diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/init.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/prov_seed.c | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/rand_local.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/rand_meth.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/rand_pool.c | 54 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/crypto/rand.h | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/crypto/rand_pool.h | 38 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_cpu_x86.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_tsc.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c | 66 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c | 28 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c | 22 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c | 42 |
16 files changed, 171 insertions, 176 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/init.c b/crypto/init.c index 09be58ea12..4bef667199 100644 --- a/crypto/init.c +++ b/crypto/init.c @@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanup(void) /* * Note that cleanup order is important: - * - rand_cleanup_int could call an ENGINE's RAND cleanup function so + * - ossl_rand_cleanup_int could call an ENGINE's RAND cleanup function so * must be called before engine_cleanup_int() * - ENGINEs use CRYPTO_EX_DATA and therefore, must be cleaned up * before the ex data handlers are wiped during default ossl_lib_ctx deinit. @@ -411,8 +411,8 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanup(void) * - ENGINEs and additional EVP algorithms might use added OIDs names so * obj_cleanup_int() must be called last */ - OSSL_TRACE(INIT, "OPENSSL_cleanup: rand_cleanup_int()\n"); - rand_cleanup_int(); + OSSL_TRACE(INIT, "OPENSSL_cleanup: ossl_rand_cleanup_int()\n"); + ossl_rand_cleanup_int(); OSSL_TRACE(INIT, "OPENSSL_cleanup: conf_modules_free_int()\n"); conf_modules_free_int(); diff --git a/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c b/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c index f79955180a..d4677c34f5 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c +++ b/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle, size_t entropy_available; RAND_POOL *pool; - pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len); + pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len); if (pool == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; @@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle, entropy_available = ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) { - ret = rand_pool_length(pool); - *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool); + ret = ossl_rand_pool_length(pool); + *pout = ossl_rand_pool_detach(pool); } - rand_pool_free(pool); + ossl_rand_pool_free(pool); return ret; } @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_nonce(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle, size_t ret = 0; RAND_POOL *pool; - pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len); + pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len); if (pool == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; @@ -60,12 +60,12 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_nonce(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle, if (!ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(pool)) goto err; - if (salt != NULL && !rand_pool_add(pool, salt, salt_len, 0)) + if (salt != NULL && !ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, salt, salt_len, 0)) goto err; - ret = rand_pool_length(pool); - *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool); + ret = ossl_rand_pool_length(pool); + *pout = ossl_rand_pool_detach(pool); err: - rand_pool_free(pool); + ossl_rand_pool_free(pool); return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c index 3cd34198c1..318540cff0 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init) goto err; # endif - if (!rand_pool_init()) + if (!ossl_rand_pool_init()) goto err; rand_inited = 1; @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init) return 0; } -void rand_cleanup_int(void) +void ossl_rand_cleanup_int(void) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth; @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void) meth->cleanup(); RAND_set_rand_method(NULL); # endif - rand_pool_cleanup(); + ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock); rand_engine_lock = NULL; @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void) void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) { if (RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) - rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep); + ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep); } /* @@ -128,9 +128,9 @@ int RAND_poll(void) if (!ret) { /* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */ - RAND_POOL *pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1, - (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8, - RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH); + RAND_POOL *pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1, + (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8, + RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH); if (pool == NULL) return 0; @@ -139,14 +139,14 @@ int RAND_poll(void) goto err; if (meth->add == NULL - || meth->add(rand_pool_buffer(pool), - rand_pool_length(pool), - (rand_pool_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0) + || meth->add(ossl_rand_pool_buffer(pool), + ossl_rand_pool_length(pool), + (ossl_rand_pool_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0) goto err; ret = 1; err: - rand_pool_free(pool); + ossl_rand_pool_free(pool); } return ret; # else @@ -194,10 +194,10 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void) default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth; } else { ENGINE_finish(e); - default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth; + default_RAND_meth = &ossl_rand_meth; } # else - default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth; + default_RAND_meth = &ossl_rand_meth; # endif } tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth; diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_local.h b/crypto/rand/rand_local.h index d1c9bd7fec..bea8149bad 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_local.h +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_local.h @@ -26,6 +26,6 @@ # define SECONDARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (7 * 60) /* 7 minutes */ /* The global RAND method, and the global buffer and DRBG instance. */ -extern RAND_METHOD rand_meth; +extern RAND_METHOD ossl_rand_meth; #endif diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_meth.c b/crypto/rand/rand_meth.c index e9237a4cd9..0f2809412a 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_meth.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_meth.c @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count) return EVP_RAND_generate(drbg, out, count, 0, 0, NULL, 0); } -RAND_METHOD rand_meth = { +RAND_METHOD ossl_rand_meth = { drbg_seed, drbg_bytes, NULL, @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ RAND_METHOD rand_meth = { RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) { #ifndef FIPS_MODULE - return &rand_meth; + return &ossl_rand_meth; #else return NULL; #endif diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_pool.c b/crypto/rand/rand_pool.c index ebb9078ce6..94bb1eab7c 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_pool.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_pool.c @@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ /* * Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool */ -RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure, - size_t min_len, size_t max_len) +RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure, + size_t min_len, size_t max_len) { RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool)); size_t min_alloc_size = RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure); @@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ err: * This function is intended to be used only for feeding random data * provided by RAND_add() and RAND_seed() into the <master> DRBG. */ -RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, - size_t entropy) +RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, + size_t entropy) { RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool)); @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, /* * Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer. */ -void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool) +void ossl_rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool) { if (pool == NULL) return; @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool) /* * Although it would be advisable from a cryptographical viewpoint, * we are not allowed to clear attached buffers, since they are passed - * to rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`. - * (see corresponding comment in rand_pool_attach()). + * to ossl_rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`. + * (see corresponding comment in ossl_rand_pool_attach()). */ if (!pool->attached) { if (pool->secure) @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool) /* * Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly). */ -const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool) +const unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool) { return pool->buffer; } @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool) /* * Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller. */ -size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) +size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) { return pool->entropy; } @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) /* * Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller. */ -size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool) +size_t ossl_rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool) { return pool->len; } @@ -140,9 +140,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool) * Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller. * It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() or to re-attach it - * again to the pool using rand_pool_reattach(). + * again to the pool using ossl_rand_pool_reattach(). */ -unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool) +unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool) { unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer; pool->buffer = NULL; @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool) * Re-attach the |pool| buffer. It is only allowed to pass * the |buffer| which was previously detached from the same pool. */ -void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer) +void ossl_rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer) { pool->buffer = buffer; OPENSSL_cleanse(pool->buffer, pool->len); @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer) * |entropy| if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough * 0 otherwise */ -size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool) +size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool) { if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested) return 0; @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool) * the random pool. */ -size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool) +size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool) { if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested) return pool->entropy_requested - pool->entropy; @@ -243,10 +243,10 @@ static int rand_pool_grow(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) * In case of an error, 0 is returned. */ -size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor) +size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor) { size_t bytes_needed; - size_t entropy_needed = rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool); + size_t entropy_needed = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool); if (entropy_factor < 1) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE); @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor) /* * Make sure the buffer is large enough for the requested amount * of data. This guarantees that existing code patterns where - * rand_pool_add_begin, rand_pool_add_end or rand_pool_add + * ossl_rand_pool_add_begin, ossl_rand_pool_add_end or ossl_rand_pool_add * are used to collect entropy data without any error handling * whatsoever, continue to be valid. * Furthermore if the allocation here fails once, make sure that @@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor) } /* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */ -size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool) +size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool) { return pool->max_len - pool->len; } @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool) * * Returns 1 if the added amount is adequate, otherwise 0 */ -int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, +int ossl_rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy) { if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) { @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, if (len > 0) { /* * This is to protect us from accidentally passing the buffer - * returned from rand_pool_add_begin. + * returned from ossl_rand_pool_add_begin. * The check for alloc_len makes sure we do not compare the * address of the end of the allocated memory to something * different, since that comparison would have an @@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, * We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect * additional data. * For entropy data, as long as the allocation request stays within - * the limits given by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow + * the limits given by ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow * below is guaranteed to succeed, thus no allocation happens. */ if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len)) @@ -354,10 +354,10 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, * If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer * is returned without producing an error message. * - * After updating the buffer, rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called + * After updating the buffer, ossl_rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called * to finish the update operation (see next comment). */ -unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) +unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) { if (len == 0) return NULL; @@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) /* * As long as the allocation request stays within the limits given - * by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow below is guaranteed + * by ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow below is guaranteed * to succeed, thus no allocation happens. * We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect * additional data. Then the buffer might need to grow here, @@ -391,12 +391,12 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) * Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place. * * Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by - * rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment). + * ossl_rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment). * It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added * to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness. * It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved. */ -int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy) +int ossl_rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy) { if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW); diff --git a/include/crypto/rand.h b/include/crypto/rand.h index f093356d9d..d9432b241d 100644 --- a/include/crypto/rand.h +++ b/include/crypto/rand.h @@ -71,24 +71,24 @@ # define DEVRANDOM_EGD "/var/run/egd-pool", "/dev/egd-pool", "/etc/egd-pool", "/etc/entropy" #endif -void rand_cleanup_int(void); +void ossl_rand_cleanup_int(void); /* * Initialise the random pool reseeding sources. * * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. */ -int rand_pool_init(void); +int ossl_rand_pool_init(void); /* * Finalise the random pool reseeding sources. */ -void rand_pool_cleanup(void); +void ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(void); /* * Control the random pool use of open file descriptors. */ -void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep); +void ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep); /* * Configuration diff --git a/include/crypto/rand_pool.h b/include/crypto/rand_pool.h index a651d29988..f4d1d954bc 100644 --- a/include/crypto/rand_pool.h +++ b/include/crypto/rand_pool.h @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ * * The max_len value for the buffer provided to the rand_drbg_get_entropy() * callback is currently 2^31 bytes (2 gigabytes), if a derivation function - * is used. Since this is much too large to be allocated, the rand_pool_new() + * is used. Since this is much too large to be allocated, the ossl_rand_pool_new() * function chooses more modest values as default pool length, bounded * by RAND_POOL_MIN_LENGTH and RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH * @@ -82,28 +82,28 @@ typedef struct rand_pool_st { size_t entropy_requested; /* requested entropy count in bits */ } RAND_POOL; -RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure, - size_t min_len, size_t max_len); -RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, - size_t entropy); -void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool); +RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure, + size_t min_len, size_t max_len); +RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, + size_t entropy); +void ossl_rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool); -const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool); -unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool); -void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer); +const unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool); +unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool); +void ossl_rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer); -size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool); -size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool); +size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool); +size_t ossl_rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool); -size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool); -size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool); +size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool); +size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool); /* |entropy_factor| expresses how many bits of data contain 1 bit of entropy */ -size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor); -size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool); +size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor); +size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool); -int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, - const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy); -unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len); -int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy); +int ossl_rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, + const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy); +unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len); +int ossl_rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy); #endif /* OSSL_PROVIDER_RAND_POOL_H */ diff --git a/providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h b/providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h index 448ff0366b..b7480e7c42 100644 --- a/providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h +++ b/providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h @@ -11,13 +11,8 @@ #include "crypto/rand_pool.h" /* Hardware-based seeding functions. */ -size_t prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool); -size_t prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool); - -/* DRBG entropy callbacks. */ -size_t prov_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout); - -void prov_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out); +size_t ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool); +size_t ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool); /* * Add some platform specific additional data @@ -28,7 +23,7 @@ void prov_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out); * * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. */ -int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool); +int ossl_rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool); /* * External seeding functions from the core dispatch table. diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c index ad315efb9b..173c99ce17 100644 --- a/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c +++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static int seed_src_generate(void *vseed, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, return 0; } - pool = rand_pool_new(strength, 1, outlen, outlen); + pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength, 1, outlen, outlen); if (pool == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; @@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ static int seed_src_generate(void *vseed, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, entropy_available = ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) - memcpy(out, rand_pool_buffer(pool), rand_pool_length(pool)); + memcpy(out, ossl_rand_pool_buffer(pool), ossl_rand_pool_length(pool)); - rand_pool_free(pool); + ossl_rand_pool_free(pool); return entropy_available > 0; } diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_cpu_x86.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_cpu_x86.c index 0b163571f1..0bdf1c302f 100644 --- a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_cpu_x86.c +++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_cpu_x86.c @@ -40,20 +40,20 @@ size_t prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool) size_t bytes_needed; unsigned char *buffer; - bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); if (bytes_needed > 0) { - buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); if (buffer != NULL) { if (get_hardware_random_value(buffer, bytes_needed) == bytes_needed) { - rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed); + ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed); } else { - rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0); + ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0); } } } - return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); } #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_TANDEM) && defined(_TNS_X_TARGET) diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_tsc.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_tsc.c index 2777335469..76311267fc 100644 --- a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_tsc.c +++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_tsc.c @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0. */ -size_t prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool) +size_t ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool) { unsigned char c; int i; @@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ size_t prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool) if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) { for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) { c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF); - rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4); + ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4); } } - return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); } #else NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c index ec0e55bec8..fd7373a3e9 100644 --- a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c +++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code); # endif - bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 4 /*entropy_factor*/); + bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 4 /*entropy_factor*/); for (i = 0; i < bytes_needed; i++) { /* @@ -174,16 +174,16 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) /* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF); - rand_pool_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2); + ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2); } - return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); } -void rand_pool_cleanup(void) +void ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(void) { } -void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) +void ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) { } @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static void close_random_device(size_t n) rd->fd = -1; } -int rand_pool_init(void) +int ossl_rand_pool_init(void) { size_t i; @@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ int rand_pool_init(void) return 1; } -void rand_pool_cleanup(void) +void ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(void) { size_t i; @@ -573,26 +573,26 @@ void rand_pool_cleanup(void) close_random_device(i); } -void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) +void ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) { if (!keep) - rand_pool_cleanup(); + ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(); keep_random_devices_open = keep; } # else /* !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */ -int rand_pool_init(void) +int ossl_rand_pool_init(void) { return 1; } -void rand_pool_cleanup(void) +void ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(void) { } -void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) +void ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) { } @@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) { # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) - return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); # else size_t entropy_available = 0; @@ -632,12 +632,12 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) /* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */ int attempts = 3; - bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) { - buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed); if (bytes > 0) { - rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); + ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); bytes_needed -= bytes; attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */ } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) { @@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) } } } - entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + entropy_available = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; # endif @@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) unsigned char *buffer; size_t i; - bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths); i++) { ssize_t bytes = 0; @@ -674,11 +674,11 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) continue; while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) { - buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed); if (bytes > 0) { - rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); + ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); bytes_needed -= bytes; attempts = 3; /* reset counter on successful attempt */ } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) { @@ -688,22 +688,22 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open) close_random_device(i); - bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1); + bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1); } - entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + entropy_available = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; } # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC) - entropy_available = prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool); + entropy_available = ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU) - entropy_available = prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool); + entropy_available = ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; # endif @@ -715,27 +715,27 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) unsigned char *buffer; int i; - bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && paths[i] != NULL; i++) { size_t bytes = 0; int num; - buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i], buffer, (int)bytes_needed); if (num == (int)bytes_needed) bytes = bytes_needed; - rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); - bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1); + ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); + bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1); } - entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + entropy_available = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; } # endif - return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); # endif } # endif @@ -763,10 +763,10 @@ int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool) data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); data.time = get_time_stamp(); - return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0); |