Cleanup record length checks for KTLS

In some corner cases the check for packets
which exceed the allowed record length was missing
when KTLS is initially enabled, when some
unprocessed packets are still pending.

Add at least some tests for KTLS, since we have
currently not very much test coverage for KTLS.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17504)

(cherry picked from commit 8fff986d52606e1a33f9404504535e2e2aee3e8b)

1 files changed, 21 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
index d4101618c6..4229c9c392 100644
--- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
+++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 
     rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
     rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
-    is_ktls_left = (rbuf->left > 0);
+    is_ktls_left = (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) > 0);
     max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
     if (max_recs == 0)
         max_recs = 1;
@@ -408,7 +408,11 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
                 len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
 #endif
 
-            if (thisrr->length > len && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
+            /* KTLS may use all of the buffer */
+            if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !is_ktls_left)
+                len = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf);
+
+            if (thisrr->length > len) {
                 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
                          SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                 return -1;
@@ -711,16 +715,27 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
             goto end;
         }
 
+        /*
+         * Usually thisrr->length is the length of a single record, but when
+         * KTLS handles the decryption, thisrr->length may be larger than
+         * SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH because the kernel may have coalesced
+         * multiple records.
+         * Therefore we have to rely on KTLS to check the plaintext length
+         * limit in the kernel.
+         */
         if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
-            && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
+                && (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) || is_ktls_left)) {
             SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
             goto end;
         }
 
-        /* If received packet overflows current Max Fragment Length setting */
+        /*
+         * Check if the received packet overflows the current
+         * Max Fragment Length setting.
+         * Note: USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT and KTLS are mutually exclusive.
+         */
         if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
-                && thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)
-                && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
+                && thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) {
             SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
             goto end;
         }