diff options
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | apps/genrsa.c | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | apps/speed.c | 41 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/err/openssl.txt | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/build.info | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c | 41 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c | 24 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c | 81 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 293 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c | 128 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_mp.c | 95 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c | 137 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | doc/man1/genpkey.pod | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | doc/man1/genrsa.pod | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | doc/man1/speed.pod | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | doc/man3/RSA_generate_key.pod | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | doc/man3/RSA_get0_key.pod | 57 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | doc/man3/RSA_meth_new.pod | 32 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/openssl/rsa.h | 28 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/openssl/rsaerr.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | test/build.info | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | test/recipes/15-test_mp_rsa.t | 126 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | test/recipes/15-test_mp_rsa_data/plain_text | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | test/rsa_mp_test.c | 370 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | util/libcrypto.num | 8 |
29 files changed, 1559 insertions, 99 deletions
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ Changes between 1.1.0f and 1.1.1 [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Add multi-prime RSA (RFC 8017) support. + [Paul Yang] + *) Add SM3 implemented according to GB/T 32905-2016 [ Jack Lloyd <jack.lloyd@ribose.com>, Ronald Tse <ronald.tse@ribose.com>, diff --git a/apps/genrsa.c b/apps/genrsa.c index b4a986cb58..f147852902 100644 --- a/apps/genrsa.c +++ b/apps/genrsa.c @@ -27,13 +27,14 @@ NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT # include <openssl/rand.h> # define DEFBITS 2048 +# define DEFPRIMES 2 static int genrsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_3, OPT_F4, OPT_ENGINE, - OPT_OUT, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_CIPHER, + OPT_OUT, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_CIPHER, OPT_PRIMES, OPT_R_ENUM } OPTION_CHOICE; @@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ const OPTIONS genrsa_options[] = { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif + {"primes", OPT_PRIMES, 'p', "Specify number of primes"}, {NULL} }; @@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ int genrsa_main(int argc, char **argv) const BIGNUM *e; RSA *rsa = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; - int ret = 1, num = DEFBITS, private = 0; + int ret = 1, num = DEFBITS, private = 0, primes = DEFPRIMES; unsigned long f4 = RSA_F4; char *outfile = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *passout = NULL; char *prog, *hexe, *dece; @@ -108,6 +110,10 @@ opthelp: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc)) goto end; break; + case OPT_PRIMES: + if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &primes)) + goto end; + break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); @@ -131,13 +137,14 @@ opthelp: if (out == NULL) goto end; - BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating RSA private key, %d bit long modulus\n", - num); + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating RSA private key, %d bit long modulus (%d primes)\n", + num, primes); rsa = eng ? RSA_new_method(eng) : RSA_new(); if (rsa == NULL) goto end; - if (!BN_set_word(bn, f4) || !RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, num, bn, cb)) + if (!BN_set_word(bn, f4) + || !RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, num, primes, bn, cb)) goto end; RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, &e, NULL); diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c index 063bc1c2dc..c52dac608a 100644 --- a/apps/speed.c +++ b/apps/speed.c @@ -339,7 +339,8 @@ static int found(const char *name, const OPT_PAIR *pairs, int *result) typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ELAPSED, OPT_EVP, OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_MULTI, - OPT_MR, OPT_MB, OPT_MISALIGN, OPT_ASYNCJOBS, OPT_R_ENUM + OPT_MR, OPT_MB, OPT_MISALIGN, OPT_ASYNCJOBS, OPT_R_ENUM, + OPT_PRIMES } OPTION_CHOICE; const OPTIONS speed_options[] = { @@ -366,6 +367,7 @@ const OPTIONS speed_options[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif + {"primes", OPT_PRIMES, 'p', "Specify number of primes (for RSA only)"}, {NULL}, }; @@ -1325,6 +1327,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv) sizeof(test15360) }; int rsa_doit[RSA_NUM] = { 0 }; + int primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static const unsigned int dsa_bits[DSA_NUM] = { 512, 1024, 2048 }; @@ -1459,6 +1462,10 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv) if (!opt_rand(o)) goto end; break; + case OPT_PRIMES: + if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &primes)) + goto end; + break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); @@ -1615,6 +1622,10 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { + if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) { + /* for multi-prime RSA, skip this */ + break; + } for (k = 0; k < RSA_NUM; k++) { const unsigned char *p; @@ -2395,6 +2406,34 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv) if (!rsa_doit[testnum]) continue; for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { + if (primes > 2) { + /* we haven't set keys yet, generate multi-prime RSA keys */ + BIGNUM *bn = BN_new(); + + if (bn == NULL) + goto end; + if (!BN_set_word(bn, RSA_F4)) { + BN_free(bn); + goto end; + } + + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generate multi-prime RSA key for %s\n", + rsa_choices[testnum].name); + + loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum] = RSA_new(); + if (loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum] == NULL) { + BN_free(bn); + goto end; + } + + if (!RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum], + rsa_bits[testnum], + primes, bn, NULL)) { + BN_free(bn); + goto end; + } + BN_free(bn); + } st = RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, loopargs[i].buf, 36, loopargs[i].buf2, &loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum]); if (st == 0) diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt index 8547d07882..e7353aa3e8 100644 --- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt +++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt @@ -2224,6 +2224,7 @@ RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER:137:invalid header RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL:160:invalid label RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH:131:invalid message length RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD:156:invalid mgf1 md +RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY:167:invalid multi prime key RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS:161:invalid oaep parameters RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING:138:invalid padding RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE:141:invalid padding mode @@ -2233,12 +2234,17 @@ RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH:150:invalid salt length RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER:139:invalid trailer RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST:142:invalid x931 digest RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q:126:iqmp not inverse of q +RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID:165:key prime num invalid RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL:120:key size too small RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID:134:last octet invalid RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED:152:mgf1 digest not allowed RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE:105:modulus too large +RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R:168:mp coefficient not inverse of r +RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D:169:mp exponent not congruent to d +RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME:170:mp r not prime RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT:140:no public exponent RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING:113:null before block missing +RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES:172:n does not equal product of primes RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q:127:n does not equal p q RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR:121:oaep decoding error RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE:148:\ diff --git a/crypto/rsa/build.info b/crypto/rsa/build.info index 4575b28879..87f924922f 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/build.info +++ b/crypto/rsa/build.info @@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c \ rsa_pk1.c rsa_ssl.c rsa_none.c rsa_oaep.c rsa_chk.c \ rsa_pss.c rsa_x931.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_depr.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \ - rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c rsa_x931g.c rsa_meth.c + rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c rsa_x931g.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c index 97a37ba47d..98121b5e64 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c @@ -316,10 +316,11 @@ static int pkey_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int off, int priv) const RSA *x = pkey->pkey.rsa; char *str; const char *s; - int ret = 0, mod_len = 0; + int ret = 0, mod_len = 0, ex_primes; if (x->n != NULL) mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n); + ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(x->prime_infos); if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) goto err; @@ -328,7 +329,8 @@ static int pkey_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int off, int priv) goto err; if (priv && x->d) { - if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) + if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit, %d primes)\n", + mod_len, ex_primes <= 0 ? 2 : ex_primes + 2) <= 0) goto err; str = "modulus:"; s = "publicExponent:"; @@ -343,6 +345,8 @@ static int pkey_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int off, int priv) if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, NULL, off)) goto err; if (priv) { + int i; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, NULL, off)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, NULL, off)) @@ -355,6 +359,39 @@ static int pkey_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int off, int priv) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, NULL, off)) goto err; + for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(x->prime_infos); i++) { + /* print multi-prime info */ + BIGNUM *bn = NULL; + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; + int j; + + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(x->prime_infos, i); + for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { + if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) + goto err; + switch (j) { + case 0: + if (BIO_printf(bp, "prime%d:", i + 3) <= 0) + goto err; + bn = pinfo->r; + break; + case 1: + if (BIO_printf(bp, "exponent%d:", i + 3) <= 0) + goto err; + bn = pinfo->d; + break; + case 2: + if (BIO_printf(bp, "coefficient%d:", i + 3) <= 0) + goto err; + bn = pinfo->t; + break; + default: + break; + } + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "", bn, NULL, off)) + goto err; + } + } } if (pkey_is_pss(pkey) && !rsa_pss_param_print(bp, 1, x->pss, off)) goto err; diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c index 43c8fc27ae..9fe62c82eb 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -14,7 +14,11 @@ #include <openssl/asn1t.h> #include "rsa_locl.h" -/* Override the default free and new methods */ +/* + * Override the default free and new methods, + * and calculate helper products for multi-prime + * RSA keys. + */ static int rsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { @@ -27,10 +31,23 @@ static int rsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, RSA_free((RSA *)*pval); *pval = NULL; return 2; + } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_D2I_POST) { + if (((RSA *)*pval)->version != RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) { + /* not a multi-prime key, skip */ + return 1; + } + return (rsa_multip_calc_product((RSA *)*pval) == 1) ? 2 : 0; } return 1; } +/* Based on definitions in RFC 8017 appendix A.1.2 */ +ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_PRIME_INFO) = { + ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, r, CBIGNUM), + ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, d, CBIGNUM), + ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, t, CBIGNUM), +} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_PRIME_INFO) + ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPrivateKey, rsa_cb) = { ASN1_EMBED(RSA, version, INT32), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM), @@ -40,7 +57,8 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPrivateKey, rsa_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, q, CBIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmp1, CBIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmq1, CBIGNUM), - ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, iqmp, CBIGNUM) + ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, iqmp, CBIGNUM), + ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(RSA, prime_infos, RSA_PRIME_INFO) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPrivateKey) diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c index 00260fb18e..4cf682258b 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb) { BIGNUM *i, *j, *k, *l, *m; BN_CTX *ctx; - int ret = 1; + int ret = 1, ex_primes = 0, idx; + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; if (key->p == NULL || key->q == NULL || key->n == NULL || key->e == NULL || key->d == NULL) { @@ -28,6 +29,13 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb) return 0; } + /* multi-prime? */ + if (key->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI + && (ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(key->prime_infos)) <= 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY); + return 0; + } + i = BN_new(); j = BN_new(); k = BN_new(); @@ -62,17 +70,37 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME); } - /* n = p*q? */ + /* r_i prime? */ + for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx); + if (BN_is_prime_ex(pinfo->r, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) { + ret = 0; + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME); + } + } + + /* n = p*q * r_3...r_i? */ if (!BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx)) { ret = -1; goto err; } + for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx); + if (!BN_mul(i, i, pinfo->r, ctx)) { + ret = -1; + goto err; + } + } if (BN_cmp(i, key->n) != 0) { ret = 0; - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q); + if (ex_primes) + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, + RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES); + else + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q); } - /* d*e = 1 mod lcm(p-1,q-1)? */ + /* d*e = 1 mod \lambda(n)? */ if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) { ret = -1; goto err; @@ -82,7 +110,7 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb) goto err; } - /* now compute k = lcm(i,j) */ + /* now compute k = \lambda(n) = LCM(i, j, r_3 - 1...) */ if (!BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx)) { ret = -1; goto err; @@ -91,6 +119,21 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb) ret = -1; goto err; } + for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx); + if (!BN_sub(k, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) { + ret = -1; + goto err; + } + if (!BN_mul(l, l, k, ctx)) { + ret = -1; + goto err; + } + if (!BN_gcd(m, m, k, ctx)) { + ret = -1; + goto err; + } + } if (!BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx)) { /* remainder is 0 */ ret = -1; goto err; @@ -145,6 +188,32 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb) } } + for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx); + /* d_i = d mod (r_i - 1)? */ + if (!BN_sub(i, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) { + ret = -1; + goto err; + } + if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) { + ret = -1; + goto err; + } + if (BN_cmp(j, pinfo->d) != 0) { + ret = 0; + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D); + } + /* t_i = R_i ^ -1 mod r_i ? */ + if (!BN_mod_inverse(i, pinfo->pp, pinfo->r, ctx)) { + ret = -1; + goto err; + } + if (BN_cmp(i, pinfo->t) != 0) { + ret = 0; + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R); + } + } + err: BN_free(i); BN_free(j); diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c index 74b0feeae4..f7d29e1999 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH), "invalid message length"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD), "invalid mgf1 md"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY), + "invalid multi prime key"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS), "invalid oaep parameters"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING), "invalid padding"}, @@ -163,14 +165,23 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = { "invalid x931 digest"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q), "iqmp not inverse of q"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID), + "key prime num invalid"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL), "key size too small"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID), "last octet invalid"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED), "mgf1 digest not allowed"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R), + "mp coefficient not inverse of r"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D), + "mp exponent not congruent to d"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME), "mp r not prime"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT), "no public exponent"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING), "null before block missing"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES), + "n does not equal product of primes"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q), "n does not equal p q"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR), diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c index 4ced965519..f7f60754ad 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #include <openssl/bn.h> #include "rsa_locl.h" -static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, +static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb); /* @@ -31,17 +31,43 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, */ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { - if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen) + if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); - return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); + + return RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, bits, RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM, + e_value, cb); } -static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, +int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, + BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) +{ + /* multi-prime is only supported with the builtin key generation */ + if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL) + return rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, + e_value, cb); + return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb); +} + +static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { - BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp; - int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0; + BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime; + int ok = -1, n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0; + int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0; + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; + STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BN_ULONG bitst = 0; + + /* + * From Github pull request #4241: + * + * We are in disagreement on how to handle security trade-off, in other + * words: + * + * mechanical-check-for-maximum-of-16-prime-factors vs. + * limiting-number-depending-on-length-less-factors-for-shorter-keys. + */ /* * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck @@ -53,6 +79,12 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, goto err; } + if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM + || primes > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM || bits <= primes) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID); + goto err; + } + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; @@ -60,12 +92,29 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - if (r3 == NULL) + if (r2 == NULL) + goto err; + + /* divide bits into 'primes' pieces evenly */ + quo = bits / primes; + rmd = bits % primes; + + if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM && quo < RSA_MIN_PRIME_SIZE) { + /* + * this means primes are too many for the key bits. + * + * This only affects multi-prime keys. For normal RSA, + * it's limited above (bits >= 16, hence each prime >= 8). + * + * This is done in this way because the original normal + * RSA's behavior should not alter at least in OpenSSL 1.1.1. + */ + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID); goto err; + } - bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2; - bitsq = bits - bitsp; + for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) + bitsr[i] = (i < rmd) ? quo + 1 : quo; /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */ if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) @@ -85,62 +134,191 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) goto err; + /* initialize multi-prime components */ + if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) { + rsa->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI; + prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, primes - 2); + if (prime_infos == NULL) + goto err; + if (rsa->prime_infos != NULL) { + /* could this happen? */ + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(rsa->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); + } + rsa->prime_infos = prime_infos; + + /* prime_info from 2 to |primes| -1 */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new(); + if (pinfo == NULL) + goto err; + (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); + } + } + if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL) goto err; - /* generate p and q */ - for (;;) { - if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) - goto err; - if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) - goto err; - if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) - goto err; - if (BN_is_one(r1)) - break; - if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) + /* generate p, q and other primes (if any) */ + for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) { + adj = 0; + retries = 0; + + if (i == 0) { + prime = rsa->p; + } else if (i == 1) { + prime = rsa->q; + } else { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + prime = pinfo->r; + } + + for (;;) { + redo: + if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(prime, bitsr[i] + adj, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) + goto err; + /* + * prime should not be equal to p, q, r_3... + * (those primes prior to this one) + */ + { + int j; + + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + BIGNUM *prev_prime; + + if (j == 0) + prev_prime = rsa->p; + else if (j == 1) + prev_prime = rsa->q; + else + prev_prime = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, + j - 2)->r; + + if (!BN_cmp(prime, prev_prime)) { + goto redo; + } + } + } + if (!BN_sub(r2, prime, BN_value_one())) + goto err; + if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) + goto err; + if (BN_is_one(r1)) + break; + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) + goto err; + } + + bitse += bitsr[i]; + + /* calculate n immediately to see if it's sufficient */ + if (i == 1) { + /* we get at least 2 primes */ + if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + } else if (i != 0) { + /* modulus n = p * q * r_3 * r_4 ... */ + if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, prime, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + /* i == 0, do nothing */ + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i)) + goto err; + continue; + } + /* + * if |r1|, product of factors so far, is not as long as expected + * (by checking the first 4 bits are less than 0x9 or greater than + * 0xF). If so, re-generate the last prime. + * + * NOTE: This actually can't happen in two-prime case, because of + * the way factors are generated. + * + * Besides, another consideration is, for multi-prime case, even the + * length modulus is as long as expected, the modulus could start at + * 0x8, which could be utilized to distinguish a multi-prime private + * key by using the modulus in a certificate. This is also covered + * by checking the length should not be less than 0x9. + */ + if (!BN_rshift(r2, r1, bitse - 4)) goto err; - } - if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) - goto err; - for (;;) { - do { - if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) + bitst = BN_get_word(r2); + + if (bitst < 0x9 || bitst > 0xF) { + /* + * For keys with more than 4 primes, we attempt longer factor to + * meet length requirement. + * + * Otherwise, we just r |