation variants of most commands available, and
adds the cross-compilation C compiler XCC.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16498)
(cherry picked from commit 6929c8fb5b46c9c2a383a7c212ee052e0dcef021)
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Fixes #16224
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16466)
(cherry picked from commit d4458e59f62b0d102069e53da41f1d5305a66912)
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Since EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo is a recognised structure, it's
reasonable to think that someone might want to specify it.
To be noted is that if someone specifies the structure PrivateKeyInfo
but has also passed a passphrase callback, the result will still
become a EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16466)
(cherry picked from commit 0195cdd28fde7d0897e368fdcd4e92509425faad)
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The protected tests need to specify the structure EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo
rather than PrivateKeyInfo, since that's the outermost structure.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16466)
(cherry picked from commit 602bfb8b98125f6745cd40dbc5fce9614ae5e418)
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When the user expects to load a certificate or a CRL through the
OSSL_STORE loading function, the 'file:' implementation sets the
corresponding structure names in the internal decoder context.
This is especially geared for PEM files, which often contain a mix of
objects, and password prompting should be avoided for objects that
need them, but aren't what the caller is looking for.
Fixes #16224
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16466)
(cherry picked from commit 821b3956ec698927281a5b29c55cd87eb7b2793d)
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The data structure wasn't given for recognised certificates or CRLs.
It's better, though, to specify it for those objects as well, so they
can be used to filter what actually gets decoded, which will be
helpful for our OSSL_STORE 'file:' scheme implementation.
Fixes #16224
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16466)
(cherry picked from commit 98408852c167d895a662dcda824fd5170cad3f7d)
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In a chain of decoders, the first that specifies an input structure
gets it compared with the structure specified by the user, if there is
one. If they aren't the same, that decoder is skipped.
Because the first structure can appear anywhere along a chain of
decoders, not just the decoders associated with the resulting OpenSSL
type, the code that checked the structure name when building up the
chain of decoders is removed.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16466)
(cherry picked from commit 73dd5d67c506cfeb9bf6183f0c19832c7d3f174d)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16495)
(cherry picked from commit d7b5f06ede163851d39f5a8b507bd0670deeaa21)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16495)
(cherry picked from commit 21a0d9f3edda78d27d12cd7704de9e32976393ba)
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If the internal operations dupctx() fails then a free is done (e.g. EVP_KEYEXCH_free()). If this is not set to NULL the EVP_PKEY_CTX_free() will do a double free.
This was found by testing kdf_dupctx() in kdf_exch.c (Note this always
fails since the internal KDF's do not have a dup method).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16495)
(cherry picked from commit 85407b77543a2d4330dbb40f6b8520ea0894a716)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16494)
(cherry picked from commit 6f2f59944826b5b7e033af438f5831493d0362c9)
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The x86_64 cross compiler says that 'unsigned long long' isn't the
same as 'unsigned __int64'. Sure, and considering that
providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c is specific VMS
only code, it's easy to just change the type to the exact same as
what's specified in the system headers.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16497)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16489)
(cherry picked from commit 1b9e467887d7852d79270c73cb88383c50460b0a)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16438)
(cherry picked from commit f92bfddc1d4c4957c57337d7f4192c586cc09a5c)
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Different tests may use unexpectedly different versions of perl,
depending on whether they hardcode the path to the perl executable or if
they resolve the path from the environment. This fixes it so that the
same perl is always used.
Fix some trailing whitespace and spelling mistakes as well.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16362)
(cherry picked from commit 473664aafdff1f60db99929bdd43c2a9b26d14cd)
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(kfreebsd-amd64, kfreebsd-i386). The error reported by the compiler
is:
../crypto/uid.c: In function 'OPENSSL_issetugid':
../crypto/uid.c:50:22: error: 'AT_SECURE' undeclared (first use in this function)
50 | return getauxval(AT_SECURE) != 0;
| ^~~~~~~~~
This commit changes the code to use the freebsd code in this case.
This fixes the compilation.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16477)
(cherry picked from commit 3a1fa0116a92235ba200228e4bb60d6a3a7f4113)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16443)
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We should not assume that the type of an ASN.1 value is UTF8String as
expected. We must actually check it, otherwise we could get a NULL ptr
deref, or worse memory errors.
Reported by David Benjamin.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16443)
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Fixes #16457
The ECDSA and DSA signature tests use Pairwise tests instead of KATS.
Note there is a seperate type used by the keygen for conditional Pairwise Tests.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16461)
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The child provider callbacks can hold the store lock. In order to avoid
deadlocks we require that the callback implementations don't themselves
call functions that may aquire those locks.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16469)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16469)
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The previous commit provided some guidelines and some rules for using
locking in order to avoid deadlocks. This commit refactors the code in
order to adhere to those guidelines and rules.
Fixes #16312
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16469)
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Provide some guidelines, as well as some rules for using the locks in
provider_core.c, in order to avoid the introduction of deadlocks.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16469)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16463)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16433)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16433)
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Fixes #16428
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16433)
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These algorithms were added to providers but have no const EVP_CIPHER*
mapping. Ciphers for SIV and CTS were previously only available via low level
function calls that are deprecated.
Reported by @reaperhulk.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16414)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16470)
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(readapted from 5c69c66a6972f84d56160c9ea4b30bab8fc2d3d4 by @bernd-edlinger)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16355)
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Some curves don't have an associated OID: for those we should not
default to `OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE` encoding of parameters and instead
set the ASN1 flag to `OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE`.
This is a follow-up to https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12312
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16355)
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These functions are part of the public API but we don't have tests
covering their usage.
They are actually implemented as macros and the absence of tests has
caused them to fall out-of-sync with the latest changes to ASN1 related
functions and cause compilation warnings.
This commit fixes the public headers to reflect these changes.
Fixes #12443
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16355)
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These functions are part of the public API but we don't have tests
covering their usage.
They are actually implemented as macros and the absence of tests has
caused them to fall out-of-sync with the latest changes to ASN1 related
functions and cause compilation warnings.
@@ Note: This commit limits to ECPKParameters as a type.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16355)
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This fixes the following error with gcc10 under strict ANSI conditions:
.../crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c:373:20: error: 'const struct in6_addr' has no member named 's6_addr32'
CLA: trivial
Fixes #16449
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16451)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16448)
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This test did not really execute, since usually
the OPENSSL_malloc(0) will fail and prevent the
execution of the KDF.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16444)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16436)
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