diff options
| author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2014-05-13 18:48:31 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2014-06-03 16:30:23 +0100 |
| commit | 82ba68c42d6a9cf245afa489471005b2a0377c10 (patch) | |
| tree | 7fef2a3e022996c77ae6b10d7d009f50ab7432d8 /ssl | |
| parent | 4b258e73ae0da0f1a7ff3eb9840b6978711c2400 (diff) | |
Fix for CVE-2014-0195
A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_both.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index 01d724211c..3426a0a5f3 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -621,7 +621,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; } else + { frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data; + if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) + { + item = NULL; + frag = NULL; + goto err; + } + } + /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a * retransmit and can be dropped. |