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authorMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2018-10-26 11:43:19 +0100
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2018-11-12 14:38:47 +0000
commitb4970e8bf5eeebd5b318d1c4b9aa11a73d183458 (patch)
tree24db579e14964c293b3feb86febc95be90f3a6ba /ssl
parent02d3c6aecc646872af1286144ce8af0693a9f4e3 (diff)
Separate ca_names handling for client and server
SSL(_CTX)?_set_client_CA_list() was a server side only function in 1.1.0. If it was called on the client side then it was ignored. In 1.1.1 it now makes sense to have a CA list defined for both client and server (the client now sends it the the TLSv1.3 certificate_authorities extension). Unfortunately some applications were using the same SSL_CTX for both clients and servers and this resulted in some client ClientHellos being excessively large due to the number of certificate authorities being sent. This commit seperates out the CA list updated by SSL(_CTX)?_set_client_CA_list() and the more generic SSL(_CTX)?_set0_CA_list(). This means that SSL(_CTX)?_set_client_CA_list() still has no effect on the client side. If both CA lists are set then SSL(_CTX)?_set_client_CA_list() takes priority. Fixes #7411 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7503) (cherry picked from commit 98732979001dbb59320803713c4c91ba40234250)
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl')
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_cert.c13
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_lib.c51
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_locl.h12
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/extensions.c4
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_lib.c18
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_locl.h3
-rw-r--r--ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c2
7 files changed, 76 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 7d7357fb3a..3314507896 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -501,17 +501,17 @@ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get0_CA_list(const SSL *s)
void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
- SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(ctx, name_list);
+ set0_CA_list(&ctx->client_ca_names, name_list);
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- return ctx->ca_names;
+ return ctx->client_ca_names;
}
void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
- SSL_set0_CA_list(s, name_list);
+ set0_CA_list(&s->client_ca_names, name_list);
}
const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get0_peer_CA_list(const SSL *s)
@@ -523,7 +523,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
{
if (!s->server)
return s->s3 != NULL ? s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names : NULL;
- return s->ca_names != NULL ? s->ca_names : s->ctx->ca_names;
+ return s->client_ca_names != NULL ? s->client_ca_names
+ : s->ctx->client_ca_names;
}
static int add_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, const X509 *x)
@@ -561,12 +562,12 @@ int SSL_CTX_add1_to_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const X509 *x)
*/
int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
{
- return add_ca_name(&ssl->ca_names, x);
+ return add_ca_name(&ssl->client_ca_names, x);
}
int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
- return add_ca_name(&ctx->ca_names, x);
+ return add_ca_name(&ctx->client_ca_names, x);
}
static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 17b13d14e3..61a0ea2cc9 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1196,6 +1196,7 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
@@ -2955,6 +2956,9 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
if ((ret->ca_names = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
+ if ((ret->client_ca_names = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data))
goto err;
@@ -3112,6 +3116,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->tls13_ciphersuites);
ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free);
a->comp_methods = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
@@ -3657,10 +3662,38 @@ const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
return ssl_protocol_to_string(s->version);
}
-SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
+static int dup_ca_names(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **dst, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *src)
{
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
X509_NAME *xn;
+ int i;
+
+ if (src == NULL) {
+ *dst = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(src); i++) {
+ xn = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(src, i));
+ if (xn == NULL) {
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(sk, X509_NAME_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_insert(sk, xn, i) == 0) {
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(sk, X509_NAME_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ *dst = sk;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
+{
SSL *ret;
int i;
@@ -3765,18 +3798,10 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
goto err;
/* Dup the client_CA list */
- if (s->ca_names != NULL) {
- if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->ca_names)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- ret->ca_names = sk;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
- xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
- if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) {
- X509_NAME_free(xn);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
+ if (!dup_ca_names(&ret->ca_names, s->ca_names)
+ || !dup_ca_names(&ret->client_ca_names, s->client_ca_names))
+ goto err;
+
return ret;
err:
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 46719b00ca..e9c5c5cf80 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -854,9 +854,11 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st {
/*
* What we put in certificate_authorities extension for TLS 1.3
* (ClientHello and CertificateRequest) or just client cert requests for
- * earlier versions.
+ * earlier versions. If client_ca_names is populated then it is only used
+ * for client cert requests, and in preference to ca_names.
*/
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_ca_names;
/*
* Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by
@@ -1233,8 +1235,14 @@ struct ssl_st {
long verify_result;
/* extra application data */
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
- /* for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use */
+ /*
+ * What we put in certificate_authorities extension for TLS 1.3
+ * (ClientHello and CertificateRequest) or just client cert requests for
+ * earlier versions. If client_ca_names is populated then it is only used
+ * for client cert requests, and in preference to ca_names.
+ */
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_ca_names;
CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
/* protocol behaviour */
uint32_t options;
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions.c b/ssl/statem/extensions.c
index ad4256d370..63e61c6184 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions.c
@@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
- const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = get_ca_names(s);
if (ca_sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, ca_sk, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
index dc2bd20e93..95c22062ba 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
@@ -2287,10 +2287,24 @@ int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
return 0;
}
-int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s)
{
- const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;;
+ if (s->server) {
+ ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
+ ca_sk = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_sk == NULL)
+ ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+
+ return ca_sk;
+}
+
+int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
/* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h b/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h
index 25e56e4e8d..6b8cf37faa 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
size_t hrrlen);
int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
-int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s);
+int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt);
size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
const void *param, size_t paramlen);
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
index 7d0e9d0ba8..e7c11c4bea 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
@@ -2880,7 +2880,7 @@ int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
}
}
- if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}