diff options
author | Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 2001-07-09 21:46:58 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 2001-07-09 21:46:58 +0000 |
commit | 2a1ef754358e35c8e86df903e0a2f92c35a550d0 (patch) | |
tree | 6ac406a5043c584c2ce0912d35192c3c30376f67 /ssl/s3_srvr.c | |
parent | c148d7097811c18f277a8559753c770f4ff85771 (diff) |
Patches from Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> to get Kerberos 5 in
SSL according to RFC 2712. His comment is:
This is a patch to openssl-SNAP-20010702 to support Kerberized SSL
authentication. I'm expecting to have the full kssl-0.5 kit up on
sourceforge by the end of the week. The full kit includes patches
for mod-ssl, apache, and a few text clients. The sourceforge URL
is http://sourceforge.net/projects/kssl/ .
Thanks to a note from Simon Wilkinson I've replaced my KRB5 AP_REQ
message with a real KerberosWrapper struct. I think this is fully
RFC 2712 compliant now, including support for the optional
authenticator field. I also added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for
a few Kerberos structs; see crypto/krb5/ if you're interested.
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/s3_srvr.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_srvr.c | 113 |
1 files changed, 92 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 09fcc59d00..9fcf8c0fdf 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ #include <openssl/objects.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 @@ -1452,13 +1453,46 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (l & SSL_kKRB5) { - krb5_error_code krb5rc; - KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; + krb5_error_code krb5rc; + krb5_data enc_ticket; + krb5_data authenticator; + krb5_data enc_pms; + KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; + EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + int padl, outl = sizeof(pms); + krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; + krb5_ticket_times ttimes; if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); - if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, - s->init_buf->data, s->init_buf->length, - &kssl_err)) != 0) + + n2s(p,i); + enc_ticket.length = i; + enc_ticket.data = p; + p+=enc_ticket.length; + + n2s(p,i); + authenticator.length = i; + authenticator.data = p; + p+=authenticator.length; + + n2s(p,i); + enc_pms.length = i; + enc_pms.data = p; + p+=enc_pms.length; + + if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + + enc_pms.length + 6) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, + &kssl_err)) != 0) { #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", @@ -1471,34 +1505,71 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) goto err; } + /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, + ** but will return authtime == 0. + */ + if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, + &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) + { +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", + krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); + if (kssl_err.text) + printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + kssl_err.reason); + goto err; + } + + if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); + goto err; + } + #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - /* 19991013 VRS - 3DES is kind of bogus here, - ** at least until Kerberos supports 3DES. The only - ** real secret is the 8-byte Kerberos session key; - ** the other key material (client_random, server_random) - ** could be sniffed. Nonces may help against replays though. - ** - ** Alternate code for Kerberos Purists: - ** - ** memcpy(s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length); - ** s->session->master_key_length = kssl_ctx->length; - */ + enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); + memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */ + + EVP_DecryptInit(&ciph_ctx,enc,kssl_ctx->key,iv); + EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, + enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length); + if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + EVP_DecryptFinal(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl); + outl += padl; + if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); + s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length); - /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, but it caused problems for apache. - ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); - ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; + s->session->master_key, pms, outl); + + /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, + ** but it caused problems for apache. + ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); + ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; */ } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); goto f_err; } |