diff options
| author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2005-04-27 16:27:14 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2005-04-27 16:27:14 +0000 |
| commit | 6c61726b2af78a1985178d31e551351231b54b10 (patch) | |
| tree | a8dbb193224405b5a6900138c9649c8a59ab0d6f /ssl/d1_both.c | |
| parent | cd202fe2f9d3cd44c361ba56b158ef400a75dc39 (diff) | |
Lots of Win32 fixes for DTLS.
1. "unsigned long long" isn't portable changed: to BN_ULLONG.
2. The LL prefix isn't allowed in VC++ but it isn't needed where it is used.
2. Avoid lots of compiler warnings about signed/unsigned mismatches.
3. Include new library directory pqueue in mk1mf build system.
4. Update symbols.
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/d1_both.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_both.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index 40d71e29d2..6b8dd8080e 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == - s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); + (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); frag_off = 0; while( s->init_num) @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake * message got sent. but why would this happen? */ - OPENSSL_assert(len == ret); + OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting) /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case @@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok) return i; - if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len == s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) + if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len == (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, unsigned long *copied) frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq && - frag->msg_header.frag_off <= s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) + frag->msg_header.frag_off <= (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); overlap = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH @@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the * handshake to fail */ - OPENSSL_assert(i == frag_len); + OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len); #if 0 /* Successfully read a fragment. @@ -1049,12 +1049,12 @@ dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) if ( is_ccs) { OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + - DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH == s->init_num); + DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); } else { OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == s->init_num); + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); } frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; |