diff options
| author | Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org> | 2016-03-18 22:09:41 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org> | 2016-04-03 11:35:35 -0400 |
| commit | fbb82a60dcbe820714a246ab3e7617eaf3a7b656 (patch) | |
| tree | 261c976e4e3d6dbea776b0fb54c635bd2a10eebd /ssl/ssl_cert.c | |
| parent | 70dd3c6593d87e4cbb56b485717cb2cfff730f3e (diff) | |
Move peer chain security checks into x509_vfy.c
A new X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() function sets the
authentication security level. For verification of SSL peers, this
is automatically set from the SSL security level. Otherwise, for
now, the authentication security level remains at (effectively) 0
by default.
The new "-auth_level" verify(1) option is available in all the
command-line tools that support the standard verify(1) options.
New verify(1) tests added to check enforcement of chain signature
and public key security levels. Also added new tests of enforcement
of the verify_depth limit.
Updated documentation.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/ssl_cert.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_cert.c | 25 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c index 4081ebe4ff..24ac352d1d 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -494,6 +494,12 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) return (0); } param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx); + /* + * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some + * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto + * and PKI authentication. + */ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s)); /* Set suite B flags if needed */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); @@ -520,17 +526,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); - else { + else i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); -# if 0 - /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); -# endif - if (i > 0) - i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, ctx.chain, NULL, 1); - } s->verify_result = ctx.error; sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free); @@ -894,12 +891,18 @@ int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can */ - X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); + (void) X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ ERR_clear_error(); i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, xs_ctx.chain, NULL, 0); if (i != 1) { X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); +#if 0 + /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); +#endif SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); return 0; } |