diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/statem/statem_lib.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/statem/statem_lib.c | 111 |
1 files changed, 91 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c index 87ce280847..f57f33c4a5 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -43,12 +43,15 @@ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll * ignore the result anyway + * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ - if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, - (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - written)) - return -1; - + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, + (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + written)) + return -1; if (written == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, @@ -504,7 +507,7 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) size_t slen; /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ - if (!s->server) + if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; /* @@ -741,8 +744,14 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ - if (s->server) - s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + if (s->server) { + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } /* * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the @@ -801,7 +810,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (s->server) { - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && + !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; @@ -1021,6 +1031,10 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) s->init_num = 0; } + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server + && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; + if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; @@ -1237,18 +1251,24 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) /* * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of * processing the message + * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished + * message. */ #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO - || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - || memcmp(hrrrandom, - s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { - if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, - s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - /* SSLfatal() already called */ - *len = 0; - return 0; + /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET + && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO + || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + || memcmp(hrrrandom, + s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } } } if (s->msg_callback) @@ -2208,3 +2228,54 @@ size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, *ptbs = tbs; return tbslen; } + +/* + * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, + * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once + */ +int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + + s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, + s->s3->handshake_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest + * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request + */ +int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, + s->pha_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} |