1 files changed, 45 insertions, 264 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index a4c9e69472..e7dfb07de2 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
 #include "e_os.h"
 
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+# include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+# include "prov/seeding.h"
+
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 /* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
 static ENGINE *funct_ref;
@@ -28,218 +31,7 @@ static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
 static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
 
 static int rand_inited = 0;
-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
-/*
- * IMPORTANT NOTE:  It is not currently possible to use this code
- * because we are not sure about the amount of randomness it provides.
- * Some SP900 tests have been run, but there is internal skepticism.
- * So for now this code is not used.
- */
-# error "RDTSC enabled?  Should not be possible!"
-
-/*
- * Acquire entropy from high-speed clock
- *
- * Since we get some randomness from the low-order bits of the
- * high-speed clock, it can help.
- *
- * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
- * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
- */
-size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    unsigned char c;
-    int i;
-
-    if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) {
-        for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) {
-            c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
-            rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
-        }
-    }
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
-size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
-size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
-
-/*
- * Acquire entropy using Intel-specific cpu instructions
- *
- * Uses the RDSEED instruction if available, otherwise uses
- * RDRAND if available.
- *
- * For the differences between RDSEED and RDRAND, and why RDSEED
- * is the preferred choice, see https://goo.gl/oK3KcN
- *
- * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
- * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
- */
-size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    size_t bytes_needed;
-    unsigned char *buffer;
-
-    bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-    if (bytes_needed > 0) {
-        buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-
-        if (buffer != NULL) {
-            /* Whichever comes first, use RDSEED, RDRAND or nothing */
-            if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) {
-                if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
-                    == bytes_needed) {
-                    rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
-                }
-            } else if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
-                if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
-                    == bytes_needed) {
-                    rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
-                }
-            } else {
-                rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-#endif
-
-#if 0
-/*
- * Implements the get_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- * If the DRBG has a parent, then the required amount of entropy input
- * is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate().
- *
- * Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources
- * using rand_pool_acquire_entropy().
- *
- * If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then
- * its entropy will be used up first.
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                             unsigned char **pout,
-                             int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
-                             int prediction_resistance)
-{
-    size_t ret = 0;
-    size_t entropy_available = 0;
-    RAND_POOL *pool;
-
-    if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->strength > drbg->parent->strength) {
-        /*
-         * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
-         * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
-         */
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
-        pool = drbg->seed_pool;
-        pool->entropy_requested = entropy;
-    } else {
-        pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, drbg->secure, min_len, max_len);
-        if (pool == NULL)
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
-        size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-        unsigned char *buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-
-        if (buffer != NULL) {
-            size_t bytes = 0;
-
-            /*
-             * Get random data from parent. Include our address as additional input,
-             * in order to provide some additional distinction between different
-             * DRBG child instances.
-             * Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
-             * generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
-             * if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
-             */
-            rand_drbg_lock(drbg->parent);
-            if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent,
-                                   buffer, bytes_needed,
-                                   prediction_resistance,
-                                   (unsigned char *)&drbg, sizeof(drbg)) != 0)
-                bytes = bytes_needed;
-            drbg->reseed_next_counter
-                = tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter);
-            rand_drbg_unlock(drbg->parent);
-
-            rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
-            entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-        }
-
-    } else {
-        /* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
-        entropy_available = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
-    }
-
-    if (entropy_available > 0) {
-        ret   = rand_pool_length(pool);
-        *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
-    }
-
-    if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
-        rand_pool_free(pool);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- */
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-                               unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
-{
-    if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) {
-        if (drbg->secure)
-            OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
-        else
-            OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate additional data that can be used for the drbg. The data does
- * not need to contain entropy, but it's useful if it contains at least
- * some bits that are unpredictable.
- *
- * Returns 0 on failure.
- *
- * On success it allocates a buffer at |*pout| and returns the length of
- * the data. The buffer should get freed using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free().
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout)
-{
-    size_t ret = 0;
-
-    if (rand_pool_add_additional_data(pool) == 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
-    *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
-
- err:
-    return ret;
-}
-
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out)
-{
-    rand_pool_reattach(pool, out);
-}
-#endif
 
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
 {
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
@@ -288,10 +80,10 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
     rand_inited = 0;
 }
 
-/* TODO(3.0): Do we need to handle this somehow in the FIPS module? */
 /*
  * RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file descriptors are
- * closed after use.
+ * closed after use.  This only applies to libcrypto/default provider,
+ * it does not apply to other providers.
  */
 void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
 {
@@ -308,39 +100,24 @@ void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
  */
 int RAND_poll(void)
 {
-    int ret = 0;
-
     const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+    int ret = meth == RAND_OpenSSL();
+    RAND_POOL *pool;
 
     if (meth == NULL)
         return 0;
 
-    if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) {
-        /* fill random pool and seed the master DRBG */
-        RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
-
-        if (drbg == NULL)
-            return 0;
-
-#if 0
-        ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
-#endif
-
-        return ret;
-
-    } else {
-        RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
-
+    if (!ret) {
         /* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
         pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
                              (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
                              RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
         if (pool == NULL)
             return 0;
-#if 0
-        if (rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
+
+        if (prov_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
             goto err;
-#endif
+
         if (meth->add == NULL
             || meth->add(rand_pool_buffer(pool),
                          rand_pool_length(pool),
@@ -348,11 +125,9 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
             goto err;
 
         ret = 1;
-
      err:
         rand_pool_free(pool);
     }
-
     return ret;
 }
 
@@ -370,13 +145,9 @@ int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
     CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
     return 1;
 }
-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 
 const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
 {
-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
-    return NULL;
-#else
     const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
 
     if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
@@ -403,10 +174,9 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
     tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
     CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
     return tmp_meth;
-#endif
 }
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE)
 int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
 {
     const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
@@ -430,7 +200,7 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
     CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock);
     return 1;
 }
-#endif
+# endif
 
 void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
 {
@@ -448,6 +218,38 @@ void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
         meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
 }
 
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0)
+int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+    if (meth != NULL && meth->pseudorand != NULL)
+        return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
+    RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+    return -1;
+}
+# endif
+
+int RAND_status(void)
+{
+    RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+    if (meth != NULL && meth != RAND_OpenSSL())
+        return meth->status != NULL ? meth->status() : 0;
+
+    if ((drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master()) == NULL || drbg->rand == NULL)
+        return EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED;
+    return EVP_RAND_state(drbg->rand) == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY;
+}
+#else  /* !FIPS_MODULE */
+
+const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* !FIPS_MODULE */
+
 /*
  * This function is not part of RAND_METHOD, so if we're not using
  * the default method, then just call RAND_bytes().  Otherwise make
@@ -500,24 +302,3 @@ int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 {
     return RAND_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
 }
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
-int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-{
-    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-
-    if (meth != NULL && meth->pseudorand != NULL)
-        return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
-    RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-    return -1;
-}
-#endif
-
-int RAND_status(void)
-{
-    const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-
-    if (meth != NULL && meth->status != NULL)
-        return meth->status();
-    return 0;
-}