Run util/openssl-format-source -v -c .

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

1 files changed, 1235 insertions, 1257 deletions

diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 5a467c4c0f..1c475200cb 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /* ssl/d1_both.c */
-/* 
+/*
  * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  * are met:
  *
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -62,21 +62,21 @@
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
+ *
  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
+ *
  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  * the code are not to be removed.
  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
+ *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
@@ -91,10 +91,10 @@
  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
+ *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
+ *
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -126,1340 +126,1318 @@
 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
 
 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
-			if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
-				long ii; \
-				for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
-			} else { \
-				long ii; \
-				bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
-				for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
-				bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
-			} }
+                        if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
+                                long ii; \
+                                for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
+                        } else { \
+                                long ii; \
+                                bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
+                                for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
+                                bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
+                        } }
 
 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
-			long ii; \
-			OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
-			is_complete = 1; \
-			if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
-			if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
-				if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
+                        long ii; \
+                        OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
+                        is_complete = 1; \
+                        if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
+                        if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
+                                if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
 
 #if 0
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
-			long ii; \
-			printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
-			printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
-			printf("\n"); }
+# define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
+                        long ii; \
+                        printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
+                        printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
+                        printf("\n"); }
 #endif
 
-static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80};
-static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[]   = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
+static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] =
+    { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80 };
+static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] =
+    { 0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f };
 
 /* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
-static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
+static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28 };
 
 static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
-static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, 
-	unsigned long frag_len);
-static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
-	unsigned char *p);
+static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
+                                     unsigned long frag_len);
+static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
 static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
-	unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, 
-	unsigned long frag_len);
-static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, 
-	long max, int *ok);
-
-static hm_fragment *
-dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
-	{
-	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
-	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-	unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
-
-	frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
-	if ( frag == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-
-	if (frag_len)
-		{
-		buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
-		if ( buf == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(frag);
-			return NULL;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
-	frag->fragment = buf;
-
-	/* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
-	if (reassembly)
-		{
-		bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
-		if (bitmask == NULL)
-			{
-			if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
-			OPENSSL_free(frag);
-			return NULL;
-			}
-		memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
-		}
-
-	frag->reassembly = bitmask;
-
-	return frag;
-	}
-
-static void
-dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
-	{
-	if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
-	if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
-	OPENSSL_free(frag);
-	}
-
-/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
+                                         unsigned long len,
+                                         unsigned short seq_num,
+                                         unsigned long frag_off,
+                                         unsigned long frag_len);
+static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max,
+                                       int *ok);
+
+static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len,
+                                          int reassembly)
+{
+    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
+
+    frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
+    if (frag == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (frag_len) {
+        buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
+        if (buf == NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(frag);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
+    frag->fragment = buf;
+
+    /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
+    if (reassembly) {
+        bitmask =
+            (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
+        if (bitmask == NULL) {
+            if (buf != NULL)
+                OPENSSL_free(buf);
+            OPENSSL_free(frag);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
+    }
+
+    frag->reassembly = bitmask;
+
+    return frag;
+}
+
+static void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
+{
+    if (frag->fragment)
+        OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+    if (frag->reassembly)
+        OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+    OPENSSL_free(frag);
+}
+
+/*
+ * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
+ * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ */
 int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	int curr_mtu;
-	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
-
-	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
-	if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
-		{
-		s->d1->mtu = 
-			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
-
-		/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
-		 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
-		if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
-			{
-			s->d1->mtu = 0;
-			s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
-			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, 
-				s->d1->mtu, NULL);
-			}
-		}
-#if 0 
-	mtu = s->d1->mtu;
-
-	fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
-
-	mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
-	curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-
-	if ( curr_mtu > 0)
-		mtu = curr_mtu;
-	else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
-		return ret;
-
-	if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
-		{
-		ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-		if ( ret <= 0)
-			return ret;
-		mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-		}
+{
+    int ret;
+    int curr_mtu;
+    unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
+
+    /* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
+    if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()
+        && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+        s->d1->mtu =
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+
+        /*
+         * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
+         * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
+         */
+        if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) {
+            s->d1->mtu = 0;
+            s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
+                     s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+        }
+    }
+#if 0
+    mtu = s->d1->mtu;
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
+
+    mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+    curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+
+    if (curr_mtu > 0)
+        mtu = curr_mtu;
+    else if ((ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
+        return ret;
+
+    if (BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu) {
+        ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            return ret;
+        mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+    }
 #endif
 
-	OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());  /* should have something reasonable now */
-
-	if ( s->init_off == 0  && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
-		OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 
-			(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
-	if (s->write_hash)
-		mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
-	else
-		mac_size = 0;
-
-	if (s->enc_write_ctx && 
-		(EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
-		blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
-	else
-		blocksize = 0;
-
-	frag_off = 0;
-	while( s->init_num)
-		{
-		curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - 
-			DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
-
-		if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
-			{
-			/* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
-			ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-			if ( ret <= 0)
-				return ret;
-			curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
-				mac_size - blocksize;
-			}
-
-		if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
-			len = curr_mtu;
-		else
-			len = s->init_num;
-
-
-		/* XDTLS: this function is too long.  split out the CCS part */
-		if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
-			{
-			if ( s->init_off != 0)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-				s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-				s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-				if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
-					len = curr_mtu;
-				else
-					len = s->init_num;
-				}
-
-			dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 
-				len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
-			dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
-
-			OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-			}
-
-		ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
-			len);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			{
-			/* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
-			 * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
-			 * really retransmit anything.  continue as if everything
-			 * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
-			 * retransmit 
-			 */
-			if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
-				BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
-				s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
-					BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
-			else
-				return(-1);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-
-			/* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
-			 * message got sent.  but why would this happen? */
-			OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
-
-			if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
-				{
-				/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
-				 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
-				unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
-				const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
-				int xlen;
-
-				if (frag_off == 0 && s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-					{
-					/* reconstruct message header is if it
-					 * is being sent in single fragment */
-					*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
-					l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
-					s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
-					l2n3(0,p);
-					l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
-					p  -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-					xlen = ret;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					p  += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-					xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-					}
-
-				ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
-				}
-
-			if (ret == s->init_num)
-				{
-				if (s->msg_callback)
-					s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, 
-						(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, 
-						s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-				s->init_off = 0;  /* done writing this message */
-				s->init_num = 0;
-
-				return(1);
-				}
-			s->init_off+=ret;
-			s->init_num-=ret;
-			frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-			}
-		}
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-
-/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
- * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
- * Read an entire handshake message.  Handshake messages arrive in
- * fragments.
+    OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); /* should have something
+                                                    * reasonable now */
+
+    if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+        OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
+                       (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+                       DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+    if (s->write_hash)
+        mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
+    else
+        mac_size = 0;
+
+    if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
+        (EVP_CIPHER_mode(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
+        blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
+    else
+        blocksize = 0;
+
+    frag_off = 0;
+    while (s->init_num) {
+        curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
+            DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
+
+        if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+            /*
+             * grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong
+             */
+            ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+            if (ret <= 0)
+                return ret;
+            curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
+                mac_size - blocksize;
+        }
+
+        if (s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+            len = curr_mtu;
+        else
+            len = s->init_num;
+
+        /*
+         * XDTLS: this function is too long.  split out the CCS part
+         */
+        if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+            if (s->init_off != 0) {
+                OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+                s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+                if (s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+                    len = curr_mtu;
+                else
+                    len = s->init_num;
+            }
+
+            dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
+                                     len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+            dtls1_write_message_header(s,
+                                       (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->
+                                       data[s->init_off]);
+
+            OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+        }
+
+        ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+                                len);
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            /*
+             * might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which
+             * previous packet caused the failure -- so can't really
+             * retransmit anything.  continue as if everything is fine and
+             * wait for an alert to handle the retransmit
+             */
+            if (BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+                         BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0)
+                s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+                                      BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+            else
+                return (-1);
+        } else {
+
+            /*
+             * bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message
+             * got sent.  but why would this happen?
+             */
+            OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
+
+            if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) {
+                /*
+                 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
+                 * we'll ignore the result anyway
+                 */
+                unsigned char *p =
+                    (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
+                const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+                int xlen;
+
+                if (frag_off == 0 && s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+                    /*
+                     * reconstruct message header is if it is being sent in
+                     * single fragment
+                     */
+                    *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+                    l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
+                    s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
+                    l2n3(0, p);
+                    l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
+                    p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                    xlen = ret;
+                } else {
+                    p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                    xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                }
+
+                ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
+            }
+
+            if (ret == s->init_num) {
+                if (s->msg_callback)
+                    s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
+                                    (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
+                                    s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+                s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
+                s->init_num = 0;
+
+                return (1);
+            }
+            s->init_off += ret;
+            s->init_num -= ret;
+            frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+        }
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), maximum
+ * acceptable body length 'max'. Read an entire handshake message.  Handshake
+ * messages arrive in fragments.
  */
 long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
-	{
-	int i, al;
-	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
-	unsigned char *p;
-	unsigned long msg_len;
-
-	/* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
-	 * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
-	if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
-		if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		*ok=1;
-		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
-		return s->init_num;
-		}
-
-	msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
-	memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
-
-again:
-	i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
-	if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
-		i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY)
-		{
-		/* bad fragment received */
-		goto again;
-		}
-	else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
-		{
-		return i;
-		}
-
-	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
-
-	/* reconstruct message header */
-	*(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
-	l2n3(msg_len,p);
-	s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
-	l2n3(0,p);
-	l2n3(msg_len,p);
-	if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
-		p       -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-	}
-
-	ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-			p, msg_len,
-			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-	memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
-
-	/* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
-	if (!s->d1->listen)
-		s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
-
-	s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-	return s->init_num;
-
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-	*ok = 0;
-	return -1;
-	}
-
-
-static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
-	{
-	size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
-
-	msg_len  = msg_hdr->msg_len;
-	frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
-	frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
-
-	/* sanity checking */
-	if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		}
-
-	if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		}
-
-	if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
-		{
-		/* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
-		 * against max above */
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-			return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			}
-
-		s->s3->tmp.message_size  = msg_len;
-		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
-		s->s3->tmp.message_type  = msg_hdr->type;
-		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type    = msg_hdr->type;
-		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq     = msg_hdr->seq;
-		}
-	else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
-		{
-		/* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
-		 * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		}
-
-	return 0; /* no error */
-	}
-
-
-static int
-dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
-	{
-	/*-
-	 * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
-	 * if so:
-	 * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
-	 * (2) update s->init_num
-	 */
-	pitem *item;
-	hm_fragment *frag;
-	int al;
-
-	*ok = 0;
-	item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
-	if ( item == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-	
-	/* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
-	if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
-		{
-		unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
-		pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
-
-		al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
-
-		if (al==0) /* no alert */
-			{
-			unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-			memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
-				frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
-			}
-
-		dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-		pitem_free(item);
-
-		if (al==0)
-			{
-			*ok = 1;
-			return frag_len;
-			}
-
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-		s->init_num = 0;
-		*ok = 0;
-		return -1;
-		}
-	else
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
- * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
- * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+{
+    int i, al;
+    struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned long msg_len;
+
+    /*
+     * s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused by the
+     * absence of an optional handshake message
+     */
+    if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
+        s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+        if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        *ok = 1;
+        s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+        return s->init_num;
+    }
+
+    msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
+    memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+
+ again:
+    i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
+    if (i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) {
+        /* bad fragment received */
+        goto again;
+    } else if (i <= 0 && !*ok) {
+        return i;
+    }
+
+    p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+    msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+
+    /* reconstruct message header */
+    *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
+    l2n3(msg_len, p);
+    s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
+    l2n3(0, p);
+    l2n3(msg_len, p);
+    if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+        p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    }
+
+    ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
+    if (s->msg_callback)
+        s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                        p, msg_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+    memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+
+    /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
+    if (!s->d1->listen)
+        s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
+    s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    return s->init_num;
+
+ f_err:
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    *ok = 0;
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
+                                     int max)
+{
+    size_t frag_off, frag_len, msg_len;
+
+    msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+    frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
+    frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+    /* sanity checking */
+    if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+        return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    if ((frag_off + frag_len) > (unsigned long)max) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+        return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) { /* first fragment */
+        /*
+         * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked against max
+         * above
+         */
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
+            (s->init_buf, (int)msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+            return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
+        s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
+        s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
+        s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
+        s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
+    } else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) {
+        /*
+         * They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce upper limit
+         * would open possibility for buffer overrun.
+         */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+        return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    return 0;                   /* no error */
+}
+
+static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
+{
+        /*-
+         * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
+         * if so:
+         * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
+         * (2) update s->init_num
+         */
+    pitem *item;
+    hm_fragment *frag;
+    int al;
+
+    *ok = 0;
+    item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+    if (item == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+    /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
+    if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) {
+        unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
+        pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+
+        al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header, max);
+
+        if (al == 0) {          /* no alert */
+            unsigned char *p =
+                (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+            memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment,
+                   frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+        }
+
+        dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+        pitem_free(item);
+
+        if (al == 0) {
+            *ok = 1;
+            return frag_len;
+        }
+
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        *ok = 0;
+        return -1;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but
+ * may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it.
+ */
 static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
-	if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
-		return s->max_cert_list;
-	return max_len;
-	}
+{
+    unsigned long max_len =
+        DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+    if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+        return s->max_cert_list;
+    return max_len;
+}
 
 static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
-	{
-	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
-	pitem *item = NULL;
-	int i = -1, is_complete;
-	PQ_64BIT seq64;
-	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
-
-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
-	    msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
-		goto err;
-
-	if (frag_len == 0)
-		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-
-	/* Try to find item in queue */
-	pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
-	pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
-	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64);
-	pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
-
-	if (item == NULL)
-		{
-		frag =