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-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_backend.c229
1 files changed, 229 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c b/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b4520a7c60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include "crypto/bn.h"
+#include "crypto/ec.h"
+
+/*
+ * The intention with the "backend" source file is to offer backend support
+ * for legacy backends (EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and EVP_PKEY_METHOD) and provider
+ * implementations alike.
+ */
+
+int ec_set_param_ecdh_cofactor_mode(EC_KEY *ec, const OSSL_PARAM *p)
+{
+ const EC_GROUP *ecg = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
+ const BIGNUM *cofactor;
+ int mode;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &mode))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * mode can be only 0 for disable, or 1 for enable here.
+ *
+ * This is in contrast with the same parameter on an ECDH EVP_PKEY_CTX that
+ * also supports mode == -1 with the meaning of "reset to the default for
+ * the associated key".
+ */
+ if (mode < 0 || mode > 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((cofactor = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(ecg)) == NULL )
+ return 0;
+
+ /* ECDH cofactor mode has no effect if cofactor is 1 */
+ if (BN_is_one(cofactor))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (mode == 1)
+ EC_KEY_set_flags(ec, EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH);
+ else if (mode == 0)
+ EC_KEY_clear_flags(ec, EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Callers of ec_key_fromdata MUST make sure that ec_key_params_fromdata has
+ * been called before!
+ *
+ * This function only gets the bare keypair, domain parameters and other
+ * parameters are treated separately, and domain parameters are required to
+ * define a keypair.
+ */
+int ec_key_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private)
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *param_priv_key, *param_pub_key;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
+ unsigned char *pub_key = NULL;
+ size_t pub_key_len;
+ const EC_GROUP *ecg = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *pub_point = NULL;
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ ecg = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
+ if (ecg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ param_priv_key =
+ OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY);
+ param_pub_key =
+ OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY);
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ec_key_get_libctx(ec));
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * We want to have at least a public key either way, so we end up
+ * requiring it unconditionally.
+ */
+ if (param_pub_key == NULL
+ || !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(param_pub_key,
+ (void **)&pub_key, 0, &pub_key_len)
+ || (pub_point = EC_POINT_new(ecg)) == NULL
+ || !EC_POINT_oct2point(ecg, pub_point,
+ pub_key, pub_key_len, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (param_priv_key != NULL && include_private) {
+ int fixed_words;
+ const BIGNUM *order;
+
+ /*
+ * Key import/export should never leak the bit length of the secret
+ * scalar in the key.
+ *
+ * For this reason, on export we use padded BIGNUMs with fixed length.
+ *
+ * When importing we also should make sure that, even if short lived,
+ * the newly created BIGNUM is marked with the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag as
+ * soon as possible, so that any processing of this BIGNUM might opt for
+ * constant time implementations in the backend.
+ *
+ * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
+ * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
+ * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
+ * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
+ * accesses.
+ *
+ * Fixed Length
+ * ------------
+ *
+ * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
+ * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
+ * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
+ * secret scalars.
+ *
+ * For padding on export we just use the bit length of the order
+ * converted to bytes (rounding up).
+ *
+ * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
+ * required for the internal representation of the order, and we
+ * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
+ * might temporarily overflow the order length.
+ */
+ order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(ecg);
+ if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order))
+ goto err;
+
+ fixed_words = bn_get_top(order) + 2;
+
+ if ((priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (bn_wexpand(priv_key, fixed_words) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_priv_key, &priv_key))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (priv_key != NULL
+ && !EC_KEY_set_private_key(ec, priv_key))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(ec, pub_point))
+ goto err;
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(priv_key);
+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key);
+ EC_POINT_free(pub_point);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int ec_key_domparams_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *param_ec_name;
+ EC_GROUP *ecg = NULL;
+ char *curve_name = NULL;
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ if (ec == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ param_ec_name = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_NAME);
+ if (param_ec_name == NULL) {
+ /* explicit parameters */
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0): should we support explicit parameters curves?
+ */
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* named curve */
+ int curve_nid;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(param_ec_name, &curve_name, 0)
+ || curve_name == NULL
+ || (curve_nid = ec_curve_name2nid(curve_name)) == NID_undef)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((ecg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name_ex(ec_key_get_libctx(ec),
+ curve_nid)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(ec, ecg))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0): if the group has changed, should we invalidate the private and
+ * public key?
+ */
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(curve_name);
+ EC_GROUP_free(ecg);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int ec_key_otherparams_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if (ec == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH);
+ if (p != NULL && !ec_set_param_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ec, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}