diff options
-rw-r--r-- | CHANGES | 39 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/bn/bn.h | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/bn/bn_blind.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/bn/bn_div.c | 229 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/bn/bn_exp.c | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c | 159 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/bn/bn_lib.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa.h | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 87 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 33 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c | 2 | ||||
-rwxr-xr-x | util/libeay.num | 2 |
16 files changed, 595 insertions, 42 deletions
@@ -483,6 +483,43 @@ Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a + single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract + information. For detailed background information, see + http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron, + J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL + and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change + are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and + BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(), + respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant + conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div() + and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for the + modulus. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to remove a + conditional branch. + + BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous + BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just + modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag + in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative + implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name + remains as a deprecated alias. + + Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general + RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses + constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation. + Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias. + + BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that + the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the + modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to + BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now + essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually + change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows + RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to + enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. + + [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)] + *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID context matching (which matters if an application uses a single external cache for different purposes). Previously, @@ -1702,7 +1739,7 @@ BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation, and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag - BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent. RSA, DSA, and DH + BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent. RSA, DSA, and DH will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set. diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn.h b/crypto/bn/bn.h index 6eb4d999c2..d69e37b04d 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn.h +++ b/crypto/bn/bn.h @@ -256,8 +256,18 @@ extern "C" { #define BN_FLG_MALLOCED 0x01 #define BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA 0x02 -#define BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x04 /* avoid leaking exponent information through timings - * (BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime) */ +#define BN_FLG_CONSTTIME 0x04 /* avoid leaking exponent information through timing, + * BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime, + * BN_div() will call BN_div_no_branch, + * BN_mod_inverse() will call BN_mod_inverse_no_branch. + */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED +#define BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME BN_FLG_CONSTTIME /* deprecated name for the flag */ + /* avoid leaking exponent information through timings + * (BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime) */ +#endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED #define BN_FLG_FREE 0x8000 /* used for debuging */ #endif @@ -436,6 +446,8 @@ void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *b, int n); int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); +int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, + const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); #define BN_mod(rem,m,d,ctx) BN_div(NULL,(rem),(m),(d),(ctx)) int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); @@ -505,6 +517,8 @@ int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r,const BIGNUM *a,const BIGNUM *b,BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a,const BIGNUM *b,BN_CTX *ctx); /* returns -2 for error */ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx); +BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *ret, + const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx); diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c index ccecc63cda..e9b6173e24 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c @@ -153,7 +153,12 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod) { if ((ret->Ai = BN_dup(Ai)) == NULL) goto err; } - ret->mod = mod; + + /* save a copy of mod in the BN_BLINDING structure */ + if ((ret->mod = BN_dup(mod)) == NULL) goto err; + if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) + BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER; return(ret); err: @@ -169,6 +174,7 @@ void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *r) if (r->A != NULL) BN_free(r->A ); if (r->Ai != NULL) BN_free(r->Ai); if (r->e != NULL) BN_free(r->e ); + if (r->mod != NULL) BN_free(r->mod); OPENSSL_free(r); } diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c index 2857f44861..1fd0206e1d 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c @@ -185,6 +185,11 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_ULONG d0,d1; int num_n,div_n; + if (BN_get_flags(num, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) + { + return BN_div_no_branch(dv, rm, num, divisor, ctx); + } + bn_check_top(dv); bn_check_top(rm); bn_check_top(num); @@ -397,4 +402,228 @@ err: return(0); } + +/* BN_div_no_branch is a special version of BN_div. It does not contain + * branches that may leak sensitive information. + */ +int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, + const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx) + { + int norm_shift,i,loop; + BIGNUM *tmp,wnum,*snum,*sdiv,*res; + BN_ULONG *resp,*wnump; + BN_ULONG d0,d1; + int num_n,div_n; + + bn_check_top(dv); + bn_check_top(rm); + bn_check_top(num); + bn_check_top(divisor); + + if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) + { + BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV,BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO); + return(0); + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + tmp=BN_CTX_get(ctx); + snum=BN_CTX_get(ctx); + sdiv=BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (dv == NULL) + res=BN_CTX_get(ctx); + else res=dv; + if (sdiv == NULL || res == NULL) goto err; + + /* First we normalise the numbers */ + norm_shift=BN_BITS2-((BN_num_bits(divisor))%BN_BITS2); + if (!(BN_lshift(sdiv,divisor,norm_shift))) goto err; + sdiv->neg=0; + norm_shift+=BN_BITS2; + if (!(BN_lshift(snum,num,norm_shift))) goto err; + snum->neg=0; + + /* Since we don't know whether snum is larger than sdiv, + * we pad snum with enough zeroes without changing its + * value. + */ + if (snum->top <= sdiv->top+1) + { + if (bn_wexpand(snum, sdiv->top + 2) == NULL) goto err; + for (i = snum->top; i < sdiv->top + 2; i++) snum->d[i] = 0; + snum->top = sdiv->top + 2; + } + else + { + if (bn_wexpand(snum, snum->top + 1) == NULL) goto err; + snum->d[snum->top] = 0; + snum->top ++; + } + + div_n=sdiv->top; + num_n=snum->top; + loop=num_n-div_n; + /* Lets setup a 'window' into snum + * This is the part that corresponds to the current + * 'area' being divided */ + wnum.neg = 0; + wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]); + wnum.top = div_n; + /* only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between top and max */ + wnum.dmax = snum->dmax - loop; /* so we don't step out of bounds */ + + /* Get the top 2 words of sdiv */ + /* div_n=sdiv->top; */ + d0=sdiv->d[div_n-1]; + d1=(div_n == 1)?0:sdiv->d[div_n-2]; + + /* pointer to the 'top' of snum */ + wnump= &(snum->d[num_n-1]); + + /* Setup to 'res' */ + res->neg= (num->neg^divisor->neg); + if (!bn_wexpand(res,(loop+1))) goto err; + res->top=loop-1; + resp= &(res->d[loop-1]); + + /* space for temp */ + if (!bn_wexpand(tmp,(div_n+1))) goto err; + + /* if res->top == 0 then clear the neg value otherwise decrease + * the resp pointer */ + if (res->top == 0) + res->neg = 0; + else + resp--; + + for (i=0; i<loop-1; i++, wnump--, resp--) + { + BN_ULONG q,l0; + /* the first part of the loop uses the top two words of + * snum and sdiv to calculate a BN_ULONG q such that + * | wnum - sdiv * q | < sdiv */ +#if defined(BN_DIV3W) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) + BN_ULONG bn_div_3_words(BN_ULONG*,BN_ULONG,BN_ULONG); + q=bn_div_3_words(wnump,d1,d0); +#else + BN_ULONG n0,n1,rem=0; + + n0=wnump[0]; + n1=wnump[-1]; + if (n0 == d0) + q=BN_MASK2; + else /* n0 < d0 */ + { +#ifdef BN_LLONG + BN_ULLONG t2; + +#if defined(BN_LLONG) && defined(BN_DIV2W) && !defined(bn_div_words) + q=(BN_ULONG)(((((BN_ULLONG)n0)<<BN_BITS2)|n1)/d0); +#else + q=bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0); +#ifdef BN_DEBUG_LEVITTE + fprintf(stderr,"DEBUG: bn_div_words(0x%08X,0x%08X,0x%08\ +X) -> 0x%08X\n", + n0, n1, d0, q); +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED + /* + * rem doesn't have to be BN_ULLONG. The least we + * know it's less that d0, isn't it? + */ + rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2; +#endif + t2=(BN_ULLONG)d1*q; + + for (;;) + { + if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG)rem)<<BN_BITS2)|wnump[-2])) + break; + q--; + rem += d0; + if (rem < d0) break; /* don't let rem overflow */ + t2 -= d1; + } +#else /* !BN_LLONG */ + BN_ULONG t2l,t2h,ql,qh; + + q=bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0); +#ifdef BN_DEBUG_LEVITTE + fprintf(stderr,"DEBUG: bn_div_words(0x%08X,0x%08X,0x%08\ +X) -> 0x%08X\n", + n0, n1, d0, q); +#endif +#ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED + rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2; +#endif + +#if defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI) + BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l,t2h,d1,q); +#elif defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH) + t2l = d1 * q; + t2h = BN_UMULT_HIGH(d1,q); +#else + t2l=LBITS(d1); t2h=HBITS(d1); + ql =LBITS(q); qh =HBITS(q); + mul64(t2l,t2h,ql,qh); /* t2=(BN_ULLONG)d1*q; */ +#endif + + for (;;) + { + if ((t2h < rem) || + ((t2h == rem) && (t2l <= wnump[-2]))) + break; + q--; + rem += d0; + if (rem < d0) break; /* don't let rem overflow */ + if (t2l < d1) t2h--; t2l -= d1; + } +#endif /* !BN_LLONG */ + } +#endif /* !BN_DIV3W */ + + l0=bn_mul_words(tmp->d,sdiv->d,div_n,q); + tmp->d[div_n]=l0; + wnum.d--; + /* ingore top values of the bignums just sub the two + * BN_ULONG arrays with bn_sub_words */ + if (bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, tmp->d, div_n+1)) + { + /* Note: As we have considered only the leading + * two BN_ULONGs in the calculation of q, sdiv * q + * might be greater than wnum (but then (q-1) * sdiv + * is less or equal than wnum) + */ + q--; + if (bn_add_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n)) + /* we can't have an overflow here (assuming + * that q != 0, but if q == 0 then tmp is + * zero anyway) */ + (*wnump)++; + } + /* store part of the result */ + *resp = q; + } + bn_correct_top(snum); + if (rm != NULL) + { + /* Keep a copy of the neg flag in num because if rm==num + * BN_rshift() will overwrite it. + */ + int neg = num->neg; + BN_rshift(rm,snum,norm_shift); + if (!BN_is_zero(rm)) + rm->neg = neg; + bn_check_top(rm); + } + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + return(1); +err: + bn_check_top(rm); + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + return(0); + } + #endif diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c index 8f8c694481..70a33f0d93 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c @@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) int i,bits,ret=0; BIGNUM *v,*rr; - if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0) + if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { - /* BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ + /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXP,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; } @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, if (BN_is_odd(m)) { # ifdef MONT_EXP_WORD - if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0)) + if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) { BN_ULONG A = a->d[0]; ret=BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r,A,p,m,ctx,NULL); @@ -245,9 +245,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; BN_RECP_CTX recp; - if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0) + if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { - /* BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ + /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; } @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; BN_MONT_CTX *mont=NULL; - if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0) + if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont); } @@ -745,9 +745,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p, #define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \ (BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx)) - if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0) + if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { - /* BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ + /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; } @@ -881,9 +881,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */ BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; - if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0) + if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { - /* BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ + /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; } diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c index f02e6fcdb4..9787a65f94 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c @@ -210,6 +210,11 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, BIGNUM *ret=NULL; int sign; + if (BN_get_flags(n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) + { + return BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(in, a, n, ctx); + } + bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(n); @@ -491,3 +496,157 @@ err: bn_check_top(ret); return(ret); } + + +/* BN_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse. + * It does not contain branches that may leak sensitive information. + */ +BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, + const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) + { + BIGNUM *A,*B,*X,*Y,*M,*D,*T,*R=NULL; + BIGNUM local_A, local_B; + BIGNUM *pA, *pB; + BIGNUM *ret=NULL; + int sign; + + bn_check_top(a); + bn_check_top(n); + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + A = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + B = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + D = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + M = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + T = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (T == NULL) goto err; + + if (in == NULL) + R=BN_new(); + else + R=in; + if (R == NULL) goto err; + + BN_one(X); + BN_zero(Y); + if (BN_copy(B,a) == NULL) goto err; + if (BN_copy(A,n) == NULL) goto err; + A->neg = 0; + + if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0)) + { + /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked, + * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually. + */ + pB = &local_B; + BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx)) goto err; + } + sign = -1; + /* From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that + * + * 0 <= B < A, + * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), + * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). + */ + + while (!BN_is_zero(B)) + { + BIGNUM *tmp; + + /* + * 0 < B < A, + * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), + * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|) + */ + + /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked, + * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually. + */ + pA = &local_A; + BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */ + if (!BN_div(D,M,pA,B,ctx)) goto err; + + /* Now + * A = D*B + M; + * thus we have + * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|). + */ + + tmp=A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */ + + /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */ + A=B; + B=M; + /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */ + + /* Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A, + * (**) translates into + * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|), + * i.e. + * sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|). + * Similarly, (*) translates into + * -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|). + * + * Thus, + * sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), + * i.e. + * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|). + * + * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at + * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), + * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). + * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time. + */ + + if (!BN_mul(tmp,D,X,ctx)) goto err; + if (!BN_add(tmp,tmp,Y)) goto err; + + M=Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */ + Y=X; + X=tmp; + sign = -sign; + } + + /* + * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when + * A == gcd(a,n); + * we have + * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|), + * where Y is non-negative. + */ + + if (sign < 0) + { + if (!BN_sub(Y,n,Y)) goto err; + } + /* Now Y*a == A (mod |n|). */ + + if (BN_is_one(A)) + { + /* Y*a == 1 (mod |n|) */ + if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y,n) < 0) + { + if (!BN_copy(R,Y)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (!BN_nnmod(R,Y,n,ctx)) goto err; + } + } + else + { + BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE,BN_R_NO_INVERSE); + goto err; + } + ret=R; +err: + if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL)) BN_free(R); + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + bn_check_top(ret); + return(ret); + } diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c index 244a430d72..63cdc34c59 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c @@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n) i=n/BN_BITS2; j=n%BN_BITS2; if (a->top <= i) return 0; - return((a->d[i]&(((BN_ULONG)1)<<j))?1:0); + return(((a->d[i])>>j)&((BN_ULONG)1)); } int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n) diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c index 37a2c1bca2..e7db440342 100644 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh) { BN_init(&local_prk); prk = &local_prk; - BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else prk = priv_key; @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh) if ((dh->flags & DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { /* XXX */ - BN_set_flags(dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } if (!mont) goto err; diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c index 0423f2e00c..c4aa86bc6d 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static int dsa_builtin_keygen(DSA *dsa) { BN_init(&local_prk); prk = &local_prk; - BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else prk = priv_key; diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c index 38004eced5..4fead07e80 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) while (BN_is_zero(&k)); if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { - BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h index 260fa43efe..898aafffae 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h @@ -196,13 +196,27 @@ struct rsa_st * default (ignoring RSA_FLAG_BLINDING), * but other engines might not need it */ -#define RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x0100 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in RSA +#define RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME 0x0100 /* new with 0.9.8f; the built-in RSA + * implementation now uses constant time + * operations by default in private key operations, + * e.g., constant time modular exponentiation, + * modular inverse without leaking branches, + * division without leaking branches. This + * flag disables these constant time + * operations and results in faster RSA + * private key operations. + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED +#define RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME /* deprecated name for the flag*/ + /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in RSA * implementation now uses constant time * modular exponentiation for secret exponents * by default. This flag causes the * faster variable sliding window method to * be used for all exponents. */ +#endif + #define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pad) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, \ diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c index 385439cdc9..15ebf5dfa3 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c @@ -429,11 +429,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME)) + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { BN_init(&local_d); d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; @@ -551,10 +551,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME)) + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; @@ -715,8 +715,9 @@ err: static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy; - BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1; - BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1; + BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1; + BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1; + int bn_flags; int ret=0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); @@ -724,26 +725,72 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + /* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct + * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag. + */ + bn_flags = rsa->p->flags; + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + rsa->p->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME; + } MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err); + /* We restore bn_flags back */ + rsa->p->flags = bn_flags; + + /* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct + * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag. + */ + bn_flags = rsa->q->flags; + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + rsa->q->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME; + } MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err); + /* We restore bn_flags back */ + rsa->q->flags = bn_flags; + MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); - if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME)) + /* compute I mod q */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + c = &local_c; + BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; + } + + /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { dmq1 = &local_dmq1; - BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; - if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME)) + /* compute I mod p */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + c = &local_c; + BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + } + + /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { dmp1 = &local_dmp1; - BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; @@ -757,7 +804,17 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; - if (!BN_mod(r0,r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + + /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + pr1 = &local_r1; + BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + else + pr1 = r1; + if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following @@ -790,10 +847,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME)) + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c index 742f8b18e5..767f7ab682 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c @@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp; + BIGNUM local_r0,local_d,local_p; + BIGNUM *pr0,*d,*p; int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; @@ -165,16 +167,39 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */ if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */ if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */ - if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d,rsa->e,r0,ctx)) goto err; /* d */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + pr0 = &local_r0; + BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + else + pr0 = r0; + if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d,rsa->e,pr0,ctx)) goto err; /* d */ + + /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + d = &local_d; + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + else + d = rsa->d; /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ - if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err; + if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,d,r1,ctx)) goto err; /* calculate d mod (q-1) */ - if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err; + if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,d,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ - if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp,rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + p = &local_p; + BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + else + p = rsa->p; + if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp,rsa->q,p,ctx)) goto err; ok=1; err: diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c index c4b5b4731d..dd09609743 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c @@ -361,7 +361,8 @@ e |