diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'engines/e_loader_attic.c')
-rw-r--r-- | engines/e_loader_attic.c | 1790 |
1 files changed, 1790 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/engines/e_loader_attic.c b/engines/e_loader_attic.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..581bfb0285 --- /dev/null +++ b/engines/e_loader_attic.c @@ -0,0 +1,1790 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* THIS ENGINE IS FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY. */ + +/* We need to use some engine deprecated APIs */ +#define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED + +/* #include "e_os.h" */ +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <assert.h> + +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/dsa.h> /* For d2i_DSAPrivateKey */ +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include <openssl/pkcs12.h> /* For the PKCS8 stuff o.O */ +#include <openssl/rsa.h> /* For d2i_RSAPrivateKey */ +#include <openssl/safestack.h> +#include <openssl/store.h> +#include <openssl/ui.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> /* For the PKCS8 stuff o.O */ +#include "internal/asn1.h" /* For asn1_d2i_read_bio */ +#include "internal/pem.h" /* For PVK and "blob" PEM headers */ +#include "internal/o_dir.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" + +#include "e_loader_attic_err.c" + +DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509) +DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_STORE_INFO) + +#ifdef _WIN32 +# define stat _stat +# define strncasecmp _strnicmp +#endif + +#ifndef S_ISDIR +# define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) +#endif + +/*- + * Password prompting + * ------------------ + */ + +static char *file_get_pass(const UI_METHOD *ui_method, char *pass, + size_t maxsize, const char *desc, const char *info, + void *data) +{ + UI *ui = UI_new(); + char *prompt = NULL; + + if (ui == NULL) { + ATTICerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + if (ui_method != NULL) + UI_set_method(ui, ui_method); + UI_add_user_data(ui, data); + + if ((prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, desc, info)) == NULL) { + ATTICerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + pass = NULL; + } else if (!UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD, + pass, 0, maxsize - 1)) { + ATTICerr(0, ERR_R_UI_LIB); + pass = NULL; + } else { + switch (UI_process(ui)) { + case -2: + ATTICerr(0, ATTIC_R_UI_PROCESS_INTERRUPTED_OR_CANCELLED); + pass = NULL; + break; + case -1: + ATTICerr(0, ERR_R_UI_LIB); + pass = NULL; + break; + default: + break; + } + } + + OPENSSL_free(prompt); + UI_free(ui); + return pass; +} + +struct pem_pass_data { + const UI_METHOD *ui_method; + void *data; + const char *prompt_desc; + const char *prompt_info; +}; + +static int file_fill_pem_pass_data(struct pem_pass_data *pass_data, + const char *desc, const char *info, + const UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *ui_data) +{ + if (pass_data == NULL) + return 0; + pass_data->ui_method = ui_method; + pass_data->data = ui_data; + pass_data->prompt_desc = desc; + pass_data->prompt_info = info; + return 1; +} + +/* This is used anywhere a pem_password_cb is needed */ +static int file_get_pem_pass(char *buf, int num, int w, void *data) +{ + struct pem_pass_data *pass_data = data; + char *pass = file_get_pass(pass_data->ui_method, buf, num, + pass_data->prompt_desc, pass_data->prompt_info, + pass_data->data); + + return pass == NULL ? 0 : strlen(pass); +} + +/* + * Check if |str| ends with |suffix| preceded by a space, and if it does, + * return the index of that space. If there is no such suffix in |str|, + * return -1. + * For |str| == "FOO BAR" and |suffix| == "BAR", the returned value is 3. + */ +static int check_suffix(const char *str, const char *suffix) +{ + int str_len = strlen(str); + int suffix_len = strlen(suffix) + 1; + const char *p = NULL; + + if (suffix_len >= str_len) + return -1; + p = str + str_len - suffix_len; + if (*p != ' ' + || strcmp(p + 1, suffix) != 0) + return -1; + return p - str; +} + +/* + * EMBEDDED is a special type of OSSL_STORE_INFO, specially for the file + * handlers, so we define it internally. This uses the possibility to + * create an OSSL_STORE_INFO with a generic data pointer and arbitrary + * type number. + * + * This is used by a FILE_HANDLER's try_decode function to signal that it + * has decoded the incoming blob into a new blob, and that the attempted + * decoding should be immediately restarted with the new blob, using the + * new PEM name. + */ +/* Negative numbers are never used for public OSSL_STORE_INFO types */ +#define STORE_INFO_EMBEDDED -1 + +/* This is the embedded data */ +struct embedded_st { + BUF_MEM *blob; + char *pem_name; +}; + +/* Helper functions */ +static struct embedded_st *get0_EMBEDDED(OSSL_STORE_INFO *info) +{ + return OSSL_STORE_INFO_get0_data(STORE_INFO_EMBEDDED, info); +} + +static void store_info_free(OSSL_STORE_INFO *info) +{ + struct embedded_st *data; + + if (info != NULL && (data = get0_EMBEDDED(info)) != NULL) { + BUF_MEM_free(data->blob); + OPENSSL_free(data->pem_name); + OPENSSL_free(data); + } + OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(info); +} + +static OSSL_STORE_INFO *new_EMBEDDED(const char *new_pem_name, + BUF_MEM *embedded) +{ + OSSL_STORE_INFO *info = NULL; + struct embedded_st *data = NULL; + + if ((data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*data))) == NULL + || (info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new(STORE_INFO_EMBEDDED, data)) == NULL) { + ATTICerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(data); + return NULL; + } + + data->pem_name = + new_pem_name == NULL ? NULL : OPENSSL_strdup(new_pem_name); + + if (new_pem_name != NULL && data->pem_name == NULL) { + ATTICerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + store_info_free(info); + info = NULL; + } + data->blob = embedded; + + return info; +} + +/*- + * The file scheme decoders + * ------------------------ + * + * Each possible data type has its own decoder, which either operates + * through a given PEM name, or attempts to decode to see if the blob + * it's given is decodable for its data type. The assumption is that + * only the correct data type will match the content. + */ + +/*- + * The try_decode function is called to check if the blob of data can + * be used by this handler, and if it can, decodes it into a supported + * OpenSSL type and returns a OSSL_STORE_INFO with the decoded data. + * Input: + * pem_name: If this blob comes from a PEM file, this holds + * the PEM name. If it comes from another type of + * file, this is NULL. + * pem_header: If this blob comes from a PEM file, this holds + * the PEM headers. If it comes from another type of + * file, this is NULL. + * blob: The blob of data to match with what this handler + * can use. + * len: The length of the blob. + * handler_ctx: For a handler marked repeatable, this pointer can + * be used to create a context for the handler. IT IS + * THE HANDLER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO CREATE AND DESTROY + * THIS CONTEXT APPROPRIATELY, i.e. create on first call + * and destroy when about to return NULL. + * matchcount: A pointer to an int to count matches for this data. + * Usually becomes 0 (no match) or 1 (match!), but may + * be higher in the (unlikely) event that the data matches + * more than one possibility. The int will always be + * zero when the function is called. + * ui_method: Application UI method for getting a password, pin + * or any other interactive data. + * ui_data: Application data to be passed to ui_method when + * it's called. + * libctx: The library context to be used if applicable + * propq: The property query string for any algorithm fetches + * Output: + * a OSSL_STORE_INFO + */ +typedef OSSL_STORE_INFO *(*file_try_decode_fn)(const char *pem_name, + const char *pem_header, + const unsigned char *blob, + size_t len, void **handler_ctx, + int *matchcount, + const UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *ui_data, const char *uri, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, + const char *propq); +/* + * The eof function should return 1 if there's no more data to be found + * with the handler_ctx, otherwise 0. This is only used when the handler is + * marked repeatable. + */ +typedef int (*file_eof_fn)(void *handler_ctx); +/* + * The destroy_ctx function is used to destroy the handler_ctx that was + * initiated by a repeatable try_decode function. This is only used when + * the handler is marked repeatable. + */ +typedef void (*file_destroy_ctx_fn)(void **handler_ctx); + +typedef struct file_handler_st { + const char *name; + file_try_decode_fn try_decode; + file_eof_fn eof; + file_destroy_ctx_fn destroy_ctx; + + /* flags */ + int repeatable; +} FILE_HANDLER; + +/* + * PKCS#12 decoder. It operates by decoding all of the blob content, + * extracting all the interesting data from it and storing them internally, + * then serving them one piece at a time. + */ +static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PKCS12(const char *pem_name, + const char *pem_header, + const unsigned char *blob, + size_t len, void **pctx, + int *matchcount, + const UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *ui_data, const char *uri, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, + const char *propq) +{ + OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL; + STACK_OF(OSSL_STORE_INFO) *ctx = *pctx; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + /* Initial parsing */ + PKCS12 *p12; + + if (pem_name != NULL) + /* No match, there is no PEM PKCS12 tag */ + return NULL; + + if ((p12 = d2i_PKCS12(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL) { + char *pass = NULL; + char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE]; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + X509 *cert = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + + *matchcount = 1; + + if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0) + || PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) { + pass = ""; + } else { + if ((pass = file_get_pass(ui_method, tpass, PEM_BUFSIZE, + "PKCS12 import pass phrase", uri, + ui_data)) == NULL) { + ATTICerr(0, ATTIC_R_PASSPHRASE_CALLBACK_ERROR); + goto p12_end; + } + if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, strlen(pass))) { + ATTICerr(0, ATTIC_R_ERROR_VERIFYING_PKCS12_MAC); + goto p12_end; + } + } + + if (PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, &pkey, &cert, &chain)) { + OSSL_STORE_INFO *osi_pkey = NULL; + OSSL_STORE_INFO *osi_cert = NULL; + OSSL_STORE_INFO *osi_ca = NULL; + int ok = 1; + + if ((ctx = sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_null()) != NULL) { + if (pkey != NULL) { + if ((osi_pkey = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PKEY(pkey)) != NULL + /* clearing pkey here avoids case distinctions */ + && (pkey = NULL) == NULL + && sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_push(ctx, osi_pkey) != 0) + osi_pkey = NULL; + else + ok = 0; + } + if (ok && cert != NULL) { + if ((osi_cert = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CERT(cert)) != NULL + /* clearing cert here avoids case distinctions */ + && (cert = NULL) == NULL + && sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_push(ctx, osi_cert) != 0) + osi_cert = NULL; + else + ok = 0; + } + while (ok && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) { + X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); + + if ((osi_ca = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CERT(ca)) != NULL + && sk_X509_shift(chain) != NULL + && sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_push(ctx, osi_ca) != 0) + osi_ca = NULL; + else + ok = 0; + } + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + X509_free(cert); + sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); + store_info_free(osi_pkey); + store_info_free(osi_cert); + store_info_free(osi_ca); + if (!ok) { + sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_pop_free(ctx, store_info_free); + ctx = NULL; + } + *pctx = ctx; + } + } + p12_end: + PKCS12_free(p12); + if (ctx == NULL) + return NULL; + } + + *matchcount = 1; + store_info = sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_shift(ctx); + return store_info; +} + +static int eof_PKCS12(void *ctx_) +{ + STACK_OF(OSSL_STORE_INFO) *ctx = ctx_; + + return ctx == NULL || sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_num(ctx) == 0; +} + +static void destroy_ctx_PKCS12(void **pctx) +{ + STACK_OF(OSSL_STORE_INFO) *ctx = *pctx; + + sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_pop_free(ctx, store_info_free); + *pctx = NULL; +} + +static FILE_HANDLER PKCS12_handler = { + "PKCS12", + try_decode_PKCS12, + eof_PKCS12, + destroy_ctx_PKCS12, + 1 /* repeatable */ +}; + +/* + * Encrypted PKCS#8 decoder. It operates by just decrypting the given blob + * into a new blob, which is returned as an EMBEDDED STORE_INFO. The whole + * decoding process will then start over with the new blob. + */ +static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PKCS8Encrypted(const char *pem_name, + const char *pem_header, + const unsigned char *blob, + size_t len, void **pctx, + int *matchcount, + const UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *ui_data, + const char *uri, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, + const char *propq) +{ + X509_SIG *p8 = NULL; + char kbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; + char *pass = NULL; + const X509_ALGOR *dalg = NULL; + const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *doct = NULL; + OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL; + BUF_MEM *mem = NULL; + unsigned char *new_data = NULL; + int new_data_len; + + if (pem_name != NULL) { + if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_PKCS8) != 0) + return NULL; + *matchcount = 1; + } + + if ((p8 = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &blob, len)) == NULL) + return NULL; + + *matchcount = 1; + + if ((mem = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { + ATTICerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto nop8; + } + + if ((pass = file_get_pass(ui_method, kbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, + "PKCS8 decrypt pass phrase", uri, + ui_data)) == NULL) { + ATTICerr(0, ATTIC_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); + goto nop8; + } + + X509_SIG_get0(p8, &dalg, &doct); + if (!PKCS12_pbe_crypt(dalg, pass, strlen(pass), doct->data, doct->length, + &new_data, &new_data_len, 0)) + goto nop8; + + mem->data = (char *)new_data; + mem->max = mem->length = (size_t)new_data_len; + X509_SIG_free(p8); + + store_info = new_EMBEDDED(PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF, mem); + if (store_info == NULL) { + ATTICerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto nop8; + } + + return store_info; + nop8: + X509_SIG_free(p8); + BUF_MEM_free(mem); + return NULL; +} + +static FILE_HANDLER PKCS8Encrypted_handler = { + "PKCS8Encrypted", + try_decode_PKCS8Encrypted +}; + +/* + * Private key decoder. Decodes all sorts of private keys, both PKCS#8 + * encoded ones and old style PEM ones (with the key type is encoded into + * the PEM name). + */ +static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PrivateKey(const char *pem_name, + const char *pem_header, + const unsigned char *blob, + size_t len, void **pctx, + int *matchcount, + const UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *ui_data, const char *uri, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, + const char *propq) +{ + OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = NULL; + + if (pem_name != NULL) { + if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF) == 0) { + PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf = + d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &blob, len); + + *matchcount = 1; + if (p8inf != NULL) + pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY_with_libctx(p8inf, libctx, propq); + PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); + } else { + int slen; + int pkey_id; + + if ((slen = check_suffix(pem_name, "PRIVATE KEY")) > 0 + && (ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pem_name, + slen)) != NULL + && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth)) { + *matchcount = 1; + pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_ex(pkey_id, NULL, &blob, len, + libctx, propq); + } + } + } else { + int i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + ENGINE *curengine = ENGINE_get_first(); + + while (curengine != NULL) { + ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR asn1meths = + ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths(curengine); + + if (asn1meths != NULL) { + const int *nids = NULL; + int nids_n = asn1meths(curengine, NULL, &nids, 0); + + for (i = 0; i < nids_n; i++) { + EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth2 = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *tmp_pkey = NULL; + const unsigned char *tmp_blob = blob; + int pkey_id, pkey_flags; + + if (!asn1meths(curengine, &ameth2, NULL, nids[i]) + || !EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, + &pkey_flags, NULL, NULL, + ameth2) + || (pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0) + continue; + + ERR_set_mark(); /* prevent flooding error queue */ + tmp_pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_ex(pkey_id, NULL, + &tmp_blob, len, + libctx, propq); + if (tmp_pkey != NULL) { + if (pkey != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey); + else + pkey = tmp_pkey; + (*matchcount)++; + } + ERR_pop_to_mark(); + } + } + curengine = ENGINE_get_next(curengine); + } +#endif + + for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) { + EVP_PKEY *tmp_pkey = NULL; + const unsigned char *tmp_blob = blob; + int pkey_id, pkey_flags; + + ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i); + if (!EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, &pkey_flags, NULL, + NULL, ameth) + || (pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0) + continue; + + ERR_set_mark(); /* prevent flooding error queue */ + tmp_pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_ex(pkey_id, NULL, &tmp_blob, len, + libctx, propq); + if (tmp_pkey != NULL) { + if (pkey != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey); + else + pkey = tmp_pkey; + (*matchcount)++; + } + ERR_pop_to_mark(); + } + + if (*matchcount > 1) { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + } + if (pkey == NULL) + /* No match */ + return NULL; + + store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PKEY(pkey); + if (store_info == NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + + return store_info; +} + +static FILE_HANDLER PrivateKey_handler = { + "PrivateKey", + try_decode_PrivateKey +}; + +/* + * Public key decoder. Only supports SubjectPublicKeyInfo formatted keys. + */ +static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PUBKEY(const char *pem_name, + const char *pem_header, + const unsigned char *blob, + size_t len, void **pctx, + int *matchcount, + const UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *ui_data, const char *uri, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, + const char *propq) +{ + OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + + if (pem_name != NULL) { + if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC) != 0) + /* No match */ + return NULL; + *matchcount = 1; + } + + if ((pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL) { + *matchcount = 1; + store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PUBKEY(pkey); + } + + return store_info; +} + +static FILE_HANDLER PUBKEY_handler = { + "PUBKEY", + try_decode_PUBKEY +}; + +/* + * Key parameter decoder. + */ +static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_params(const char *pem_name, + const char *pem_header, + const unsigned char *blob, + size_t len, void **pctx, + int *matchcount, + const UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *ui_data, const char *uri, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, + const char *propq) +{ + OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = NULL; + + if (pem_name != NULL) { + int slen; + int pkey_id; + + if ((slen = check_suffix(pem_name, "PARAMETERS")) > 0 + && (ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pem_name, slen)) != NULL + && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth)) { + *matchcount = 1; + pkey = d2i_KeyParams(pkey_id, NULL, &blob, len); + } + } else { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) { + EVP_PKEY *tmp_pkey = NULL; + const unsigned char *tmp_blob = blob; + int pkey_id, pkey_flags; + + ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i); + if (!EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, &pkey_flags, NULL, + NULL, ameth) + || (pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0) + continue; + + ERR_set_mark(); /* prevent flooding error queue */ + + tmp_pkey = d2i_KeyParams(pkey_id, NULL, &tmp_blob, len); + + if (tmp_pkey != NULL) { + if (pkey != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey); + else + pkey = tmp_pkey; + (*matchcount)++; + } + ERR_pop_to_mark(); + } + + if (*matchcount > 1) { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + } + if (pkey == NULL) + /* No match */ + return NULL; + + store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PARAMS(pkey); + if (store_info == NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + + return store_info; +} + +static FILE_HANDLER params_handler = { + "params", + try_decode_params +}; + +/* + * X.509 certificate decoder. + */ +static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_X509Certificate(const char *pem_name, + const char *pem_header, + const unsigned char *blob, + size_t len, void **pctx, + int *matchcount, + const UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *ui_data, + const char *uri, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, + const char *propq) +{ + OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL; + X509 *cert = NULL; + + /* + * In most cases, we can try to interpret the serialized data as a trusted + * cert (X509 + X509_AUX) and fall back to reading it as a normal cert + * (just X509), but if the PEM name specifically declares it as a trusted + * cert, then no fallback should be engaged. |ignore_trusted| tells if + * the fallback can be used (1) or not (0). + */ + int ignore_trusted = 1; + + if (pem_name != NULL) { + if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0) + ignore_trusted = 0; + else if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) != 0 + && strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_X509) != 0) + /* No match */ + return NULL; + *matchcount = 1; + } + + cert = X509_new_with_libctx(libctx, propq); + if (cert == NULL) + return NULL; + + if ((d2i_X509_AUX(&cert, &blob, len)) != NULL + || (ignore_trusted && (d2i_X509(&cert, &blob, len)) != NULL)) { + *matchcount = 1; + store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CERT(cert); + } + + if (store_info == NULL) + X509_free(cert); + + return store_info; +} + +static FILE_HANDLER X509Certificate_handler = { + "X509Certificate", + try_decode_X509Certificate +}; + +/* + * X.509 CRL decoder. + */ +static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_X509CRL(const char *pem_name, + const char *pem_header, + const unsigned char *blob, + size_t len, void **pctx, + int *matchcount, + const UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *ui_data, const char *uri, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, + const char *propq) +{ + OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL; + X509_CRL *crl = NULL; + + if (pem_name != NULL) { + if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_X509_CRL) != 0) + /* No match */ + return NULL; + *matchcount = 1; + } + + if ((crl = d2i_X509_CRL(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL) { + *matchcount = 1; + store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CRL(crl); + } + + if (store_info == NULL) + X509_CRL_free(crl); + + return store_info; +} + +static FILE_HANDLER X509CRL_handler = { + "X509CRL", + try_decode_X509CRL +}; + +/* + * To finish it all off, we collect all the handlers. + */ +static const FILE_HANDLER *file_handlers[] = { + &PKCS12_handler, + &PKCS8Encrypted_handler, + &X509Certificate_handler, + &X509CRL_handler, + ¶ms_handler, + &PUBKEY_handler, + &PrivateKey_handler, +}; + + +/*- + * The loader itself + * ----------------- + */ + +struct ossl_store_loader_ctx_st { + char *uri; /* The URI we currently try to load */ + enum { + is_raw = 0, + is_pem, + is_dir + } type; + int errcnt; +#define FILE_FLAG_SECMEM (1<<0) +#define FILE_FLAG_ATTACHED (1<<1) + unsigned int flags; + union { + struct { /* Used with is_raw and is_pem */ + BIO *file; + + /* + * The following are used when the handler is marked as + * repeatable + */ + const FILE_HANDLER *last_handler; + void *last_handler_ctx; + } file; + struct { /* Used with is_dir */ + OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *ctx; + int end_reached; + + /* + * When a search expression is given, these are filled in. + * |search_name| contains the file basename to look for. + * The string is exactly 8 characters long. + */ + char search_name[9]; + + /* + * The directory reading utility we have combines opening with + * reading the first name. To make sure we can detect the end + * at the right time, we read early and cache the name. + */ + const char *last_entry; + int last_errno; + } dir; + } _; + + /* Expected object type. May be unspecified */ + int expected_type; + + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx; + char *propq; +}; + +static void OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX_free(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) + return; + + OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq); + OPENSSL_free(ctx->uri); + if (ctx->type != is_dir) { + if (ctx->_.file.last_handler != NULL) { + ctx->_.file.last_handler->destroy_ctx(&ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx); + ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx = NULL; + ctx->_.file.last_handler = NULL; + } + } + OPENSSL_free(ctx); +} + +static int file_find_type(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx) +{ + BIO *buff = NULL; + char peekbuf[4096] = { 0, }; + + if ((buff = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL) + return 0; + + ctx->_.file.file = BIO_push(buff, ctx->_.file.file); + if (BIO_buffer_peek(ctx->_.file.file, peekbuf, sizeof(peekbuf) - 1) > 0) { + peekbuf[sizeof(peekbuf) - 1] = '\0'; + if (strstr(peekbuf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL) + ctx->type = is_pem; + } + return 1; +} + +static OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *file_open_with_libctx + (const OSSL_STORE_LOADER *loader, const char *uri, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq, + const UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *ui_data) +{ + OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx = NULL; + struct stat st; + struct { + const char *path; + unsigned int check_absolute:1; + } path_data[2]; + size_t path_data_n = 0, i; + const char *path; + + /* + * First step, just take the URI as is. + */ + path_data[path_data_n].check_absolute = 0; + path_data[path_data_n++].path = uri; + + /* + * Second step, if the URI appears to start with the 'file' scheme, + * extract the path and make that the second path to check. + * There's a special case if the URI also contains an authority, then + * the full URI shouldn't be used as a path anywhere. + */ + if (strncasecmp(uri, "file:", 5) == 0) { + const char *p = &uri[5]; + + if (strncmp(&uri[5], "//", 2) == 0) { + path_data_n--; /* Invalidate using the full URI */ + if (strncasecmp(&uri[7], "localhost/", 10) == 0) { + p = &uri[16]; + } else if (uri[7] == '/') { + p = &uri[7]; + } else { + ATTICerr(0, ATTIC_R_URI_AUTHORITY_UNSUPPORTED); + return NULL; + } + } + + path_data[path_data_n].check_absolute = 1; +#ifdef _WIN32 + /* Windows file: URIs with a drive letter start with a / */ + if (p[0] == '/' && p[2] == ':' && p[3] == '/') { + char c = tolower(p[1]); + + if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') { + p++; + /* We know it's absolute, so no need to check */ + path_data[path_data_n].check_absolute = 0; + } + } +#endif + path_data[path_data_n++].path = p; + } + + + for (i = 0, path = NULL; path == NULL && i < path_data_n; i++) { + /* + * If the scheme "file" was an explicit part of the URI, the path must + * be absolute. So says RFC 8089 + */ + if (path_data[i].check_absolute && path_data[i].path[0] != '/') { + ATTICerr(0, ATTIC_R_PATH_MUST_BE_ABSOLUTE); + ERR_add_error_data(1, path_data[i].path); + return NULL; + } + + if (stat(path_data[i].path, &st) < 0) { + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SYS, errno, + "calling stat(%s)", + path_data[i].path); + } else { + path = path_data[i].path; + } + } + if (path == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + /* Successfully found a working path */ + |