diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/s3_srvr.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_srvr.c | 6551 |
1 files changed, 3189 insertions, 3362 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 5ec671a7bc..f77c4c6c07 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -5,21 +5,21 @@ * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * + * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * + * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * + * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: @@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. - * + * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source @@ -162,11 +162,11 @@ #include <openssl/hmac.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -#include <openssl/dh.h> +# include <openssl/dh.h> #endif #include <openssl/bn.h> #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> +# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> #endif #include <openssl/md5.h> @@ -174,3543 +174,3370 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) - { - if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) - return(SSLv3_server_method()); - else - return(NULL); - } +{ + if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) + return (SSLv3_server_method()); + else + return (NULL); +} IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, - ssl3_accept, - ssl_undefined_function, - ssl3_get_server_method) + ssl3_accept, + ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) - { - int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; - - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - - if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && - (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) - { - if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) - { - /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, - we do so if There is no srp login name */ - ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; - } - else - { - ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al); - } - } - return ret; - } +{ + int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; + + *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + + if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && + (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { + if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { + /* + * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp + * login name + */ + ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; + *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; + } else { + ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); + } + } + return ret; +} #endif int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) - { - BUF_MEM *buf; - unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; - int ret= -1; - int new_state,state,skip=0; - - RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); - ERR_clear_error(); - clear_sys_error(); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->ctx->info_callback; - - /* init things to blank */ - s->in_handshake++; - if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); - - if (s->cert == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); - return(-1); - } - +{ + BUF_MEM *buf; + unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + int ret = -1; + int new_state, state, skip = 0; + + RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); + ERR_clear_error(); + clear_sys_error(); + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + + /* init things to blank */ + s->in_handshake++; + if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) + SSL_clear(s); + + if (s->cert == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); + return (-1); + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we - * already got and don't await it anymore, because - * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. - */ - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) - { - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; - s->tlsext_hb_seq++; - } + /* + * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and + * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during + * handshakes anyway. + */ + if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { + s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; + s->tlsext_hb_seq++; + } #endif - for (;;) - { - state=s->state; - - switch (s->state) - { - case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: - s->renegotiate=1; - /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ - - case SSL_ST_BEFORE: - case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - - s->server=1; - if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); - - if ((s->version>>8) != 3) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, - s->version, NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); - return -1; - } - - s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; - - if (s->init_buf == NULL) - { - if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) - { - BUF_MEM_free(buf); - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - s->init_buf=buf; - } - - if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - - s->init_num=0; - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; - s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */ - s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - - if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) - { - /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that - * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) - */ - if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } - - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; - } - else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) - { - /* Server attempting to renegotiate with - * client that doesn't support secure - * renegotiation. - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - else - { - /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, - * we will just send a HelloRequest */ - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: - - s->shutdown=0; - ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->init_num=0; - - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: - s->state=SSL_ST_OK; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: - - ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; + for (;;) { + state = s->state; + + switch (s->state) { + case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: + s->renegotiate = 1; + /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ + + case SSL_ST_BEFORE: + case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + + s->server = 1; + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); + + if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); + return -1; + } + + s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; + + if (s->init_buf == NULL) { + if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { + BUF_MEM_free(buf); + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + s->init_buf = buf; + } + + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + + s->init_num = 0; + s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + /* + * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. + */ + s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; + + if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { + /* + * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the + * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) + */ + if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; + } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && + !(s->options & + SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { + /* + * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't + * support secure renegotiation. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ret = -1; + goto end; + } else { + /* + * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a + * HelloRequest + */ + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: + + s->shutdown = 0; + ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + s->init_num = 0; + + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: + s->state = SSL_ST_OK; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: + + ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: - { - int al; - if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0) - { - /* callback indicates firther work to be done */ - s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - goto end; - } - if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - /* This is not really an error but the only means to - for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ - if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - } -#endif - - s->renegotiate = 2; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: - ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: + { + int al; + if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { + /* + * callback indicates firther work to be done + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + goto end; + } + if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + /* + * This is not really an error but the only means to for + * a client to detect whether srp is supported. + */ + if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + } +#endif + + s->renegotiate = 2; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: + ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->hit) - { - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - } + if (s->hit) { + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + } #else - if (s->hit) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + if (s->hit) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; #endif - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: - /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ - /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP)) - && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) - { - ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: + /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ + /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ + if (! + (s->s3->tmp. + new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | + SSL_aSRP)) +&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { + ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - } - else - { - skip = 1; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - } + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } else { + skip = 1; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } #else - } - else - skip=1; + } else + skip = 1; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; #endif - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - - /* - * clear this, it may get reset by - * send_server_key_exchange - */ - s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; - - - /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or - * RSA but we have a sign only certificate - * - * PSK: may send PSK identity hints - * - * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange - * message only if the cipher suite is either - * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the - * server certificate contains the server's - * public key for key exchange. - */ - if (0 - /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity - * hint if provided */ + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + + /* + * clear this, it may get reset by + * send_server_key_exchange + */ + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; + + /* + * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a + * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For + * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if + * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, + * the server certificate contains the server's public key for + * key exchange. + */ + if (0 + /* + * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if + * provided + */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) + || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ - || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) + /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ + || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) #endif - || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) - || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) - || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL - || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) - && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) - ) - ) - ) - ) - { - ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - } - else - skip=1; - - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: - if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ - !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || - /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, - * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ - ((s->session->peer != NULL) && - (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || - /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites - * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts - * and in RFC 2246): */ - ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && - /* ... except when the application insists on verification - * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ - !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || - /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || - /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) - /* With normal PSK Certificates and - * Certificate Requests are omitted */ - || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) - { - /* no cert request */ - skip=1; - s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - return -1; - } - else - { - s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; - ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; + || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) + || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) + || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) + && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL + || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) + && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert-> + pkeys + [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * + 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) + ) + ) + ) + ) { + ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + } else + skip = 1; + + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: + if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ + !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || + /* + * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert + * during re-negotiation: + */ + ((s->session->peer != NULL) && + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || + /* + * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see + * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in + * RFC 2246): + */ + ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && + /* + * ... except when the application insists on + * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts + * this for SSL 3) + */ + !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || + /* + * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites + */ + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || + /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) + /* + * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests + * are omitted + */ + || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { + /* no cert request */ + skip = 1; + s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; + } else { + s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; + ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; #else - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; #endif - s->init_num=0; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: - ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: - - /* This code originally checked to see if - * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO - * and then flushed. This caused problems - * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed - * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue - * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING - * still exist. So instead we just flush - * unconditionally. - */ - - s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; - if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - - s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) - { - ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - } - s->init_num=0; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (ret == 2) - { - /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when - * the client sends its ECDH pub key in - * a certificate, the CertificateVerify - * message is not sent. - * Also for GOST ciphersuites when - * the client uses its key from the certificate - * for key exchange. - */ + s->init_num = 0; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: + ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: + + /* + * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending + * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as + * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely + * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of + * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush + * unconditionally. + */ + + s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; + if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + + s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { + ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + } + s->init_num = 0; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: + ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + if (ret == 2) { + /* + * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH + * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is + * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses + * its key from the certificate for key exchange. + */ #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #else - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #endif - s->init_num = 0; - } - else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; - s->init_num=0; - if (!s->session->peer) - break; - /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer - * at this point and digest cached records. - */ - if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - return -1; - } - else - { - int offset=0; - int dgst_num; - - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; - s->init_num=0; - - /* We need to get hashes here so if there is - * a client cert, it can be verified - * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify - * should be generalized. But it is next step - */ - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - return -1; - for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++) - if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) - { - int dgst_size; - - s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); - dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); - if (dgst_size < 0) - { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - offset+=dgst_size; - } - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: - /* - * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be - * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need - * to set this here because we don't know if we're - * expecting a CertificateVerify or not. - */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - /* we should decide if we expected this one */ - ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num = 0; + } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; + s->init_num = 0; + if (!s->session->peer) + break; + /* + * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and + * digest cached records. + */ + if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; + } else { + int offset = 0; + int dgst_num; + + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; + s->init_num = 0; + + /* + * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, + * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for + * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next + * step + */ + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; + for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) + if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { + int dgst_size; + + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, + EVP_MD_CTX_type + (s-> + s3->handshake_dgst + [dgst_num]), + &(s->s3-> + tmp.cert_verify_md + [offset])); + |