diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c | 594 |
1 files changed, 594 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8c4648106f --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c @@ -0,0 +1,594 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* + * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for + * internal use. + */ +#include "internal/deprecated.h" + +#include <string.h> /* memcpy */ +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h> +#include <openssl/core_names.h> +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#include <openssl/params.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/proverr.h> +#include "internal/nelem.h" +#include "internal/sizes.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "prov/providercommon.h" +#include "prov/implementations.h" +#include "prov/provider_ctx.h" +#include "prov/securitycheck.h" +#include "crypto/ec.h" +#include "prov/der_ec.h" + +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn ecdsa_newctx; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn ecdsa_sign_init; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn ecdsa_verify_init; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn ecdsa_sign; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn ecdsa_verify; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn ecdsa_digest_sign_init; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_update; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn ecdsa_digest_sign_final; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_init; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_update; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_final; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn ecdsa_freectx; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn ecdsa_dupctx; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_get_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_set_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_settable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_get_ctx_md_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_gettable_ctx_md_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_set_ctx_md_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params; + +/* + * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface. + * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes DSA structures, so + * we use that here too. + */ + +typedef struct { + OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx; + char *propq; + EC_KEY *ec; + char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; + + /* + * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0) + * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify + * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again + * by their Final function. + */ + unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1; + + /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */ + unsigned char aid_buf[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE]; + unsigned char *aid; + size_t aid_len; + size_t mdsize; + int operation; + + EVP_MD *md; + EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx; + /* + * Internally used to cache the results of calling the EC group + * sign_setup() methods which are then passed to the sign operation. + * This is used by CAVS failure tests to terminate a loop if the signature + * is not valid. + * This could of also been done with a simple flag. + */ + BIGNUM *kinv; + BIGNUM *r; +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) + /* + * This indicates that KAT (CAVS) test is running. Externally an app will + * override the random callback such that the generated private key and k + * are known. + * Normal operation will loop to choose a new k if the signature is not + * valid - but for this mode of operation it forces a failure instead. + */ + unsigned int kattest; +#endif +} PROV_ECDSA_CTX; + +static void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return NULL; + + ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_ECDSA_CTX)); + if (ctx == NULL) + return NULL; + + ctx->flag_allow_md = 1; + ctx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx); + if (propq != NULL && (ctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(ctx); + ctx = NULL; + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + } + return ctx; +} + +static int ecdsa_signverify_init(void *vctx, void *ec, + const OSSL_PARAM params[], int operation) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running() + || ctx == NULL + || ec == NULL + || !EC_KEY_up_ref(ec)) + return 0; + EC_KEY_free(ctx->ec); + ctx->ec = ec; + ctx->operation = operation; + if (!ecdsa_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)) + return 0; + return ossl_ec_check_key(ctx->libctx, ec, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); +} + +static int ecdsa_sign_init(void *vctx, void *ec, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + return ecdsa_signverify_init(vctx, ec, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); +} + +static int ecdsa_verify_init(void *vctx, void *ec, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + return ecdsa_signverify_init(vctx, ec, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY); +} + +static int ecdsa_sign(void *vctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + int ret; + unsigned int sltmp; + size_t ecsize = ECDSA_size(ctx->ec); + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return 0; + + if (sig == NULL) { + *siglen = ecsize; + return 1; + } + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) + if (ctx->kattest && !ECDSA_sign_setup(ctx->ec, NULL, &ctx->kinv, &ctx->r)) + return 0; +#endif + + if (sigsize < (size_t)ecsize) + return 0; + + if (ctx->mdsize != 0 && tbslen != ctx->mdsize) + return 0; + + ret = ECDSA_sign_ex(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ctx->kinv, ctx->r, ctx->ec); + if (ret <= 0) + return 0; + + *siglen = sltmp; + return 1; +} + +static int ecdsa_verify(void *vctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || (ctx->mdsize != 0 && tbslen != ctx->mdsize)) + return 0; + + return ECDSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ctx->ec); +} + +static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, + const char *mdprops) +{ + EVP_MD *md = NULL; + size_t mdname_len; + int md_nid, sha1_allowed; + WPACKET pkt; + + if (mdname == NULL) + return 1; + + mdname_len = strlen(mdname); + if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) { + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, + "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname); + return 0; + } + if (mdprops == NULL) + mdprops = ctx->propq; + md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops); + if (md == NULL) { + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, + "%s could not be fetched", mdname); + return 0; + } + sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); + md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md, + sha1_allowed); + if (md_nid == NID_undef) { + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED, + "digest=%s", mdname); + EVP_MD_free(md); + return 0; + } + + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); + EVP_MD_free(ctx->md); + + ctx->aid_len = 0; + if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf)) + && ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_ECDSA_with_MD(&pkt, -1, ctx->ec, + md_nid) + && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { + WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len); + ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt); + } + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + ctx->mdctx = NULL; + ctx->md = md; + ctx->mdsize = EVP_MD_size(ctx->md); + OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname)); + + return 1; +} + +static int ecdsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vctx, const char *mdname, + void *ec, const OSSL_PARAM params[], + int operation) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return 0; + + ctx->flag_allow_md = 0; + if (!ecdsa_signverify_init(vctx, ec, params, operation) + || !ecdsa_setup_md(ctx, mdname, NULL)) + return 0; + + ctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (ctx->mdctx == NULL) + goto error; + + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex2(ctx->mdctx, ctx->md, params)) + goto error; + return 1; +error: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); + EVP_MD_free(ctx->md); + ctx->mdctx = NULL; + ctx->md = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static int ecdsa_digest_sign_init(void *vctx, const char *mdname, void *ec, + const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + return ecdsa_digest_signverify_init(vctx, mdname, ec, params, + EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); +} + +static int ecdsa_digest_verify_init(void *vctx, const char *mdname, void *ec, + const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + return ecdsa_digest_signverify_init(vctx, mdname, ec, params, + EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY); +} + +int ecdsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vctx, const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, data, datalen); +} + +int ecdsa_digest_sign_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + size_t sigsize) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned int dlen = 0; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || ctx == NULL || ctx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + /* + * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields + * are ignored. Defer to ecdsa_sign. + */ + if (sig != NULL + && !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) + return 0; + ctx->flag_allow_md = 1; + return ecdsa_sign(vctx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen); +} + +int ecdsa_digest_verify_final(void *vctx, const unsigned char *sig, + size_t siglen) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned int dlen = 0; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || ctx == NULL || ctx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) + return 0; + ctx->flag_allow_md = 1; + return ecdsa_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen); +} + +static void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); + EVP_MD_free(ctx->md); + ctx->propq = NULL; + ctx->mdctx = NULL; + ctx->md = NULL; + ctx->mdsize = 0; + EC_KEY_free(ctx->ec); + BN_clear_free(ctx->kinv); + BN_clear_free(ctx->r); + OPENSSL_free(ctx); +} + +static void *ecdsa_dupctx(void *vctx) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *dstctx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return NULL; + + dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx)); + if (dstctx == NULL) + return NULL; + + *dstctx = *srcctx; + dstctx->ec = NULL; + dstctx->md = NULL; + dstctx->mdctx = NULL; + dstctx->propq = NULL; + + if (srcctx->ec != NULL && !EC_KEY_up_ref(srcctx->ec)) + goto err; + /* Test KATS should not need to be supported */ + if (srcctx->kinv != NULL || srcctx->r != NULL) + goto err; + dstctx->ec = srcctx->ec; + + if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md)) + goto err; + dstctx->md = srcctx->md; + + if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) { + dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL + || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx)) + goto err; + } + + if (srcctx->propq != NULL) { + dstctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(srcctx->propq); + if (dstctx->propq == NULL) + goto err; + } + + return dstctx; + err: + ecdsa_freectx(dstctx); + return NULL; +} + +static int ecdsa_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM *params) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + OSSL_PARAM *p; + + if (ctx == NULL) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->aid, ctx->aid_len)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->mdsize)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, ctx->md == NULL + ? ctx->mdname + : EVP_MD_name(ctx->md))) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_END +}; + +static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx, + ossl_unused void *provctx) +{ + return known_gettable_ctx_params; +} + +static int ecdsa_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + + if (ctx == NULL) + return 0; + if (params == NULL) + return 1; + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ctx->kattest)) + return 0; +#endif + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); + /* Not allowed during certain operations */ + if (p != NULL && !ctx->flag_allow_md) + return 0; + if (p != NULL) { + char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname; + char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops; + const OSSL_PARAM *propsp = + OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, + OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES); + + if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname))) + return 0; + if (propsp != NULL + && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops))) + return 0; + if (!ecdsa_setup_md(ctx, mdname, mdprops)) + return 0; + } + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (p != NULL + && (!ctx->flag_allow_md + || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &ctx->mdsize))) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM settable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_END +}; + +static const OSSL_PARAM settable_ctx_params_no_digest[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_END +}; + +static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_ctx_params(void *vctx, + ossl_unused void *provctx) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx != NULL && !ctx->flag_allow_md) + return settable_ctx_params_no_digest; + return settable_ctx_params; +} + +static int ecdsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM *params) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(ctx->mdctx, params); +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vctx) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx->md == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(ctx->md); +} + +static int ecdsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(ctx->mdctx, params); +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vctx) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx->md == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(ctx->md); +} + +const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_ecdsa_signature_functions[] = { + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_newctx }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_sign_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_sign }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_verify_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_verify }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_sign_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_signverify_update }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_sign_final }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_verify_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_signverify_update }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_verify_final }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_freectx }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_dupctx }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_get_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_set_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_settable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_get_ctx_md_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_gettable_ctx_md_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_set_ctx_md_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params }, + { 0, NULL } +}; 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