diff options
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c | 67 |
5 files changed, 94 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c index f742bf75cf..1ad50b850d 100644 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) /* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */ if (ctx->pkey != NULL && !EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey)) return 0; - return DH_generate_key(pkey->pkey.dh); + return DH_generate_key((DH *)EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey)); } static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET); return 0; } - dh = ctx->pkey->pkey.dh; + dh = (DH *)EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ctx->pkey); dhpub = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ctx->peerkey); if (dhpub == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET); diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c index ffb19da580..ba6be720a2 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c @@ -81,7 +81,12 @@ static int pkey_dsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, int ret; unsigned int sltmp; DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; - DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + DSA *dsa = (DSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(ctx->pkey); if (dctx->md != NULL && tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(dctx->md)) return 0; @@ -100,7 +105,12 @@ static int pkey_dsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, { int ret; DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; - DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + DSA *dsa = (DSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(ctx->pkey); if (dctx->md != NULL && tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(dctx->md)) return 0; @@ -245,7 +255,7 @@ static int pkey_dsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) /* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */ if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey)) return 0; - return DSA_generate_key(pkey->pkey.dsa); + return DSA_generate_key((DSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey)); } static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dsa_pkey_meth = { diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c b/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c index ce658e14ca..19e2f0d0c0 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c @@ -109,7 +109,12 @@ static int pkey_ec_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, int ret, type; unsigned int sltmp; EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; - EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + EC_KEY *ec = (EC_KEY *)EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ctx->pkey); const int sig_sz = ECDSA_size(ec); /* ensure cast to size_t is safe */ @@ -142,7 +147,12 @@ static int pkey_ec_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, { int ret, type; EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; - EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + EC_KEY *ec = (EC_KEY *)EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ctx->pkey); if (dctx->md) type = EVP_MD_get_type(dctx->md); @@ -174,7 +184,8 @@ static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen) return 0; } - eckey = dctx->co_key ? dctx->co_key : ctx->pkey->pkey.ec; + eckey = dctx->co_key ? dctx->co_key + : (EC_KEY *)EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ctx->pkey); if (!key) { const EC_GROUP *group; @@ -266,14 +277,23 @@ static int pkey_ec_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) if (dctx->cofactor_mode != -1) return dctx->cofactor_mode; else { - EC_KEY *ec_key = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec; + const EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ctx->pkey); return EC_KEY_get_flags(ec_key) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH ? 1 : 0; } } else if (p1 < -1 || p1 > 1) return -2; dctx->cofactor_mode = p1; if (p1 != -1) { - EC_KEY *ec_key = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec; + EC_KEY *ec_key = (EC_KEY *)EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ctx->pkey); + + /* + * We discarded the "const" above. This will only work if the key is + * a "real" legacy key, and not a cached copy of a provided key + */ + if (evp_pkey_is_provided(ctx->pkey)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED); + return 0; + } if (!ec_key->group) return -2; /* If cofactor is 1 cofactor mode does nothing */ diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c index c4bbb0a535..9098decf2f 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c @@ -732,8 +732,8 @@ static int validate_ecx_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET); return 0; } - ecxkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ecx; - peerkey = EVP_PKEY_get0(ctx->peerkey); + ecxkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(ctx->pkey); + peerkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(ctx->peerkey); if (ecxkey == NULL || ecxkey->privkey == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY); return 0; @@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ static int pkey_ecd_digestsign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { - const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx; + const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey); if (sig == NULL) { *siglen = ED25519_SIGSIZE; @@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static int pkey_ecd_digestsign448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { - const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx; + const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey); if (sig == NULL) { *siglen = ED448_SIGSIZE; @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static int pkey_ecd_digestverify25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { - const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx; + const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey); if (siglen != ED25519_SIGSIZE) return 0; @@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ static int pkey_ecd_digestverify448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { - const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx; + const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey); if (siglen != ED448_SIGSIZE) return 0; @@ -1177,7 +1177,7 @@ static int s390x_pkey_ecd_digestsign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, } ed25519; unsigned long long buff[512]; } param; - const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx; + const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey); int rc; if (sig == NULL) { @@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ static int s390x_pkey_ecd_digestsign448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, } ed448; unsigned long long buff[512]; } param; - const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx; + const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey); int rc; if (sig == NULL) { @@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ static int s390x_pkey_ecd_digestverify25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, } ed25519; unsigned long long buff[512]; } param; - const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx; + const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey); if (siglen != ED25519_SIGSIZE) return 0; @@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ static int s390x_pkey_ecd_digestverify448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, } ed448; unsigned long long buff[512]; } param; - const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx; + const ECX_KEY *edkey = evp_pkey_get_legacy(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey); if (siglen != ED448_SIGSIZE) return 0; diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c index 110d998ebd..44c819a5c3 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c @@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) { if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) return 1; - if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(pk->pkey->pkey.rsa))) == NULL) { + if ((ctx->tbuf = + OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk->pkey)))) == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } @@ -135,7 +136,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); if (rctx->md) { if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) { @@ -147,8 +153,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sltmp; if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) return -1; - ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, - tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); + ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); if (ret <= 0) return ret; @@ -187,8 +192,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, return -1; } } else { - ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, - rctx->pad_mode); + ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); } if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -202,13 +206,18 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); if (rctx->md) { if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; - ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, - rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, + ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); if (ret < 1) return 0; @@ -227,7 +236,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, size_t sltmp; ret = ossl_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp, - sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa); + sig, siglen, rsa); if (ret <= 0) return 0; ret = sltmp; @@ -235,8 +244,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, return -1; } } else { - ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, - rctx->pad_mode); + ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); } if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -249,7 +257,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); size_t rslen; if (rctx->md) { @@ -302,9 +315,15 @@ static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { - int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa); + int klen = RSA_size(rsa); if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen, @@ -313,11 +332,9 @@ static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md)) return -1; - ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, - ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); + ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); } else { - ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, - rctx->pad_mode); + ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); } if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -331,12 +348,17 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; - ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, - ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); + ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); if (ret <= 0) return ret; ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf, @@ -345,8 +367,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md); } else { - ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, - rctx->pad_mode); + ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); } *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret); ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1); @@ -805,7 +826,7 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void) static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { - RSA *rsa; + const RSA *rsa; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; const EVP_MD *md; const EVP_MD *mgf1md; @@ -814,7 +835,7 @@ static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) /* Should never happen */ if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) return 0; - rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); /* If no restrictions just return */ if (rsa->pss == NULL) return 1; |