diff options
| author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2020-06-18 09:30:48 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 2020-07-16 14:21:07 +0200 |
| commit | 660c534435e238c6bd8065c1d544a1c4d3c555a3 (patch) | |
| tree | a114a104199c298b21e7670eb169df179f4e3cee /ssl/tls13_enc.c | |
| parent | 865adf97c9b8271788ee7293ecde9e8a643a1c45 (diff) | |
Revert "kdf: make function naming consistent."
The commit claimed to make things more consistent. In fact it makes it
less so. Revert back to the previous namig convention.
This reverts commit 765d04c9460a304c8119f57941341a149498b9db.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12186)
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/tls13_enc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/tls13_enc.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_enc.c b/ssl/tls13_enc.c index cf8e42c97e..ba385f6ea2 100644 --- a/ssl/tls13_enc.c +++ b/ssl/tls13_enc.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, + 1 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; WPACKET pkt; - kctx = EVP_KDF_new_ctx(kdf); + kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); EVP_KDF_free(kdf); if (kctx == NULL) return 0; @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); } - EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx); + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); return 0; } @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, data, (data == NULL) ? 0 : datalen) || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &hkdflabellen) || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { - EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx); + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); if (fatal) SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, @@ -107,10 +107,10 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, hkdflabel, hkdflabellen); *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); - ret = EVP_KDF_set_ctx_params(kctx, params) <= 0 + ret = EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kctx, params) <= 0 || EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen) <= 0; - EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx); + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); if (ret != 0) { if (fatal) @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned char preextractsec[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_HKDF, s->ctx->propq); - kctx = EVP_KDF_new_ctx(kdf); + kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); EVP_KDF_free(kdf); if (kctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET, @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, if (!ossl_assert(mdleni >= 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx); + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); return 0; } mdlen = (size_t)mdleni; @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); - EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx); + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); return 0; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1, hash, mdlen, preextractsec, mdlen, 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ - EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx); + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); return 0; } @@ -264,14 +264,14 @@ int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, prevsecretlen); *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); - ret = EVP_KDF_set_ctx_params(kctx, params) <= 0 + ret = EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kctx, params) <= 0 || EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, outsecret, mdlen) <= 0; if (ret != 0) SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx); + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); if (prevsecret == preextractsec) OPENSSL_cleanse(preextractsec, mdlen); return ret == 0; |