diff options
author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-02-01 17:14:43 +0000 |
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committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-03-26 15:01:57 +0000 |
commit | 02a36fdae8cb503e2f88eac52eb3053431089397 (patch) | |
tree | 51edae5f881d512fc253259157cd635ad6e7b120 /ssl/s3_enc.c | |
parent | fe589e6175f350a3e83b39ea07a08b0c824ea6fb (diff) |
Move more SSL3_RECORD oriented functions into ssl3_record.c
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/s3_enc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_enc.c | 169 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 169 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c index 19cd49a85e..d3269245d3 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_enc.c +++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c @@ -480,80 +480,6 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = 0; } -/*- - * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. - * - * Returns: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too - * short etc). - * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. - * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error - * occurred. - */ -int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send) -{ - SSL3_RECORD *rec; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; - unsigned long l; - int bs, i, mac_size = 0; - const EVP_CIPHER *enc; - - if (send) { - ds = s->enc_write_ctx; - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&s->rlayer); - if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) - enc = NULL; - else - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); - } else { - ds = s->enc_read_ctx; - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); - if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) - enc = NULL; - else - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); - } - - if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { - memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); - rec->input = rec->data; - } else { - l = rec->length; - bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); - - /* COMPRESS */ - - if ((bs != 1) && send) { - i = bs - ((int)l % bs); - - /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ - l += i; - /* - * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the - * padding length. - */ - memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); - rec->length += i; - rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1); - } - - if (!send) { - if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) - return 0; - /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ - } - - if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1) - return -1; - - if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - if ((bs != 1) && !send) - return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); - } - return (1); -} - void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s) { BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); @@ -713,101 +639,6 @@ static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, return ((int)ret); } -int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) -{ - SSL3_RECORD *rec; - unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq; - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; - const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; - unsigned char *p, rec_char; - size_t md_size; - int npad; - int t; - - if (send) { - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer); - mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); - seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); - hash = ssl->write_hash; - } else { - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer); - mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); - seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); - hash = ssl->read_hash; - } - - t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); - if (t < 0) - return -1; - md_size = t; - npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; - - if (!send && - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && - ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) { - /* - * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any - * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we - * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. - */ - - /*- - * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: - * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. - * - * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size - * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller - * total size. - */ - unsigned char header[75]; - unsigned j = 0; - memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); - j += md_size; - memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); - j += npad; - memcpy(header + j, seq, 8); - j += 8; - header[j++] = rec->type; - header[j++] = rec->length >> 8; - header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff; - - /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ - ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, - md, &md_size, - header, rec->input, - rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, - mac_sec, md_size, 1); - } else { - unsigned int md_size_u; - /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - - EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8); - rec_char = rec->type; - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1); - p = md; - s2n(rec->length, p); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - - EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u); - md_size = md_size_u; - - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - } - - ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); - return (md_size); -} - void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) { int i; |