diff options
author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2016-09-29 18:00:37 +0100 |
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committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2016-09-29 18:00:37 +0100 |
commit | a00d75e1b21bc5c49817610b172bae440f526622 (patch) | |
tree | f43f53567f4d623098045c2253bc5b4f6adc5d75 /ssl | |
parent | b36017fe5f2ee0a2cbc1028d842a183e0ac22da7 (diff) |
Convert NewSessionTicket construction to WPACKET
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c | 109 |
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 58 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c index 3fbc4ad590..c7d77ae5ec 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c @@ -2956,15 +2956,17 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) unsigned char *senc = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; - unsigned char *p, *macstart; + unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; const unsigned char *const_p; - int len, slen_full, slen; + int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned int hlen; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; int iv_len; + size_t macoffset, macendoffset; + WPACKET pkt; /* get session encoding length */ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); @@ -2982,6 +2984,12 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) return 0; } + if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf) + || !ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { @@ -3014,21 +3022,6 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); - /*- - * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows handshake_header_length + - * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + - * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) + - * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + - * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length. - */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) + - EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + - EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) - goto err; - - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. @@ -3039,11 +3032,15 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) hctx, 1); if (ret == 0) { - l2n(0, p); /* timeout */ - s2n(0, p); /* length */ - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header - (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s))) + + /* Put timeout and length */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(&pkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt, 0) + || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); @@ -3074,44 +3071,38 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. */ - l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); - - /* Skip ticket length for now */ - p += 2; - /* Output key name */ - macstart = p; - memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name)); - p += sizeof(key_name); - /* output IV */ - memcpy(p, iv, iv_len); - p += iv_len; - /* Encrypt session data */ - if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) - goto err; - p += len; - if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len)) - goto err; - p += len; - - if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) - goto err; - if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen)) - goto err; - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); - ctx = NULL; - hctx = NULL; - - p += hlen; - /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ - /* Total length */ - len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); - /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ - p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; - s2n(len - 6, p); - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(&pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout) + /* Now the actual ticket data */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &macoffset) + /* Output key name */ + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) + /* output IV */ + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, iv, iv_len) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(&pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, + &encdata1) + /* Encrypt session data */ + || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) + || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt, len, &encdata2) + || encdata1 != encdata2 + || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) + || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) + || encdata1 + len != encdata2 + || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &macendoffset) + || !HMAC_Update(hctx, + (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, + macendoffset - macoffset) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(&pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) + || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) + || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt, hlen, &macdata2) + || macdata1 != macdata2 + || !WPACKET_close(&pkt) + || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } OPENSSL_free(senc); return 1; @@ -3119,7 +3110,9 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); return 0; } |