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-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_clnt.c18
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_enc.c6
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_pkt.c12
-rw-r--r--ssl/kssl.c3
-rw-r--r--ssl/kssl.h3
-rw-r--r--ssl/s2_pkt.c15
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_enc.c6
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl.h9
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_ciph.c3
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_locl.h2
10 files changed, 49 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index 58a3b46994..b709c3b9e9 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -906,7 +906,8 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
goto err;
}
- /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+ /*-
+ * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
**
** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
@@ -952,12 +953,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
goto err;
- /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
- ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
- ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
- ** kssl_ctx->length);
- ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
- */
+ /*-
+ * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
+ * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+ * kssl_ctx->length);
+ * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+ */
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
@@ -1060,7 +1062,7 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
- /*
+ /*-
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
l2n3(n,d);
l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
diff --git a/ssl/d1_enc.c b/ssl/d1_enc.c
index f0c446dedd..f637830913 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -126,14 +126,16 @@
#include <openssl/des.h>
#endif
-/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+/*-
+ * dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* short etc).
* 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
* -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
- * an internal error occured. */
+ * an internal error occured.
+ */
int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index ae888d966c..02d062a2e5 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -364,10 +364,12 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
rr->data=rr->input;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
- /* enc_err is:
+ /*-
+ * enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
- * -1: if the padding is invalid */
+ * -1: if the padding is invalid
+ */
if (enc_err == 0)
{
/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
@@ -919,9 +921,11 @@ start:
}
}
- /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ /*-
+ * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
- * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
+ * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
+ */
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
if ((!s->server) &&
diff --git a/ssl/kssl.c b/ssl/kssl.c
index cdd0ae09bb..d57f000825 100644
--- a/ssl/kssl.c
+++ b/ssl/kssl.c
@@ -1300,7 +1300,8 @@ kssl_TKT2tkt( /* IN */ krb5_context krb5context,
}
-/* Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"),
+/*-
+ * Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"),
* and krb5 AP_REQ message & message length,
* Return Kerberos session key and client principle
* to SSL Server in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx.
diff --git a/ssl/kssl.h b/ssl/kssl.h
index c7e16a5a95..4cab3146e9 100644
--- a/ssl/kssl.h
+++ b/ssl/kssl.h
@@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ typedef unsigned char krb5_octet;
#endif
-/* Uncomment this to debug kssl problems or
+/*-
+ * Uncomment this to debug kssl problems or
* to trace usage of the Kerberos session key
*
* #define KSSL_DEBUG
diff --git a/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/ssl/s2_pkt.c
index 7387d8b7c5..9527504939 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -561,16 +561,20 @@ static int do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
}
else if ((bs <= 1) && (!s->s2->escape))
{
- /* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus
- * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER */
+ /*-
+ * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus
+ * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
+ */
s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
p=0;
}
else /* we may have to use a 3 byte header */
{
- /* If s->s2->escape is not set, then
+ /*-
+ * If s->s2->escape is not set, then
* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, and thus
- * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER. */
+ * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER.
+ */
p=(j%bs);
p=(p == 0)?0:(bs-p);
if (s->s2->escape)
@@ -584,7 +588,8 @@ static int do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
}
}
- /* Now
+ /*-
+ * Now
* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
* holds, and if s->s2->three_byte_header is set, then even
* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER.
diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index f4391ec394..03951a655b 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -433,7 +433,8 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
}
-/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+/*-
+ * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
@@ -619,7 +620,8 @@ int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
* data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
* timing-oracle. */
- /* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
+ /*-
+ * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
* 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
*
* With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index ec604a930e..035322738d 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -198,7 +198,8 @@ extern "C" {
#endif
/* SSLeay version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */
-/* Version 0 - initial version
+/*-
+ * Version 0 - initial version
* Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate
*/
#define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001
@@ -1134,10 +1135,12 @@ extern "C" {
#define SSL_ST_READ_BODY 0xF1
#define SSL_ST_READ_DONE 0xF2
-/* Obtain latest Finished message
+/*-
+ * Obtain latest Finished message
* -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished)
* -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished).
- * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes. */
+ * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes.
+ */
size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index c364c142c7..bef847b92b 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -885,7 +885,8 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
if (!found)
break; /* ignore this entry */
- /* New algorithms:
+ /*-
+ * New algorithms:
* 1 - any old restrictions apply outside new mask
* 2 - any new restrictions apply outside old mask
* 3 - enforce old & new where masks intersect
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index a06e81c5c2..dd5c4ac012 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@
* SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN
*/
-/*
+/*-
#define CERT_INVALID 0
#define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY 1
#define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-08-23 10:59:22 +0000