diff options
author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-09-11 10:48:59 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-10-30 08:38:18 +0000 |
commit | 8ba708e5166b02ab61f2762d36b3e7b7455e9c06 (patch) | |
tree | 656a9eea1a383757494ea7058d7ea680ba46e93c /ssl/s3_clnt.c | |
parent | 1aeaa7ec06ccd4c819a3ca94139c3ab79463fada (diff) |
Reorganise state machine files
Pull out the state machine into a separate sub directory. Also moved some
functions which were nothing to do with the state machine but were in state
machine files. Pulled all the SSL_METHOD definitions into one place...most
of those files had very little left in them any more.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/s3_clnt.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_clnt.c | 2819 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2819 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c deleted file mode 100644 index 49a9f60259..0000000000 --- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2819 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. - * - * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license provided above. - * - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by - * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include "ssl_locl.h" -#include <openssl/buffer.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/md5.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -# include <openssl/dh.h> -#endif -#include <openssl/bn.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -# include <openssl/engine.h> -#endif - -static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s); -static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); -static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, - unsigned char *p); - -/* - * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if - * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. - * Returns 1 on success - * Returns 0 on error - */ -static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned long mask, options = s->options; - - if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) { - /* - * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are - * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order - * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So - * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of - * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the - * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3. - */ - mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) - | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 -#endif - ; -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT) - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) { - if ((options & mask) != mask) { - s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION; - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); - return 0; - } - } else { - s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION; - } -#else - if ((options & mask) == mask) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); - return 0; - } - s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION; -#endif - - mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; - if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask) - s->version = TLS1_VERSION; - mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) - if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask) - s->version = SSL3_VERSION; -#endif - - if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, - SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - return 0; - } - - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); - return 0; - } - - } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { - /* Determine which DTLS version to use */ - /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) { - if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, - SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - return 0; - } - /* - * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. - */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - return 0; - } - /* - * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features. - */ - s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); - s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; - } else { - /* - * We only support one version: update method - */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) - s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); - s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; - } - } - - s->client_version = s->version; - - return 1; -} - -int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p, *d; - int i; - unsigned long l; - int al = 0; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - int j; - SSL_COMP *comp; -#endif - SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; - - buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ - if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0) - goto err; - - if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || - /* - * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared - * "ticket" without a session ID. - */ - (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || - (sess->not_resumable)) { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) - goto err; - } - /* else use the pre-loaded session */ - - p = s->s3->client_random; - - /* - * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are - * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify - */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - size_t idx; - i = 1; - for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) { - if (p[idx]) { - i = 0; - break; - } - } - } else - i = 1; - - if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, - sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) - goto err; - - /* Do the message type and length last */ - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - - /*- - * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from - * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version - * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also - * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can - * choke if we initially report a higher version then - * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This - * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it - * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports - * 1.0. - * - * Possible scenario with previous logic: - * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 - * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 - * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. - * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. - * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. - * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now - * know that is maximum server supports. - * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret - * containing version 1.0. - * - * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the - * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely - * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't - * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with - * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using - * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to - * the negotiated version. - */ - *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; - *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; - - /* Random stuff */ - memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /* Session ID */ - if (s->new_session) - i = 0; - else - i = s->session->session_id_length; - *(p++) = i; - if (i != 0) { - if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); - p += i; - } - - /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; - memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); - p += s->d1->cookie_len; - } - - /* Ciphers supported */ - i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2])); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); - goto err; - } -#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH - /* - * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround - * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we - * use TLS v1.2 - */ - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION - && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH) - i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; -#endif - s2n(i, p); - p += i; - - /* COMPRESSION */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - *(p++) = 1; -#else - - if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods) - j = 0; - else - j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); - *(p++) = 1 + j; - for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { - comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); - *(p++) = comp->id; - } -#endif - *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ - - /* TLS extensions */ - if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - if ((p = - ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, - &al)) == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - l = p - d; - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - return 1; - err: - statem_set_error(s); - return 0; -} - -enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) -{ - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - PACKET session_id; - size_t session_id_len; - unsigned char *cipherchars; - int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - unsigned int compression; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - SSL_COMP *comp; -#endif - - if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) { - unsigned int sversion; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - -#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION -#error Code needs updating for new TLS version -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 - if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) { - if (FIPS_mode()) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->method = SSLv3_client_method(); - } else -#endif - if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) { - s->method = TLSv1_client_method(); - } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) { - s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method(); - } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) { - s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method(); - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version; - - if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { - /* Work out correct protocol version to use */ - unsigned int hversion; - int options; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &hversion)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - options = s->options; - if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) - s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); - else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - s->version = hversion; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) - s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); - else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - s->version = hversion; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version; - } else { - unsigned char *vers; - - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &vers, 2)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8)) - || (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1]; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - } - - /* load the server hello data */ - /* load the server random */ - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - s->hit = 0; - - /* Get the session-id. */ - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); - if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id - || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret. - * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. - * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. - * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) - * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application - * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST - * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone - * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if - * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the - * server wants to resume. - */ - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb && - s->session->tlsext_tick) { - SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; - s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, - &s->session->master_key_length, - NULL, &pref_cipher, - s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { - s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? - pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - - if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length - && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, - session_id_len) == 0) { - if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length - || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { - /* actually a client application bug */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); - goto f_err; - } - s->hit = 1; - } else { - /* - * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server - * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION. - * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, - * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be - * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. - */ - if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { - goto f_err; - } - } - - s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; - /* session_id_len could be 0 */ - memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), - session_id_len); - } - - c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); - if (c == NULL) { - /* unknown cipher */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */ - if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) - s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; - else - s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0; - /* - * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so - * return an error. - */ - if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - - sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); - i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); - if (i < 0) { - /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher - * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is - * set and use it for comparison. - */ - if (s->session->cipher) - s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; - if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; - /* - * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client - * authentication. - */ - if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) - goto f_err; - /* lets get the compression algorithm */ - /* COMPRESSION */ - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (compression != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; - } - /* - * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session - * using compression. - */ - if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; - } -#else - if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - if (compression == 0) - comp = NULL; - else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); - goto f_err; - } else { - comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression); - } - - if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; - } else { - s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; - } -#endif - - /* TLS extensions */ - if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - /* wrong packet length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { - unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; - char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; - - /* - * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if - * no SCTP used. - */ - snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, - sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), - DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); - - if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), - labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, - 0) <= 0) - goto err; - - BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), - BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); - } -#endif - - return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: - statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; -} - -enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) -{ - int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx; - unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; - X509 *x = NULL; - unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; - STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - - if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { - if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - certstart = certbytes; - x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len); - if (x == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto f_err; - } - if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - x = NULL; - } - - i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); - if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { - al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - goto f_err; - } - ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ - if (i > 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; - } - - s->session->peer_chain = sk; - /* - * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, - * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c - */ - x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); - sk = NULL; - /* - * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end - */ - - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); - - if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { - x = NULL; - al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } - - i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey); - if (i < 0) { - x = NULL; - al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); - if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) { - x = NULL; - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - s->session->peer_type = i; - - X509_free(s->session->peer); - X509_up_ref(x); - s->session->peer = x; - s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; - - x = NULL; - ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - goto done; - - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: - statem_set_error(s); - done: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - X509_free(x); - sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); - return ret; -} - -enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) -{ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; -#endif - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; - int al, j, verify_ret; - long alg_k, alg_a; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA *rsa = NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH *dh = NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; - EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - int curve_nid = 0; -#endif - PACKET save_param_start, signature; - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - - save_param_start = *pkt; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |