diff options
| author | Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 2001-07-31 07:21:06 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 2001-07-31 07:21:06 +0000 |
| commit | 882e891284c81c7a49b2bce28f44df3e8d6f7ffc (patch) | |
| tree | fe1e72c9ff5edce490f7da03e639ad7e54cfe0f9 /ssl/ssl_txt.c | |
| parent | 05bbf78afd4cc10c776ad141749c13c25a2daa5e (diff) | |
More Kerberos SSL changes from Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@columbia.edu>
His comments are:
First, it corrects a problem introduced in the last patch where the
kssl_map_enc() would intentionally return NULL for valid ENCTYPE
values. This was done to prevent verification of the kerberos 5
authenticator from being performed when Derived Key ciphers were
in use. Unfortunately, the authenticator verification routine was
not the only place that function was used. And it caused core dumps.
Second, it attempt to add to SSL_SESSION the Kerberos 5 Client
Principal Name.
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/ssl_txt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_txt.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_txt.c b/ssl/ssl_txt.c index 8b37a37e40..77e881d061 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_txt.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_txt.c @@ -139,6 +139,18 @@ int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, SSL_SESSION *x) { if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->key_arg[i]) <= 0) goto err; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + if (BIO_puts(bp,"/n Krb5 Principal: ") <= 0) goto err; + if (x->krb5_client_princ_len == 0) + { + if (BIO_puts(bp,"None") <= 0) goto err; + } + else + for (i=0; i<x->krb5_client_princ_len; i++) + { + if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->key_arg[i]) <= 0) goto err; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (x->compress_meth != 0) { SSL_COMP *comp; |