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authorBenjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>2018-01-11 11:47:12 -0600
committerBenjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>2018-01-25 12:57:22 -0600
commitc589c34e619c8700ab16b152dd9c8ee58356b319 (patch)
treea2e3f758062721c082f0d836040b80c37bad329a /ssl/t1_lib.c
parenta6419d1ed873a94bce99ae2b880885b8780d6eb9 (diff)
Add support for the TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures). We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received information when selecting what certificate to present. There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages. So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg pair. As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/t1_lib.c')
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_lib.c108
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 00ac5133b3..d4c9086e5a 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1131,7 +1131,8 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
* If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
* the default algorithm for each certificate type
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
+ && s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
@@ -1596,7 +1597,7 @@ int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
return 1;
}
-int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
{
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
@@ -1605,10 +1606,13 @@ int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
if (s->cert == NULL)
return 0;
- return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
+ if (cert)
+ return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
+ &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
+ else
+ return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
+ &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
- return 1;
}
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
@@ -1974,10 +1978,11 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
int default_nid;
int rsign = 0;
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
+ || s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
default_nid = 0;
/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
- else {
+ } else {
switch (idx) {
case SSL_PKEY_RSA:
rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
@@ -2312,14 +2317,49 @@ static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
if (clu == NULL || !(clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth))
return -1;
- /* If PSS and we have no PSS cert use RSA */
- if (sig_idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN && !ssl_has_cert(s, sig_idx))
- sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
-
return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
}
/*
+ * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
+ * with signature scheme |sig|.
+ * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
+ * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
+ * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
+ */
+static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
+{
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
+ int mdnid, pknid;
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
+ if (idx == -1)
+ idx = sig->sig_idx;
+ if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
+ return 0;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
+ if (lu == NULL
+ || !X509_get_signature_info(s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509, &mdnid,
+ &pknid, NULL, NULL))
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * TODO this does not differentiate between the
+ * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
+ * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
+ * signing certificate.
+ */
+ if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
* Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
* Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
*
@@ -2355,14 +2395,9 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
|| lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
continue;
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL) || !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
continue;
- if (!ssl_has_cert(s, lu->sig_idx)) {
- if (lu->sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
- || !ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA))
- continue;
- sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
- }
if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (curve == -1) {
@@ -2381,21 +2416,8 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
} else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- int pkey_id;
- if (sig_idx == -1)
- pkey = s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
- else
- pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
- pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
- if (pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
- && pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
- continue;
- /*
- * The pkey type is EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS or EVP_PKEY_RSA
- * EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA returns NULL if the type is not EVP_PKEY_RSA
- * so use EVP_PKEY_get0 instead
- */
+ pkey = s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
continue;
}
@@ -2416,8 +2438,8 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
return 1;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ size_t i;
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
- size_t i;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int curve;
@@ -2444,21 +2466,16 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
- if (cc_idx != sig_idx) {
- if (sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
- || cc_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA)
- continue;
- sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
- }
+ if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
+ continue;
}
+ /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
+ if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
+ continue;
if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
- int pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
- if (pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
- && pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
- continue;
if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
continue;
}
@@ -2479,7 +2496,7 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
* If we have no sigalg use defaults
*/
const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
- size_t sent_sigslen, i;
+ size_t sent_sigslen;
if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
if (!fatalerrs)
@@ -2492,7 +2509,8 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
- if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
+ if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
+ && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
break;
}
if (i == sent_sigslen) {