diff options
| author | Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 2013-02-01 15:31:50 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2013-02-06 14:19:10 +0000 |
| commit | 2aec073a529f8d8dc0e625b9c444db9de7b46873 (patch) | |
| tree | 4ba9453ee337ebaa319fd7dcf9346daa084cb6a7 /ssl/s3_cbc.c | |
| parent | b714a1fe09fc03588b0a0f6f8f14488bd3a2efaf (diff) | |
ssl/*: remove SSL3_RECORD->orig_len to restore binary compatibility.
Kludge alert. This is arranged by passing padding length in unused
bits of SSL3_RECORD->type, so that orig_len can be reconstructed.
(cherry picked from commit 8bfd4c659f180a6ce34f21c0e62956b362067fba)
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/s3_cbc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_cbc.c | 21 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c index 52e294157e..b91d84098d 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c +++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c @@ -116,7 +116,9 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead); /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1); - rec->length -= good & (padding_length+1); + padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); + rec->length -= padding_length; + rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); } @@ -203,7 +205,9 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1; good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good); - rec->length -= good & (padding_length+1); + padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); + rec->length -= padding_length; + rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ /* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning * of this function that the record has at least enough space for the @@ -218,7 +222,6 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, rec->data += block_size; rec->input += block_size; rec->length -= block_size; - rec->orig_len -= block_size; } return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); @@ -246,7 +249,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, */ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, const SSL3_RECORD *rec, - unsigned md_size) + unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len) { #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; @@ -265,7 +268,7 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, unsigned div_spoiler; unsigned rotate_offset; - OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size); + OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size); OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) @@ -273,8 +276,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, #endif /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ - if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) - scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); + if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) + scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); /* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least. @@ -287,9 +290,9 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size; memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); - for (i = scan_start; i < rec->orig_len;) + for (i = scan_start; i < orig_len;) { - for (j = 0; j < md_size && i < rec->orig_len; i++, j++) + for (j = 0; j < md_size && i < orig_len; i++, j++) { unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start); unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end); |