diff options
69 files changed, 89 insertions, 89 deletions
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE. [Shane Lontis] - *) Default cipher lists/suites are now avaialble via a function, the + *) Default cipher lists/suites are now available via a function, the #defines are deprecated. [Todd Short] @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ SSL_set_ciphersuites() [Matt Caswell] - *) Memory allocation failures consistenly add an error to the error + *) Memory allocation failures consistently add an error to the error stack. [Rich Salz] diff --git a/Configurations/15-ios.conf b/Configurations/15-ios.conf index a95f808c54..4b5aeecc28 100644 --- a/Configurations/15-ios.conf +++ b/Configurations/15-ios.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ #### iPhoneOS/iOS # -# It takes recent enough XCode to use following two targets. It shouldn't +# It takes recent enough Xcode to use following two targets. It shouldn't # be a problem by now, but if they don't work, original targets below # that depend on manual definition of environment variables should still # work... diff --git a/Configurations/50-win-onecore.conf b/Configurations/50-win-onecore.conf index 42a1ee00b2..d4e6e64f15 100644 --- a/Configurations/50-win-onecore.conf +++ b/Configurations/50-win-onecore.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Windows OneCore targets. # -# OneCore is new API stability "contract" that transends Desktop, IoT and +# OneCore is new API stability "contract" that transcends Desktop, IoT and # Mobile[?] Windows editions. It's a set up "umbrella" libraries that # export subset of Win32 API that are common to all Windows 10 devices. # diff --git a/Configurations/common0.tmpl b/Configurations/common0.tmpl index 03acb3e0b3..852b1fb3e8 100644 --- a/Configurations/common0.tmpl +++ b/Configurations/common0.tmpl @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ our @generated = sort ( ( grep { defined $unified_info{generate}->{$_} } sort keys %generatables ), - # Scripts are assumed to be generated, so add thhem too + # Scripts are assumed to be generated, so add them too ( grep { defined $unified_info{sources}->{$_} } @{$unified_info{scripts}} ) ); diff --git a/apps/pkcs12.c b/apps/pkcs12.c index bf22aeb48d..407340b388 100644 --- a/apps/pkcs12.c +++ b/apps/pkcs12.c @@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ static int alg_print(const X509_ALGOR *alg) goto done; } BIO_printf(bio_err, ", Salt length: %d, Cost(N): %ld, " - "Block size(r): %ld, Paralelizm(p): %ld", + "Block size(r): %ld, Parallelism(p): %ld", ASN1_STRING_length(kdf->salt), ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->costParameter), ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->blockSize), diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c index b0cbdf43bb..a5e9d4430b 100644 --- a/apps/speed.c +++ b/apps/speed.c @@ -1876,7 +1876,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv) } buflen = lengths[size_num - 1]; - if (buflen < 36) /* size of random vector in RSA bencmark */ + if (buflen < 36) /* size of random vector in RSA benchmark */ buflen = 36; buflen += MAX_MISALIGNMENT + 1; loopargs[i].buf_malloc = app_malloc(buflen, "input buffer"); diff --git a/apps/storeutl.c b/apps/storeutl.c index bc212c6b7c..f557f4d3ed 100644 --- a/apps/storeutl.c +++ b/apps/storeutl.c @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int storeutl_main(int argc, char *argv[]) } /* * If expected wasn't set at this point, it means the map - * isn't syncronised with the possible options leading here. + * isn't synchronised with the possible options leading here. */ OPENSSL_assert(expected != 0); } diff --git a/crypto/README.sparse_array b/crypto/README.sparse_array index 947c34dbbe..d86a48d9e1 100644 --- a/crypto/README.sparse_array +++ b/crypto/README.sparse_array @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ The tree height is dynamically increased as needed based on additions. An empty tree is represented by a NULL root pointer. Inserting a value at index 0 results in the allocation of a top level node full of null pointers except for the single pointer to the user's data (N = SA_BLOCK_MAX for -breviety): +brevity): +----+ |Root| diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl index 4f55a6be82..9a15091803 100644 --- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl +++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl @@ -38,14 +38,14 @@ # Implement AES_set_[en|de]crypt_key. Key schedule setup is avoided # for 128-bit keys, if hardware support is detected. -# Januray 2009. +# January 2009. # # Add support for hardware AES192/256 and reschedule instructions to # minimize/avoid Address Generation Interlock hazard and to favour # dual-issue z10 pipeline. This gave ~25% improvement on z10 and # almost 50% on z9. The gain is smaller on z10, because being dual- # issue z10 makes it impossible to eliminate the interlock condition: -# critial path is not long enough. Yet it spends ~24 cycles per byte +# critical path is not long enough. Yet it spends ~24 cycles per byte # processed with 128-bit key. # # Unlike previous version hardware support detection takes place only diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_time.c b/crypto/asn1/a_time.c index 60df899148..491909b08e 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_time.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_time.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static void determine_days(struct tm *tm) } c = y / 100; y %= 100; - /* Zeller's congruance */ + /* Zeller's congruence */ tm->tm_wday = (d + (13 * m) / 5 + y + y / 4 + c / 4 + 5 * c + 6) % 7; } diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c index cc8080c529..941429a398 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c @@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) * reasons. When BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE was first defined its value * was incorrectly clashing with BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE. The * value has been updated to a non-clashing value. However to preserve - * binary compatiblity we now respond to both the old value and the new one + * binary compatibility we now respond to both the old value and the new one */ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE: case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE: diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl index bff624d186..35971769a6 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl +++ b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl @@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ $code.=<<___; #if 0 /* * The bn_div_3_words entry point is re-used for constant-time interface. - * Implementation is retained as hystorical reference. + * Implementation is retained as historical reference. */ .align 5 .globl bn_div_3_words diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c index 750c30ed10..88fcaf7f95 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor, * * - availability of constant-time bn_div_3_words; * - dividend is at least as "wide" as divisor, limb-wise, zero-padded - * if so requied, which shouldn't be a privacy problem, because + * if so required, which shouldn't be a privacy problem, because * divisor's length is considered public; */ int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h index bc5274960f..160f2f5a07 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ struct bn_gencb_st { (b) > 23 ? 3 : 1) /* - * BN_mod_exp_mont_conttime is based on the assumption that the L1 data cache + * BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime is based on the assumption that the L1 data cache * line width of the target processor is at least the following value. */ # define MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH ( 64 ) diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c index b66d5ad0c9..a9384a0f03 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, * one bit longer than the modulus. * * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this. More - * specificly refer to the discussion starting with: + * specifically refer to the discussion starting with: * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705 * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required. */ diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl index e1e23ca90a..7fbc3eb4ac 100755 --- a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl +++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_montx: ################################# reduction mulx 8*0+128(%r14), $t0, $t1 - adcx $t0, $acc3 # guranteed to be zero + adcx $t0, $acc3 # guaranteed to be zero adox $t1, $acc4 mulx 8*1+128(%r14), $t0, $t1 diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-ppc64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-ppc64.pl index 2f8d82c2b0..5f6bff1850 100755 --- a/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-ppc64.pl +++ b/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-ppc64.pl @@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ x25519_fe64_tobytes: and $t0,$t0,$t1 sldi $a3,$a3,1 add $t0,$t0,$t1 # compare to modulus in the same go - srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most signifcant bit cleared + srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most significant bit cleared addc $a0,$a0,$t0 addze $a1,$a1 @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ x25519_fe64_tobytes: sradi $t0,$a3,63 # most significant bit -> mask sldi $a3,$a3,1 andc $t0,$t1,$t0 - srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most signifcant bit cleared + srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most significant bit cleared subi $rp,$rp,1 subfc $a0,$t0,$a0 diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h index c54789ba6a..0b1697ec3a 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ struct ec_method_st { int (*field_div) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); /*- - * 'field_inv' computes the multipicative inverse of a in the field, + * 'field_inv' computes the multiplicative inverse of a in the field, * storing the result in r. * * If 'a' is zero (or equivalent), you'll get an EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error. diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c index fe6f3b3bbd..06f1a6380f 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3, * ffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb * 71e913863f7, in that case the penultimate intermediate is -9G and * the final digit is also -9G. Since this only happens for a single - * scalar, the timing leak is irrelevent. (Any attacker who wanted to + * scalar, the timing leak is irrelevant. (Any attacker who wanted to * check whether a secret scalar was that exact value, can already do * so.) */ diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c index 7d133a3c96..1958aa2610 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static int ecd_item_sign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ED25519), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL); if (alg2) X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ED25519), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL); - /* Algorithm idetifiers set: carry on as normal */ + /* Algorithm identifiers set: carry on as normal */ return 3; } diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt index c70cdee435..5a19bdc2cb 100644 --- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt +++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt @@ -2439,7 +2439,7 @@ EVP_R_NO_OPERATION_SET:149:no operation set EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED:177:only oneshot supported EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE:150:\ operation not supported for this keytype -EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED:151:operaton not initialized +EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED:151:operation not initialized EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE:187:parameter too large EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING:162:partially overlapping buffers EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR:181:pbkdf2 error diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c index 848346530d..99535c00a8 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE), "operation not supported for this keytype"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED), - "operaton not initialized"}, + "operation not initialized"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE), "parameter too large"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING), diff --git a/crypto/initthread.c b/crypto/initthread.c index b398b05cd2..99cd96ceb8 100644 --- a/crypto/initthread.c +++ b/crypto/initthread.c @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ init_get_thread_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *local, int alloc, int keep) * destructor for threads terminating before libcrypto is initialized or * after it's de-initialized. Access to the key doesn't have to be * serialized for the said threads, because they didn't use libcrypto - * and it doesn't matter if they pick "impossible" or derefernce real + * and it doesn't matter if they pick "impossible" or dereference real * key value and pull NULL past initialization in the first thread that * intends to use libcrypto. */ diff --git a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c index e3c7ac456b..f91a56a70a 100644 --- a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c +++ b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c @@ -19,14 +19,14 @@ /* * A hashing implementation that appears to be based on the linear hashing - * alogrithm: + * algorithm: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_hashing * * Litwin, Witold (1980), "Linear hashing: A new tool for file and table * addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212-223 - * http://hackthology.com/pdfs/Litwin-1980-Linear_Hashing.pdf + * https://hackthology.com/pdfs/Litwin-1980-Linear_Hashing.pdf * - * From the wikipedia article "Linear hashing is used in the BDB Berkeley + * From the Wikipedia article "Linear hashing is used in the BDB Berkeley * database system, which in turn is used by many software systems such as * OpenLDAP, using a C implementation derived from the CACM article and first * published on the Usenet in 1988 by Esmond Pitt." diff --git a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl index 9f15c0d0be..2770f5e79d 100755 --- a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl +++ b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl @@ -969,15 +969,15 @@ __poly1305_blocks_vsx: addi $t1,$ctx,`48+(12^$BIG_ENDIAN)` bl __poly1305_splat - bl __poly1305_mul # caclulate r^2 + bl __poly1305_mul # calculate r^2 addi $t1,$ctx,`48+(4^$BIG_ENDIAN)` bl __poly1305_splat - bl __poly1305_mul # caclulate r^3 + bl __poly1305_mul # calculate r^3 addi $t1,$ctx,`48+(8^$BIG_ENDIAN)` bl __poly1305_splat - bl __poly1305_mul # caclulate r^4 + bl __poly1305_mul # calculate r^4 addi $t1,$ctx,`48+(0^$BIG_ENDIAN)` bl __poly1305_splat diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c index 812a52fa5a..c1b9b3b251 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, /* * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing - * the minimum length to accomadate the length of the nonce. + * the minimum length to accommodate the length of the nonce. * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL. */ if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) { diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c index 45742f5123..07d2362b04 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void) /* TODO(3.0): Do we need to handle this somehow in the FIPS module? */ /* - * RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file decriptors are + * RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file descriptors are * closed after use. */ |