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authorMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2016-09-29 18:00:37 +0100
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2016-09-29 18:00:37 +0100
commita00d75e1b21bc5c49817610b172bae440f526622 (patch)
treef43f53567f4d623098045c2253bc5b4f6adc5d75 /ssl
parentb36017fe5f2ee0a2cbc1028d842a183e0ac22da7 (diff)
Convert NewSessionTicket construction to WPACKET
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl')
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c109
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 58 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
index 3fbc4ad590..c7d77ae5ec 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
@@ -2956,15 +2956,17 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
- unsigned char *p, *macstart;
+ unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
const unsigned char *const_p;
- int len, slen_full, slen;
+ int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int hlen;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
int iv_len;
+ size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
+ WPACKET pkt;
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
@@ -2982,6 +2984,12 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
return 0;
}
+ if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
+ || !ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
@@ -3014,21 +3022,6 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
}
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
- /*-
- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- * follows handshake_header_length +
- * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
- * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
- * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
- * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
- */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
- SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
- EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
- EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
- goto err;
-
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/*
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
@@ -3039,11 +3032,15 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
hctx, 1);
if (ret == 0) {
- l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
- s2n(0, p); /* length */
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header
- (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))
+
+ /* Put timeout and length */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(&pkt, 0)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt, 0)
+ || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
+ }
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
@@ -3074,44 +3071,38 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
* for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
* new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
*/
- l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
-
- /* Skip ticket length for now */
- p += 2;
- /* Output key name */
- macstart = p;
- memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
- p += sizeof(key_name);
- /* output IV */
- memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
- p += iv_len;
- /* Encrypt session data */
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
- goto err;
- p += len;
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
- goto err;
- p += len;
-
- if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
- goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
- goto err;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
- ctx = NULL;
- hctx = NULL;
-
- p += hlen;
- /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
- /* Total length */
- len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
- /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
- s2n(len - 6, p);
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(&pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
+ /* Now the actual ticket data */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &macoffset)
+ /* Output key name */
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
+ /* output IV */
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, iv, iv_len)
+ || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(&pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+ &encdata1)
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
+ || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt, len, &encdata2)
+ || encdata1 != encdata2
+ || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
+ || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
+ || encdata1 + len != encdata2
+ || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &macendoffset)
+ || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
+ (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
+ macendoffset - macoffset)
+ || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(&pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
+ || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
+ || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
+ || macdata1 != macdata2
+ || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)
+ || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
+ }
OPENSSL_free(senc);
return 1;
@@ -3119,7 +3110,9 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
return 0;
}