diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/statem/statem_lib.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/statem/statem_lib.c | 712 |
1 files changed, 712 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..75d151e5e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -0,0 +1,712 @@ +/* ssl/statem/statem_lib.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. + */ + +#include <limits.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> + +/* + * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or + * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) + */ +int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) +{ + int ret; + + ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + s->init_num); + if (ret < 0) + return (-1); + if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) + /* + * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll + * ignore the result anyway + */ + ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + ret); + + if (ret == s->init_num) { + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, + (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + return (1); + } + s->init_off += ret; + s->init_num -= ret; + return (0); +} + +int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) +{ + unsigned char *p; + int i; + unsigned long l; + + p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, + sender, slen, + s->s3->tmp.finish_md); + if (i <= 0) + return 0; + s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; + memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); + l = i; + + /* + * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks + */ + if (!s->server) { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; + } else { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; + } + + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +/* + * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen + * to far. + */ +static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) +{ + const char *sender; + int slen; + /* + * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set + * the appropriate error. + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) + return; + if (!s->server) { + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; + } else { + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; + } + + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, + sender, + slen, + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); +} +#endif + +enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + int al; + long remain; + + remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); + /* + * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have + * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, + * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER + && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) + || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER + && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + goto f_err; + } + } else { + if (remain != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + goto f_err; + } + } + + /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + goto f_err; + } + + s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; + if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); + + if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* + * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of + * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no + * SCTP is used + */ + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); +#endif + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + statem_set_error(s); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + int al, i; + + /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); + goto f_err; + } + s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; + + i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; + + if (i < 0 || (unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks + */ + if (s->server) { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; + } else { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + statem_set_error(s); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *p; + + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + *p = SSL3_MT_CCS; + s->init_num = 1; + s->init_off = 0; + + return 1; +} + +unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) +{ + unsigned char *p; + unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); + + if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) + return 0; + + l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); + p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + l2n3(l, p); + l += 3; + + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); +} + +enum WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst) +{ + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { + enum WORK_STATE ret; + ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); + if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) + return ret; + } +#endif + + /* clean a few things up */ + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); + + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* + * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf + * in case there are any unexpected retransmits + */ + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + s->init_buf = NULL; + } + + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); + + s->init_num = 0; + + if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { + /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ + s->renegotiate = 0; + s->new_session = 0; + + if (s->server) { + s->renegotiate = 0; + s->new_session = 0; + + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; + s->handshake_func = statem_accept; + } else { + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + if (s->hit) + s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; + + s->handshake_func = statem_connect; + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; + } + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* done with handshaking */ + s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; + s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; + s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; + } + } + + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; +} + +int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) +{ + /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ + int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned long l; + + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + do { + while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { + i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, + &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, 0); + if (i <= 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + return 0; + } + if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + s->init_num = i - 1; + s->s3->tmp.message_size = i; + return 1; + } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + goto f_err; + } + s->init_num += i; + } + + skip_message = 0; + if (!s->server) + if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) + /* + * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- + * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if + * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' + * MAC. + */ + if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { + s->init_num = 0; + skip_message = 1; + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + } + } while (skip_message); + /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ + + *mt = *p; + s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); + + if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { + /* + * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible + * ClientHello + */ + /* + * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read + * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read + */ + l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) + + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; + + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; + s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + } else { + n2l3(p, l); + /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ + if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + goto f_err; + } + if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, + (int)l + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; + + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + s->init_num = 0; + } + + return 1; + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + return 0; +} + +int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) +{ + long n; + unsigned char *p; + int i; + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* We've already read everything in */ + *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; + return 1; + } + + p = s->init_msg; + n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; + while (n > 0) { + i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, + &p[s->init_num], n, 0); + if (i <= 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + *len = 0; + return 0; + } + s->init_num += i; + n -= i; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + /* + * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for + * Finished verification. + */ + if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) + ssl3_take_mac(s); +#endif + + /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ + if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { + ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, + (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + } else { + ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, + (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + } + + /* + * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared + * unsigned + */ + if (s->init_num < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *len = 0; + return 0; + } + *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; + return 1; +} + +int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pk; + int ret = -1, i; + + if (pkey == NULL) + pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); + else + pk = pkey; + if (pk == NULL) + goto err; + + i = pk->type; + if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + ret = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; + } else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { + ret = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC) { + ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } +#endif + else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { + ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01; + } else if (x && (i == EVP_PKEY_DH || i == EVP_PKEY_DHX)) { + /* + * For DH two cases: DH certificate signed with RSA and DH + * certificate signed with DSA. + */ + i = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); + if (i & EVP_PKS_RSA) + ret = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; + else if (i & EVP_PKS_DSA) + ret = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; + } + + err: + if (!pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + return (ret); +} + +int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) +{ + int al; + + switch (type) { + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: + al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: + case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: + al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: + al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: + case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: + case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: + case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: + al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + break; + case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: + al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; + break; + default: + al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; + break; + } + return (al); +} + +int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) + return 0; + return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); +} |