diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/ct/ct_sct.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ct/ct_sct.c | 33 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c b/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c index 9eefa0caf0..1fc7456129 100644 --- a/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c +++ b/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c @@ -334,17 +334,22 @@ int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL; const CTLOG *log; + /* + * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means, + * let alone validate one. So we return validation failure (0). + */ if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION; - goto end; + return 0; } log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store, sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len); + /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */ if (log == NULL) { sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG; - goto end; + return 0; } sctx = SCT_CTX_new(); @@ -372,10 +377,28 @@ int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) goto err; } + /* + * XXX: Potential for optimization. This repeats some idempotent heavy + * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not + * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is + * processed. So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps + * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx. + * + * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an + * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of + * memory condition. When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just + * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the + * validation status. That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT + * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal + * errors. Since the function does not distinguish between certificate + * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing + * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or + * application decide what to do. + */ if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1) - goto err; - - sct->validation_status = SCT_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ? + sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED; + else + sct->validation_status = SCT_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ? SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID; end: |