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-rw-r--r--crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c16
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c30
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c20
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c67
5 files changed, 94 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
index f742bf75cf..1ad50b850d 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
/* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */
if (ctx->pkey != NULL && !EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey))
return 0;
- return DH_generate_key(pkey->pkey.dh);
+ return DH_generate_key((DH *)EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey));
}
static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
- dh = ctx->pkey->pkey.dh;
+ dh = (DH *)EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ctx->pkey);
dhpub = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ctx->peerkey);
if (dhpub == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
index ffb19da580..ba6be720a2 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
@@ -81,7 +81,12 @@ static int pkey_dsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
int ret;
unsigned int sltmp;
DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
- DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa;
+ /*
+ * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
+ * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
+ * be reflected back in the "original" key.
+ */
+ DSA *dsa = (DSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(ctx->pkey);
if (dctx->md != NULL && tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(dctx->md))
return 0;
@@ -100,7 +105,12 @@ static int pkey_dsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
{
int ret;
DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
- DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa;
+ /*
+ * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
+ * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
+ * be reflected back in the "original" key.
+ */
+ DSA *dsa = (DSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(ctx->pkey);
if (dctx->md != NULL && tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(dctx->md))
return 0;
@@ -245,7 +255,7 @@ static int pkey_dsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
/* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */
if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey))
return 0;
- return DSA_generate_key(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+ return DSA_generate_key((DSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey));
}
static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dsa_pkey_meth = {
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c b/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c
index ce658e14ca..19e2f0d0c0 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c
@@ -109,7 +109,12 @@ static int pkey_ec_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
int ret, type;
unsigned int sltmp;
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
- EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+ /*
+ * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
+ * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
+ * be reflected back in the "original" key.
+ */
+ EC_KEY *ec = (EC_KEY *)EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ctx->pkey);
const int sig_sz = ECDSA_size(ec);
/* ensure cast to size_t is safe */
@@ -142,7 +147,12 @@ static int pkey_ec_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
{
int ret, type;
EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
- EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+ /*
+ * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
+ * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
+ * be reflected back in the "original" key.
+ */
+ EC_KEY *ec = (EC_KEY *)EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ctx->pkey);
if (dctx->md)
type = EVP_MD_get_type(dctx->md);
@@ -174,7 +184,8 @@ static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)
return 0;
}
- eckey = dctx->co_key ? dctx->co_key : ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+ eckey = dctx->co_key ? dctx->co_key
+ : (EC_KEY *)EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ctx->pkey);
if (!key) {
const EC_GROUP *group;
@@ -266,14 +277,23 @@ static int pkey_ec_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
if (dctx->cofactor_mode != -1)
return dctx->cofactor_mode;
else {
- EC_KEY *ec_key = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+ const EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ctx->pkey);
return EC_KEY_get_flags(ec_key) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH ? 1 : 0;
}
} else if (p1 < -1 || p1 > 1)
return -2;
dctx->cofactor_mode = p1;
if (p1 != -1) {
- EC_KEY *ec_key = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+ EC_KEY *ec_key = (EC_KEY *)EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ctx->pkey);
+
+ /*
+ * We discarded the "const" above. This will only work if the key is
+ * a "real" legacy key, and not a cached copy of a provided key
+ */
+ if (evp_pkey_is_provided(ctx->pkey)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (!ec_key->group)
return -2;
/* If cofactor is 1 cofactor mode does nothing */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
index c4bbb0a535..9098decf2f 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
@@ -732,8 +732,8 @@ static int validate_ecx_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
return 0;
}
- ecxkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ecx;
- peerkey = EVP_PKEY_get0(ctx->peerkey);
+ ecxkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(ctx->pkey);
+ peerkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(ctx->peerkey);
if (ecxkey == NULL || ecxkey->privkey == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
return 0;
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ static int pkey_ecd_digestsign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
- const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+ const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey);
if (sig == NULL) {
*siglen = ED25519_SIGSIZE;
@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static int pkey_ecd_digestsign448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
- const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+ const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey);
if (sig == NULL) {
*siglen = ED448_SIGSIZE;
@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static int pkey_ecd_digestverify25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
- const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+ const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey);
if (siglen != ED25519_SIGSIZE)
return 0;
@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ static int pkey_ecd_digestverify448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
- const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+ const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey);
if (siglen != ED448_SIGSIZE)
return 0;
@@ -1177,7 +1177,7 @@ static int s390x_pkey_ecd_digestsign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
} ed25519;
unsigned long long buff[512];
} param;
- const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+ const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey);
int rc;
if (sig == NULL) {
@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ static int s390x_pkey_ecd_digestsign448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
} ed448;
unsigned long long buff[512];
} param;
- const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+ const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey);
int rc;
if (sig == NULL) {
@@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ static int s390x_pkey_ecd_digestverify25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
} ed25519;
unsigned long long buff[512];
} param;
- const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+ const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey);
if (siglen != ED25519_SIGSIZE)
return 0;
@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ static int s390x_pkey_ecd_digestverify448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
} ed448;
unsigned long long buff[512];
} param;
- const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+ const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey);
if (siglen != ED448_SIGSIZE)
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
index 110d998ebd..44c819a5c3 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
{
if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
return 1;
- if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(pk->pkey->pkey.rsa))) == NULL) {
+ if ((ctx->tbuf =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk->pkey)))) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
@@ -135,7 +136,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ /*
+ * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
+ * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
+ * be reflected back in the "original" key.
+ */
+ RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
if (rctx->md) {
if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
@@ -147,8 +153,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
unsigned int sltmp;
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
return -1;
- ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0,
- tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+ ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
@@ -187,8 +192,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
return -1;
}
} else {
- ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
- rctx->pad_mode);
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -202,13 +206,18 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ /*
+ * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
+ * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
+ * be reflected back in the "original" key.
+ */
+ RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
if (rctx->md) {
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig,
- rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa,
RSA_X931_PADDING);
if (ret < 1)
return 0;
@@ -227,7 +236,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
size_t sltmp;
ret = ossl_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md),
NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
- sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ sig, siglen, rsa);
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
ret = sltmp;
@@ -235,8 +244,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
return -1;
}
} else {
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
- rctx->pad_mode);
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -249,7 +257,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ /*
+ * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
+ * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
+ * be reflected back in the "original" key.
+ */
+ RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
size_t rslen;
if (rctx->md) {
@@ -302,9 +315,15 @@ static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ /*
+ * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
+ * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
+ * be reflected back in the "original" key.
+ */
+ RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
- int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ int klen = RSA_size(rsa);
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
@@ -313,11 +332,9 @@ static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
rctx->oaep_labellen,
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
return -1;
- ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out,
- ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
} else {
- ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
- rctx->pad_mode);
+ ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -331,12 +348,17 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ /*
+ * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
+ * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
+ * be reflected back in the "original" key.
+ */
+ RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
- ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf,
- ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf,
@@ -345,8 +367,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
rctx->oaep_labellen,
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
} else {
- ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
- rctx->pad_mode);
+ ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
}
*outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1);
@@ -805,7 +826,7 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void)
static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
- RSA *rsa;
+ const RSA *rsa;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
const EVP_MD *md;
const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
@@ -814,7 +835,7 @@ static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
/* Should never happen */
if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
return 0;
- rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
/* If no restrictions just return */
if (rsa->pss == NULL)
return 1;