diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/ssl_sess.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_sess.c | 1737 |
1 files changed, 864 insertions, 873 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 52bf5464a1..24f2670dfd 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -5,21 +5,21 @@ * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * + * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * + * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * + * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: @@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. - * + * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in @@ -139,300 +139,283 @@ #include <openssl/lhash.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -#include <openssl/engine.h> +# include <openssl/engine.h> #endif #include "ssl_locl.h" static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); -static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s); +static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) /* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */ - { - return(ssl->session); - } +{ + return (ssl->session); +} SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) /* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */ - { - SSL_SESSION *sess; - /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that - * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's - * non-null and when we up the reference count. */ - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); - sess = ssl->session; - if(sess) - sess->references++; - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); - return(sess); - } - -int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, - CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) - { - return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp, - new_func, dup_func, free_func); - } +{ + SSL_SESSION *sess; + /* + * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that + * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null + * and when we up the reference count. + */ + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + sess = ssl->session; + if (sess) + sess->references++; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + return (sess); +} + +int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) +{ + return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp, + new_func, dup_func, free_func); +} int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) - { - return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); - } +{ + return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); +} void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) - { - return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); - } +{ + return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); +} SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) - { - SSL_SESSION *ss; - - ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); - if (ss == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return(0); - } - memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); - - ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */ - ss->references=1; - ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */ - ss->time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); - ss->prev=NULL; - ss->next=NULL; - ss->compress_meth=0; +{ + SSL_SESSION *ss; + + ss = (SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + if (ss == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + memset(ss, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + + ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */ + ss->references = 1; + ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */ + ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); + ss->prev = NULL; + ss->next = NULL; + ss->compress_meth = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; - ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; - ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL; -#endif + ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL; +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; + ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; + ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; + ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL; +# endif #endif - CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - ss->psk_identity_hint=NULL; - ss->psk_identity=NULL; + ss->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + ss->psk_identity = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - ss->srp_username=NULL; + ss->srp_username = NULL; #endif - return(ss); - } + return (ss); +} -const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) - { - if(len) - *len = s->session_id_length; - return s->session_id; - } +const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, + unsigned int *len) +{ + if (len) + *len = s->session_id_length; + return s->session_id; +} unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s) - { - return s->compress_meth; - } - -/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1 - * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly - * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much - * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations - * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call - * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly - * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might - * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */ +{ + return s->compress_meth; +} + +/* + * Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. + * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random + * gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one + * iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it + * takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a + * reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or + * someone is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL + * sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps + * a more interesting question ... + */ #define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, - unsigned int *id_len) + unsigned int *id_len) { - unsigned int retry = 0; - do - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) - return 0; - while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && - (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)); - if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS) - return 1; - /* else - woops a session_id match */ - /* XXX We should also check the external cache -- - * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and - * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions - * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means - * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists - * and make a reservation for it if it does not - * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well). - */ - return 0; + unsigned int retry = 0; + do + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) + return 0; + while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && + (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ; + if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS) + return 1; + /* else - woops a session_id match */ + /* + * XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of + * a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent + * creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have + * means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make + * a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the + * internal cache as well). + */ + return 0; } int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) - { - /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ - - unsigned int tmp; - SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL; - GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; - - if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0); - - /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */ - if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0) - ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s); - else - ss->timeout=s->session_ctx->session_timeout; - - if (s->session != NULL) - { - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); - s->session=NULL; - } - - if (session) - { - if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) - { - ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION; - ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; - } - else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) - { - ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION; - ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; - } - else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) - { - ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION; - ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; - } - else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) - { - ss->ssl_version=TLS1_1_VERSION; - ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; - } - else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - ss->ssl_version=TLS1_2_VERSION; - ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; - } - else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { - ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_BAD_VER; - ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; - } - else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) - { - ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_VERSION; - ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; - } - else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) - { - ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_2_VERSION; - ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; - } - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); - SSL_SESSION_free(ss); - return(0); - } +{ + /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ + + unsigned int tmp; + SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL; + GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; + + if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */ + if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0) + ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s); + else + ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout; + + if (s->session != NULL) { + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = NULL; + } + + if (session) { + if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = SSL2_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = SSL3_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = TLS1_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { + ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_BAD_VER; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return (0); + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /*- - * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server). - * Note that: - * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the - * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket. - * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls - * ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello(). - * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions, - * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows - * whether a ticket is expected or not. - * - * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing - * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session - * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop. - */ - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - { - ss->session_id_length = 0; - goto sess_id_done; - } + /*- + * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server). + * Note that: + * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the + * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket. + * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls + * ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello(). + * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions, + * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows + * whether a ticket is expected or not. + * + * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing + * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session + * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop. + */ + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + ss->session_id_length = 0; + goto sess_id_done; + } #endif - /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - if(s->generate_session_id) - cb = s->generate_session_id; - else if(s->session_ctx->generate_session_id) - cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id; - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - /* Choose a session ID */ - tmp = ss->session_id_length; - if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) - { - /* The callback failed */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, - SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); - SSL_SESSION_free(ss); - return(0); - } - /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. - * nor set it higher than it was. */ - if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) - { - /* The callback set an illegal length */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, - SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); - SSL_SESSION_free(ss); - return(0); - } - /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */ - if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)) - memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp); - else - ss->session_id_length = tmp; - /* Finally, check for a conflict */ - if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, - ss->session_id_length)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, - SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); - SSL_SESSION_free(ss); - return(0); - } + /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + if (s->generate_session_id) + cb = s->generate_session_id; + else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id) + cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id; + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + /* Choose a session ID */ + tmp = ss->session_id_length; + if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) { + /* The callback failed */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return (0); + } + /* + * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor + * set it higher than it was. + */ + if (!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) { + /* The callback set an illegal length */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return (0); + } + /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */ + if ((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)) + memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp); + else + ss->session_id_length = tmp; + /* Finally, check for a conflict */ + if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, + ss->session_id_length)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return (0); + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - sess_id_done: - if (s->tlsext_hostname) { - ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); - if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSL_SESSION_free(ss); - return 0; - } - } + sess_id_done: + if (s->tlsext_hostname) { + ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); + if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + } #endif - } - else - { - ss->session_id_length=0; - } - - if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSL_SESSION_free(ss); - return 0; - } - memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length); - ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length; - s->session=ss; - ss->ssl_version=s->version; - ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK; - - return(1); - } + } else { + ss->session_id_length = 0; + } + + if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); + ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; + s->session = ss; + ss->ssl_version = s->version; + ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK; + + return (1); +} /*- * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this @@ -455,704 +438,712 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise). */ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, - const unsigned char *limit) - { - /* This is used only by servers. */ + const unsigned char *limit) +{ + /* This is used only by servers. */ - SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL; - int fatal = 0; - int try_session_cache = 1; + SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL; + int fatal = 0; + int try_session_cache = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - int r; + int r; #endif - if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) - goto err; + if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) + goto err; - if (len == 0) - try_session_cache = 0; + if (len == 0) + try_session_cache = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */ - r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret); - switch (r) - { - case -1: /* Error during processing */ - fatal = 1; - goto err; - case 0: /* No ticket found */ - case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */ - break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */ - case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */ - case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */ - try_session_cache = 0; - break; - default: - abort(); - } + /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */ + r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret); + switch (r) { + case -1: /* Error during processing */ + fatal = 1; + goto err; + case 0: /* No ticket found */ + case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */ + break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */ + case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */ + case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */ + try_session_cache = 0; + break; + default: + abort(); + } #endif - if (try_session_cache && - ret == NULL && - !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) - { - SSL_SESSION data; - data.ssl_version=s->version; - data.session_id_length=len; - if (len == 0) - return 0; - memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len); - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - ret=lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions,&data); - if (ret != NULL) - { - /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */ - CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); - } - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - if (ret == NULL) - s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++; - } - - if (try_session_cache && - ret == NULL && - s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) - { - int copy=1; - - if ((ret=s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,©))) - { - s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++; - - /* Increment reference count now if the session callback - * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures - * returned by the callback are shared between threads, - * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], - * or things won't be thread-safe). */ - if (copy) - CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); - - /* Add the externally cached session to the internal - * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */ - if(!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) - /* The following should not return 1, otherwise, - * things are very strange */ - SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,ret); - } - } - - if (ret == NULL) - goto err; - - /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */ - - if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length - || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length)) - { - /* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't - * want to use it in this context. */ - goto err; /* treat like cache miss */ - } - - if((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) - { - /* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of - * context, which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. - * The application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. - * - * For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating - * the event like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for - * applications to effectively disable the session cache by - * accident without anyone noticing). - */ - - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); - fatal = 1; - goto err; - } - - if (ret->cipher == NULL) - { - unsigned char buf[5],*p; - unsigned long l; - - p=buf; - l=ret->cipher_id; - l2n(l,p); - if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) - ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2])); - else - ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1])); - if (ret->cipher == NULL) - goto err; - } - - if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) /* timeout */ - { - s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++; - if (try_session_cache) - { - /* session was from the cache, so remove it */ - SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx,ret); - } - goto err; - } - - s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++; - - if (s->session != NULL) - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); - s->session=ret; - s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; - return 1; + if (try_session_cache && + ret == NULL && + !(s-> + session_ctx->session_cache_mode & + SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) { + SSL_SESSION data; + data.ssl_version = s->version; + data.session_id_length = len; + if (len == 0) + return 0; + memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, len); + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data); + if (ret != NULL) { + /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */ + CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + } + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + if (ret == NULL) + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++; + } + + if (try_session_cache && + ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) { + int copy = 1; + + if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id, len, ©))) { + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++; + + /* + * Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us + * to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the + * callback are shared between threads, it must handle the + * reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be + * thread-safe). + */ + if (copy) + CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + + /* + * Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as + * well if and only if we are supposed to. + */ + if (! + (s-> + session_ctx->session_cache_mode & + SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) + /* + * The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are + * very strange + */ + SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret); + } + } + + if (ret == NULL) + goto err; + + /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */ + + if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length + || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) { + /* + * We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to + * use it in this context. + */ + goto err; /* treat like cache miss */ + } + + if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) { + /* + * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context, + * which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application + * should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error + * case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a + * cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to + * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone + * noticing). + */ + + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION, + SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); + fatal = 1; + goto err; + } + + if (ret->cipher == NULL) { + unsigned char buf[5], *p; + unsigned long l; + + p = buf; + l = ret->cipher_id; + l2n(l, p); + if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) + ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2])); + else + ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1])); + if (ret->cipher == NULL) + goto err; + } + + if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */ + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++; + if (try_session_cache) { + /* session was from the cache, so remove it */ + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret); + } + goto err; + } + + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++; + + if (s->session != NULL) + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = ret; + s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; + return 1; err: - if (ret != NULL) - { - SSL_SESSION_free(ret); + if (ret != NULL) { + SSL_SESSION_free(ret); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (!try_session_cache) - { - /* The session was from a ticket, so we should - * issue a ticket for the new session */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - } + if (!try_session_cache) { + /* + * The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for + * the new session + */ + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + } #endif - } - if (fatal) - return -1; - else - return 0; - } + } + if (fatal) + return -1; + else + return 0; +} int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) - { - int ret=0; - SSL_SESSION *s; - - /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache - * even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a - * doubly linked list and an lhash */ - CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); - /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */ - - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - s=lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions,c); - - /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. - * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify - * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */ - if (s != NULL && s != c) - { - /* We *are* in trouble ... */ - SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s); - SSL_SESSION_free(s); - /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache - * (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical - * session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when - * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external - * cache) */ - s = NULL; - } - - /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */ - if (s == NULL) - SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c); - - if (s != NULL) - { - /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference - * count because it already takes into account the cache */ - - SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */ - ret=0; - } - else - { - /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */ - - ret=1; - - if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) - { - while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > - SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) - { - if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, - ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) - break; - else - ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++; - } - } - } - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - return(ret); - } +{ + int ret = 0; + SSL_SESSION *s; + + /* + * add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though + * it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and + * an lhash + */ + CRYPTO_add(&c->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + /* + * if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later + */ + + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c); + + /* + * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this + * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify + * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. + */ + if (s != NULL && s != c) { + /* We *are* in trouble ... */ + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); + SSL_SESSION_free(s); + /* + * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot + * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the + * same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently + * obtain the same session from an external cache) |