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| author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2012-05-10 15:10:15 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2012-05-10 15:10:15 +0000 |
| commit | d414a5a0f041af6ef460150b093049ff80921fbf (patch) | |
| tree | 3f038f776c764624347e4bffee2f712516cadb3b /ssl/d1_enc.c | |
| parent | 9eb4460e68ddbd7ba048349dadec5ae66a9d3756 (diff) | |
Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS 1.2, 1.1 and
DTLS to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/d1_enc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_enc.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_enc.c b/ssl/d1_enc.c index becbab91c2..07a5e97ce5 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_enc.c +++ b/ssl/d1_enc.c @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) } /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size. * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */ - if (i > (int)rec->length) + if (i + bs > (int)rec->length) { /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is |