diff options
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_both.c | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/t1_lib.c | 14 |
3 files changed, 36 insertions, 13 deletions
@@ -4,6 +4,15 @@ Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [xx XXX xxxx] + *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension + can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or + server. + + Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to + Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for + preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) + [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] + *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index 7a5596a6b3..2e8cf681ed 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -1459,26 +1459,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) unsigned int payload; unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ - /* Read type and payload length first */ - hbtype = *p++; - n2s(p, payload); - pl = p; - if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + /* Read type and payload length first */ + if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) + return 0; /* silently discard */ + hbtype = *p++; + n2s(p, payload); + if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) + return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ + pl = p; + if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { unsigned char *buffer, *bp; + unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ + + 2 /* heartbeat length */ + + payload + padding; int r; + if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) + return 0; + /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus * payload, plus padding */ - buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); + buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length); bp = buffer; /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ @@ -1489,11 +1499,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) /* Random padding */ RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); - r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); + r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length); if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - buffer, 3 + payload + padding, + buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); OPENSSL_free(buffer); diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index b82fadace6..bddffd92cc 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -2588,16 +2588,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) unsigned int payload; unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ - /* Read type and payload length first */ - hbtype = *p++; - n2s(p, payload); - pl = p; - if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + /* Read type and payload length first */ + if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) + return 0; /* silently discard */ + hbtype = *p++; + n2s(p, payload); + if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) + return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ + pl = p; + if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { unsigned char *buffer, *bp; |