diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'engines/e_sureware.c')
-rw-r--r-- | engines/e_sureware.c | 1040 |
1 files changed, 1040 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/engines/e_sureware.c b/engines/e_sureware.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..89f708661d --- /dev/null +++ b/engines/e_sureware.c @@ -0,0 +1,1040 @@ +/* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com) +* +* +* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +* are met: +* +* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +* +* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in +* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the +* distribution. +* +* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this +* software must display the following acknowledgment: +* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project +* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" +* +* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to +* endorse or promote products derived from this software without +* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact +* licensing@OpenSSL.org. +* +* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" +* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written +* permission of the OpenSSL Project. +* +* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following +* acknowledgment: +* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project +* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" +* +* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com) +* +* Copyright@2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd. +* All right Reserved. +* * +* THIS FILE IS PROVIDED BY BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES ``AS IS'' AND * +* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * +* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * +* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES BE LIABLE * +* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * +* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * +* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * +* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * +* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * +* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * +* SUCH DAMAGE. * +====================================================================*/ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include "cryptlib.h" +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include <openssl/dso.h> +#include "eng_int.h" +#include "engine.h" +#include <openssl/engine.h> + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE + +#ifdef FLAT_INC +#include "sureware.h" +#else +#include "vendor_defns/sureware.h" +#endif + +#define SUREWARE_LIB_NAME "sureware engine" +#include "hw_sureware_err.c" + +static int surewarehk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()); +static int surewarehk_destroy(ENGINE *e); +static int surewarehk_init(ENGINE *e); +static int surewarehk_finish(ENGINE *e); +static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + +/* RSA stuff */ +static int surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to, + RSA *rsa,int padding); +static int surewarehk_rsa_sign(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to, + RSA *rsa,int padding); + +/* RAND stuff */ +static int surewarehk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); +static void surewarehk_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); +static void surewarehk_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy); + +/* KM stuff */ +static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +static void surewarehk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx,long argl, void *argp); +#if 0 +static void surewarehk_dh_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx,long argl, void *argp); +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */ +static int surewarehk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) +{ + return surewarehk_modexp(r, a, p, m, ctx); +} + +/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static RSA_METHOD surewarehk_rsa = + { + "SureWare RSA method", + NULL, /* pub_enc*/ + NULL, /* pub_dec*/ + surewarehk_rsa_sign, /* our rsa_sign is OpenSSL priv_enc*/ + surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec, /* priv_dec*/ + NULL, /*mod_exp*/ + surewarehk_mod_exp_mont, /*mod_exp_mongomery*/ + NULL, /* init*/ + NULL, /* finish*/ + 0, /* RSA flag*/ + NULL, + NULL, /* OpenSSL sign*/ + NULL /* OpenSSL verify*/ + }; +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the dh and mont dropped). */ +static int surewarehk_modexp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) +{ + return surewarehk_modexp(r, a, p, m, ctx); +} + +static DH_METHOD surewarehk_dh = + { + "SureWare DH method", + NULL,/*gen_key*/ + NULL,/*agree,*/ + surewarehk_modexp_dh, /*dh mod exp*/ + NULL, /* init*/ + NULL, /* finish*/ + 0, /* flags*/ + NULL + }; +#endif + +static RAND_METHOD surewarehk_rand = + { + /* "SureWare RAND method", */ + surewarehk_rand_seed, + surewarehk_rand_bytes, + NULL,/*cleanup*/ + surewarehk_rand_add, + surewarehk_rand_bytes, + NULL,/*rand_status*/ + }; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* DSA stuff */ +static DSA_SIG * surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); +static int surewarehk_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, + BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, + BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) +{ + BIGNUM t; + int to_return = 0; + BN_init(&t); + /* let rr = a1 ^ p1 mod m */ + if (!surewarehk_modexp(rr,a1,p1,m,ctx)) goto end; + /* let t = a2 ^ p2 mod m */ + if (!surewarehk_modexp(&t,a2,p2,m,ctx)) goto end; + /* let rr = rr * t mod m */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(rr,rr,&t,m,ctx)) goto end; + to_return = 1; +end: + BN_free(&t); + return to_return; +} + +static DSA_METHOD surewarehk_dsa = + { + "SureWare DSA method", + surewarehk_dsa_do_sign, + NULL,/*sign setup*/ + NULL,/*verify,*/ + surewarehk_dsa_mod_exp,/*mod exp*/ + NULL,/*bn mod exp*/ + NULL, /*init*/ + NULL,/*finish*/ + 0, + NULL, + }; +#endif + +static const char *engine_sureware_id = "sureware"; +static const char *engine_sureware_name = "SureWare hardware engine support"; + +/* Now, to our own code */ + +/* As this is only ever called once, there's no need for locking + * (indeed - the lock will already be held by our caller!!!) */ +static int bind_sureware(ENGINE *e) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + const RSA_METHOD *meth1; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + const DSA_METHOD *meth2; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + const DH_METHOD *meth3; +#endif + + if(!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_sureware_id) || + !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_sureware_name) || +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &surewarehk_rsa) || +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + !ENGINE_set_DSA(e, &surewarehk_dsa) || +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + !ENGINE_set_DH(e, &surewarehk_dh) || +#endif + !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &surewarehk_rand) || + !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, surewarehk_destroy) || + !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, surewarehk_init) || + !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, surewarehk_finish) || + !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, surewarehk_ctrl) || + !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, surewarehk_load_privkey) || + !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, surewarehk_load_pubkey)) + return 0; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + /* We know that the "PKCS1_SSLeay()" functions hook properly + * to the cswift-specific mod_exp and mod_exp_crt so we use + * those functions. NB: We don't use ENGINE_openssl() or + * anything "more generic" because something like the RSAref + * code may not hook properly, and if you own one of these + * cards then you have the right to do RSA operations on it + * anyway! */ + meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); + if (meth1) + { + surewarehk_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc; + surewarehk_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec; + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + /* Use the DSA_OpenSSL() method and just hook the mod_exp-ish + * bits. */ + meth2 = DSA_OpenSSL(); + if (meth2) + { + surewarehk_dsa.dsa_do_verify = meth2->dsa_do_verify; + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + /* Much the same for Diffie-Hellman */ + meth3 = DH_OpenSSL(); + if (meth3) + { + surewarehk_dh.generate_key = meth3->generate_key; + surewarehk_dh.compute_key = meth3->compute_key; + } +#endif + + /* Ensure the sureware error handling is set up */ + ERR_load_SUREWARE_strings(); + return 1; +} + +#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT +static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) + { + if(id && (strcmp(id, engine_sureware_id) != 0)) + return 0; + if(!bind_sureware(e)) + return 0; + return 1; + } +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) +#else +static ENGINE *engine_sureware(void) + { + ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); + if(!ret) + return NULL; + if(!bind_sureware(ret)) + { + ENGINE_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; + } + +void ENGINE_load_sureware(void) + { + /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */ + ENGINE *toadd = engine_sureware(); + if(!toadd) return; + ENGINE_add(toadd); + ENGINE_free(toadd); + ERR_clear_error(); + } +#endif + +/* This is a process-global DSO handle used for loading and unloading + * the SureWareHook library. NB: This is only set (or unset) during an + * init() or finish() call (reference counts permitting) and they're + * operating with global locks, so this should be thread-safe + * implicitly. */ +static DSO *surewarehk_dso = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +static int rsaHndidx = -1; /* Index for KM handle. Not really used yet. */ +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +static int dsaHndidx = -1; /* Index for KM handle. Not really used yet. */ +#endif + +/* These are the function pointers that are (un)set when the library has + * successfully (un)loaded. */ +static SureWareHook_Init_t *p_surewarehk_Init = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Finish_t *p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Free_t *p_surewarehk_Free=NULL; +static SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec=NULL; +static SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign=NULL; +static SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign=NULL; +static SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp=NULL; + +/* Used in the DSO operations. */ +static const char *surewarehk_LIBNAME = "SureWareHook"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Init = "SureWareHook_Init"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Finish = "SureWareHook_Finish"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes="SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Rand_Seed="SureWareHook_Rand_Seed"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Privkey="SureWareHook_Load_Privkey"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey="SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey="SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey="SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Free="SureWareHook_Free"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec="SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign="SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign="SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Mod_Exp="SureWareHook_Mod_Exp"; +static BIO *logstream = NULL; + +/* SureWareHook library functions and mechanics - these are used by the + * higher-level functions further down. NB: As and where there's no + * error checking, take a look lower down where these functions are + * called, the checking and error handling is probably down there. +*/ +static int threadsafe=1; +static int surewarehk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()) +{ + int to_return = 1; + + switch(cmd) + { + case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM: + { + BIO *bio = (BIO *)p; + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); + if (logstream) + { + BIO_free(logstream); + logstream = NULL; + } + if (CRYPTO_add(&bio->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO) > 1) + logstream = bio; + else + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_CTRL,SUREWARE_R_BIO_WAS_FREED); + } + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); + break; + /* This will prevent the initialisation function from "installing" + * the mutex-handling callbacks, even if they are available from + * within the library (or were provided to the library from the + * calling application). This is to remove any baggage for + * applications not using multithreading. */ + case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING: + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); + threadsafe = 0; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); + break; + + /* The command isn't understood by this engine */ + default: + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_CTRL, + ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + to_return = 0; + break; + } + + return to_return; +} + +/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_surewarehk()" constructor) */ +static int surewarehk_destroy(ENGINE *e) +{ + ERR_unload_SUREWARE_strings(); + return 1; +} + +/* (de)initialisation functions. */ +static int surewarehk_init(ENGINE *e) +{ + char msg[64]="ENGINE_init"; + SureWareHook_Init_t *p1=NULL; + SureWareHook_Finish_t *p2=NULL; + SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *p3=NULL; + SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *p4=NULL; + SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *p5=NULL; + SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *p6=NULL; + SureWareHook_Free_t *p7=NULL; + SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *p8=NULL; + SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *p9=NULL; + SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *p12=NULL; + SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *p13=NULL; + SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *p14=NULL; + SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *p15=NULL; + + if(surewarehk_dso != NULL) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED); + goto err; + } + /* Attempt to load libsurewarehk.so/surewarehk.dll/whatever. */ + surewarehk_dso = DSO_load(NULL, surewarehk_LIBNAME, NULL, 0); + if(surewarehk_dso == NULL) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if(!(p1=(SureWareHook_Init_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Init)) || + !(p2=(SureWareHook_Finish_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Finish)) || + !(p3=(SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes)) || + !(p4=(SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rand_Seed)) || + !(p5=(SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Load_Privkey)) || + !(p6=(SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey)) || + !(p7=(SureWareHook_Free_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Free)) || + !(p8=(SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec)) || + !(p9=(SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign)) || + !(p12=(SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign)) || + !(p13=(SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey)) || + !(p14=(SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey)) || + !(p15=(SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Mod_Exp))) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + /* Copy the pointers */ + p_surewarehk_Init = p1; + p_surewarehk_Finish = p2; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = p3; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = p4; + p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = p5; + p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = p6; + p_surewarehk_Free = p7; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = p8; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = p9; + p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = p12; + p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = p13; + p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = p14; + p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = p15; + /* Contact the hardware and initialises it. */ + if(p_surewarehk_Init(msg,threadsafe)==SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if(p_surewarehk_Init(msg,threadsafe)==SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + /* try to load the default private key, if failed does not return a failure but + wait for an explicit ENGINE_load_privakey */ + surewarehk_load_privkey(e,NULL,NULL,NULL); + + /* Everything's fine. */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (rsaHndidx == -1) + rsaHndidx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, + "SureWareHook RSA key handle", + NULL, NULL, surewarehk_ex_free); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (dsaHndidx == -1) + dsaHndidx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, + "SureWareHook DSA key handle", + NULL, NULL, surewarehk_ex_free); +#endif + + return 1; +err: + if(surewarehk_dso) + DSO_free(surewarehk_dso); + surewarehk_dso = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Init = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Free = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static int surewarehk_finish(ENGINE *e) +{ + int to_return = 1; + if(surewarehk_dso == NULL) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_FINISH,ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED); + to_return = 0; + goto err; + } + p_surewarehk_Finish(); + if(!DSO_free(surewarehk_dso)) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_FINISH,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE); + to_return = 0; + goto err; + } + err: + if (logstream) + BIO_free(logstream); + surewarehk_dso = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Init = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Free = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL; + return to_return; +} + +static void surewarehk_error_handling(char *const msg,int func,int ret) +{ + switch (ret) + { + case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE: + ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE); + break; + case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK: + ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK); + break; + case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE: + ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_SIZE_TOO_LARGE_OR_TOO_SMALL); + break; + case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_INVALID_PAD: + ENGINEerr(func,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + break; + default: + ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_REQUEST_FAILED); + break; + case 1:/*nothing*/ + msg[0]='\0'; + } + if (*msg) + { + ERR_add_error_data(1,msg); + if (logstream) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO); + BIO_write(logstream, msg, strlen(msg)); + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO); + } + } +} + +static int surewarehk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) +{ + int ret=0; + char msg[64]="ENGINE_rand_bytes"; + if(!p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_BYTES,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + else + { + ret = p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes(msg,buf, num); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_BYTES,ret); + } + return ret==1 ? 1 : 0; +} + +static void surewarehk_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) +{ + int ret=0; + char msg[64]="ENGINE_rand_seed"; + if(!p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_SEED,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + else + { + ret = p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed(msg,buf, num); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_SEED,ret); + } +} + +static void surewarehk_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy) +{ + surewarehk_rand_seed(buf,num); +} + +static EVP_PKEY* sureware_load_public(ENGINE *e,const char *key_id,char *hptr,unsigned long el,char keytype) +{ + EVP_PKEY *res = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + RSA *rsatmp = NULL; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + DSA *dsatmp=NULL; +#endif + char msg[64]="sureware_load_public"; + int ret=0; + if(!p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey || !p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + goto err; + } + switch (keytype) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + case 1: /*RSA*/ + /* set private external reference */ + rsatmp = RSA_new_method(e); + RSA_set_ex_data(rsatmp,rsaHndidx,hptr); + rsatmp->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; + + /* set public big nums*/ + rsatmp->e = BN_new(); + rsatmp->n = BN_new(); + bn_expand2(rsatmp->e, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + bn_expand2(rsatmp->n, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + if (!rsatmp->e || rsatmp->e->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG))|| + !rsatmp->n || rsatmp->n->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG))) + goto err; + ret=p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey(msg,key_id,el, + (unsigned long *)rsatmp->n->d, + (unsigned long *)rsatmp->e->d); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ret); + if (ret!=1) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY); + goto err; + } + /* normalise pub e and pub n */ + rsatmp->e->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(rsatmp->e); + rsatmp->n->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(rsatmp->n); + /* create an EVP object: engine + rsa key */ + res = EVP_PKEY_new(); + EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(res, rsatmp); + break; +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + case 2:/*DSA*/ + /* set private/public external reference */ + dsatmp = DSA_new_method(e); + DSA_set_ex_data(dsatmp,dsaHndidx,hptr); + /*dsatmp->flags |= DSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;*/ + + /* set public key*/ + dsatmp->pub_key = BN_new(); + dsatmp->p = BN_new(); + dsatmp->q = BN_new(); + dsatmp->g = BN_new(); + bn_expand2(dsatmp->pub_key, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + bn_expand2(dsatmp->p, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + bn_expand2(dsatmp->q, 20/sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + bn_expand2(dsatmp->g, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + if (!dsatmp->pub_key || dsatmp->pub_key->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG))|| + !dsatmp->p || dsatmp->p->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)) || + !dsatmp->q || dsatmp->q->dmax!=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG) || + !dsatmp->g || dsatmp->g->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG))) + goto err; + + ret=p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey(msg,key_id,el, + (unsigned long *)dsatmp->pub_key->d, + (unsigned long *)dsatmp->p->d, + (unsigned long *)dsatmp->q->d, + (unsigned long *)dsatmp->g->d); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ret); + if (ret!=1) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY); + goto err; + } + /* set parameters */ + /* normalise pubkey and parameters in case of */ + dsatmp->pub_key->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(dsatmp->pub_key); + dsatmp->p->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(dsatmp->p); + dsatmp->q->top=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(dsatmp->q); + dsatmp->g->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(dsatmp->g); + + /* create an EVP object: engine + rsa key */ + res = EVP_PKEY_new(); + EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(res, dsatmp); + break; +#endif + + default: + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY); + goto err; + } + return res; + err: + if (res) + EVP_PKEY_free(res); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (rsatmp) + RSA_free(rsatmp); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (dsatmp) + DSA_free(dsatmp); +#endif + return NULL; +} + +static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) +{ + EVP_PKEY *res = NULL; + int ret=0; + unsigned long el=0; + char *hptr=NULL; + char keytype=0; + char msg[64]="ENGINE_load_privkey"; + + if(!p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + else + { + ret=p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey(msg,key_id,&hptr,&el,&keytype); + if (ret!=1) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY); + ERR_add_error_data(1,msg); + } + else + res=sureware_load_public(e,key_id,hptr,el,keytype); + } + return res; +} + +static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) +{ + EVP_PKEY *res = NULL; + int ret=0; + unsigned long el=0; + char *hptr=NULL; + char keytype=0; + char msg[64]="ENGINE_load_pubkey"; + + if(!p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + else + { + /* call once to identify if DSA or RSA */ + ret=p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey(msg,key_id,&el,&keytype); + if (ret!=1) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY); + ERR_add_error_data(1,msg); + } + else + res=sureware_load_public(e,key_id,hptr,el,keytype); + } + return res; +} + +/* This cleans up an RSA/DSA KM key(do not destroy the key into the hardware) +, called when ex_data is freed */ +static void surewarehk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx,long argl, void *argp) +{ + if(!p_surewarehk_Free) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_EX_FREE,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + else + p_surewarehk_Free((char *)item,0); +} + +#if 0 +/* not currently used (bug?) */ +/* This cleans up an DH KM key (destroys the key into hardware), +called when ex_data is freed */ +static void surewarehk_dh_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx,long argl, void *argp) +{ + if(!p_surewarehk_Free) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_EX_FREE,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + else + p_surewarehk_Free((char *)item,1); +} +#endif + +/* +* return number of decrypted bytes +*/ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +static int surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to, + RSA *rsa,int padding) +{ + int ret=0,tlen; + char *buf=NULL,*hptr=NULL; + char msg[64]="ENGINE_rsa_priv_dec"; + if (!p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + /* extract ref to private key */ + else if (!(hptr=RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsaHndidx))) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS); + goto err; + } + /* analyse what padding we can do into the hardware */ + if (padding==RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) + { + /* do it one shot */ + ret=p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec(msg,flen,(unsigned char *)from,&tlen,to,hptr,SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ret); + if (ret!=1) + goto err; + ret=tlen; + } + else /* do with no padding into hardware */ + { + ret=p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec(msg,flen,(unsigned char *)from,&tlen,to,hptr,SUREWARE_NO_PAD); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ret); + if (ret!=1) + goto err; + /* intermediate buffer for padding */ + if ((buf=OPENSSL_malloc(tlen)) == NULL) + { + RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + memcpy(buf,to,tlen);/* transfert to into buf */ + switch (padding) /* check padding in software */ + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + ret=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,tlen,(unsigned char *)buf,tlen,tlen,NULL,0); + break; +#endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + ret=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,tlen,(unsigned char *)buf,flen,tlen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + ret=RSA_padding_check_none(to,tlen,(unsigned char *)buf,flen,tlen); + break; + default: + RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (ret < 0) + RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + } +err: + if (buf) + { + memset(buf,0,tlen); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return ret; +} + +/* +* Does what OpenSSL rsa_priv_enc does. +*/ +static int surewarehk_rsa_sign(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to, + RSA *rsa,int padding) +{ + int ret=0,tlen; + char *hptr=NULL; + char msg[64]="ENGINE_rsa_sign"; + if (!p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + /* extract ref to private key */ + else if (!(hptr=RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsaHndidx))) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS); + } + else + { + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: /* do it in one shot */ + ret=p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign(msg,flen,(unsigned char *)from,&tlen,to,hptr,SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,ret); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + default: + RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + } + } + return ret==1 ? tlen : ret; +} + +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* DSA sign and verify */ +static DSA_SIG * surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *from, int flen, DSA *dsa) +{ + int ret=0; + char *hptr=NULL; + DSA_SIG *psign=NULL; + char msg[64]="ENGINE_dsa_do_sign"; + if (!p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + /* extract ref to private key */ + else if (!(hptr=DSA_get_ex_data(dsa, dsaHndidx))) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS); + } + else + { + if((psign = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + psign->r=BN_new(); + psign->s=BN_new(); + bn_expand2(psign->r, 20/sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + bn_expand2(psign->s, 20/sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + if (!psign->r || psign->r->dmax!=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG) || + !psign->s || psign->s->dmax!=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG)) + goto err; + ret=p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign(msg,flen,from, + (unsigned long *)psign->r->d, + (unsigned long *)psign->s->d, + hptr); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,ret); + } + psign->r->top=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(psign->r); + psign->s->top=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(psign->s); + +err: + if (psign) + { + DSA_SIG_free(psign); + psign=NULL; + } + return psign; +} +#endif + +static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + int ret=0; + char msg[64]="ENGINE_modexp"; + if (!p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp) + { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MOD_EXP,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + else + { + bn_expand2(r,m->top); + if (r && r->dmax==m->top) + { + /* do it*/ + ret=p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp(msg, + m->top*sizeof(BN_ULONG), + (unsigned long *)m->d, + p->top*sizeof(BN_ULONG), + (unsigned long *)p->d, + a->top*sizeof(BN_ULONG), + (unsigned long *)a->d, + (unsigned long *)r->d); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MOD_EXP,ret); + if (ret==1) + { + /* normalise result */ + r->top=m->top; + bn_fix_top(r); + } + } + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */ |