Move KDFs to the provider.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9662)

8 files changed, 2917 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/providers/common/kdfs/build.info b/providers/common/kdfs/build.info
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..422cf7471e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/providers/common/kdfs/build.info
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+$COMMON=tls1_prf.c hkdf.c scrypt.c pbkdf2.c sskdf.c
+
+LIBS=../../../libcrypto
+SOURCE[../../../libcrypto]=$COMMON sshkdf.c x942kdf.c
+INCLUDE[../../../libcrypto]=. ../../../crypto
+
+IF[{- !$disabled{fips} -}]
+  MODULES=../../fips
+  SOURCE[../../fips]=$COMMON
+  INCLUDE[../../fips]=. ../../../crypto
+ENDIF
+
+        
diff --git a/providers/common/kdfs/hkdf.c b/providers/common/kdfs/hkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..33c74da86a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/providers/common/kdfs/hkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "kdf_local.h"
+
+#define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024
+
+static void kdf_hkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
+static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+                const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+                unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
+static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                        const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                        const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
+                        unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len);
+static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                       const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
+                       const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+                       unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
+
+struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+    int mode;
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    unsigned char *salt;
+    size_t salt_len;
+    unsigned char *key;
+    size_t key_len;
+    unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
+    size_t info_len;
+};
+
+static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_hkdf_new(void)
+{
+    EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+
+    if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return impl;
+}
+
+static void kdf_hkdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+    kdf_hkdf_reset(impl);
+    OPENSSL_free(impl);
+}
+
+static void kdf_hkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->info, impl->info_len);
+    memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
+}
+
+static int kdf_hkdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    size_t len;
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
+        md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
+        if (md == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        impl->md = md;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_HKDF_MODE:
+        impl->mode = va_arg(args, int);
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
+        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
+        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
+        if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
+            return 1;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
+        impl->salt = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
+        if (impl->salt == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        impl->salt_len = len;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
+        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
+        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
+        impl->key = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
+        if (impl->key == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        impl->key_len  = len;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_RESET_HKDF_INFO:
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->info, impl->info_len);
+        impl->info_len = 0;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO:
+        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
+        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
+        if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
+            return 1;
+
+        if (len > (HKDF_MAXBUF - impl->info_len))
+            return 0;
+
+        memcpy(impl->info + impl->info_len, p, len);
+        impl->info_len += len;
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+    }
+}
+
+static int kdf_hkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
+                             const char *value)
+{
+    if (strcmp(type, "mode") == 0) {
+        int mode;
+
+        if (strcmp(value, "EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND") == 0)
+            mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND;
+        else if (strcmp(value, "EXTRACT_ONLY") == 0)
+            mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
+        else if (strcmp(value, "EXPAND_ONLY") == 0)
+            mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
+        else
+            return 0;
+
+        return call_ctrl(kdf_hkdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_HKDF_MODE, mode);
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
+        return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
+        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
+        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
+        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
+        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
+        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO,
+                            value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
+        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO,
+                            value);
+
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+    int sz;
+
+    if (impl->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
+        return SIZE_MAX;
+
+    if (impl->md == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    sz = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
+    if (sz < 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return sz;
+}
+
+static int kdf_hkdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
+                           size_t keylen)
+{
+    if (impl->md == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (impl->key == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    switch (impl->mode) {
+    case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
+        return HKDF(impl->md, impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->key,
+                    impl->key_len, impl->info, impl->info_len, key,
+                    keylen);
+
+    case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY:
+        return HKDF_Extract(impl->md, impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->key,
+                            impl->key_len, key, keylen);
+
+    case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY:
+        return HKDF_Expand(impl->md, impl->key, impl->key_len, impl->info,
+                           impl->info_len, key, keylen);
+
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+const EVP_KDF hkdf_kdf_meth = {
+    EVP_KDF_HKDF,
+    kdf_hkdf_new,
+    kdf_hkdf_free,
+    kdf_hkdf_reset,
+    kdf_hkdf_ctrl,
+    kdf_hkdf_ctrl_str,
+    kdf_hkdf_size,
+    kdf_hkdf_derive
+};
+
+/*
+ * Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
+ * Section 2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2) and
+ * "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme"
+ * Section 4.2 (https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf).
+ *
+ * From the paper:
+ *   The scheme HKDF is specified as:
+ *     HKDF(XTS, SKM, CTXinfo, L) = K(1) | K(2) | ... | K(t)
+ *
+ *     where:
+ *       SKM is source key material
+ *       XTS is extractor salt (which may be null or constant)
+ *       CTXinfo is context information (may be null)
+ *       L is the number of key bits to be produced by KDF
+ *       k is the output length in bits of the hash function used with HMAC
+ *       t = ceil(L/k)
+ *       the value K(t) is truncated to its first d = L mod k bits.
+ *
+ * From RFC 5869:
+ *   2.2.  Step 1: Extract
+ *     HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
+ *   2.3.  Step 2: Expand
+ *     HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
+ */
+static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
+                const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+                unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
+{
+    unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int ret, sz;
+    size_t prk_len;
+
+    sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
+    if (sz < 0)
+        return 0;
+    prk_len = (size_t)sz;
+
+    /* Step 1: HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK */
+    if (!HKDF_Extract(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, prk_len))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Step 2: HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM */
+    ret = HKDF_Expand(evp_md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(prk, sizeof(prk));
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
+ * Section 2.2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.2).
+ *
+ * 2.2.  Step 1: Extract
+ *
+ *   HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
+ *
+ *   Options:
+ *      Hash     a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
+ *               hash function output in octets
+ *
+ *   Inputs:
+ *      salt     optional salt value (a non-secret random value);
+ *               if not provided, it is set to a string of HashLen zeros.
+ *      IKM      input keying material
+ *
+ *   Output:
+ *      PRK      a pseudorandom key (of HashLen octets)
+ *
+ *   The output PRK is calculated as follows:
+ *
+ *   PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM)
+ */
+static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                        const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                        const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
+                        unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len)
+{
+    int sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
+
+    if (sz < 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (prk_len != (size_t)sz) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_HKDF_EXTRACT, KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* calc: PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM) */
+    return HMAC(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, NULL) != NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
+ * Section 2.3 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.3).
+ *
+ * 2.3.  Step 2: Expand
+ *
+ *   HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
+ *
+ *   Options:
+ *      Hash     a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
+ *               hash function output in octets
+ *
+ *   Inputs:
+ *      PRK      a pseudorandom key of at least HashLen octets
+ *               (usually, the output from the extract step)
+ *      info     optional context and application specific information
+ *               (can be a zero-length string)
+ *      L        length of output keying material in octets
+ *               (<= 255*HashLen)
+ *
+ *   Output:
+ *      OKM      output keying material (of L octets)
+ *
+ *   The output OKM is calculated as follows:
+ *
+ *   N = ceil(L/HashLen)
+ *   T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N)
+ *   OKM = first L octets of T
+ *
+ *   where:
+ *   T(0) = empty string (zero length)
+ *   T(1) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(0) | info | 0x01)
+ *   T(2) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(1) | info | 0x02)
+ *   T(3) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(2) | info | 0x03)
+ *   ...
+ *
+ *   (where the constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a
+ *   single octet.)
+ */
+static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+                       const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
+                       const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+                       unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
+{
+    HMAC_CTX *hmac;
+    int ret = 0, sz;
+    unsigned int i;
+    unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    size_t done_len = 0, dig_len, n;
+
+    sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
+    if (sz <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    dig_len = (size_t)sz;
+
+    /* calc: N = ceil(L/HashLen) */
+    n = okm_len / dig_len;
+    if (okm_len % dig_len)
+        n++;
+
+    if (n > 255 || okm == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
+        size_t copy_len;
+        const unsigned char ctr = i;
+
+        /* calc: T(i) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(i - 1) | info | i) */
+        if (i > 1) {
+            if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
+                goto err;
+
+            if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len))
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1))
+            goto err;
+
+        if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL))
+            goto err;
+
+        copy_len = (done_len + dig_len > okm_len) ?
+                       okm_len - done_len :
+                       dig_len;
+
+        memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len);
+
+        done_len += copy_len;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(prev, sizeof(prev));
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/providers/common/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/common/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d41689773c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/providers/common/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "kdf_local.h"
+
+/* Constants specified in SP800-132 */
+#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS  112
+#define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
+#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
+#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN   (128 / 8)
+/*
+ * For backwards compatibility reasons,
+ * Extra checks are done by default in fips mode only.
+ */
+#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+# define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 1
+#else
+# define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 0
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
+static int  pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+                          const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                          const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
+                          size_t keylen, int extra_checks);
+
+struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+    unsigned char *pass;
+    size_t pass_len;
+    unsigned char *salt;
+    size_t salt_len;
+    int iter;
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    int lower_bound_checks;
+};
+
+static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void)
+{
+    EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+
+    impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
+    if (impl == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    kdf_pbkdf2_init(impl);
+    return impl;
+}
+
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+    kdf_pbkdf2_reset(impl);
+    OPENSSL_free(impl);
+}
+
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
+    memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
+    kdf_pbkdf2_init(impl);
+}
+
+static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+    impl->iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
+    impl->md = EVP_sha1();
+    impl->lower_bound_checks = KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS;
+}
+
+static int pbkdf2_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
+                             const unsigned char *new_buffer,
+                             size_t new_buflen)
+{
+    if (new_buffer == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
+
+    if (new_buflen > 0) {
+        *buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
+    } else {
+        *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+    }
+    if (*buffer == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *buflen = new_buflen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+{
+    int iter, pkcs5, min_iter;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    size_t len;
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE:
+        pkcs5 = va_arg(args, int);
+        impl->lower_bound_checks = (pkcs5 == 0) ? 1 : 0;
+        return 1;
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
+        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
+        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
+        return pbkdf2_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
+        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
+        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
+        if (impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 && len < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
+            KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return pbkdf2_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_ITER:
+        iter = va_arg(args, int);
+        min_iter = impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 ? KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS : 1;
+        if (iter < min_iter) {
+            KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        impl->iter = iter;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
+        md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        impl->md = md;
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+    }
+}
+
+static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
+                               const char *value)
+{
+    if (value == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
+        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
+                            value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
+        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
+                            value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
+        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
+                            value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
+        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
+                            value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "iter") == 0)
+        return call_ctrl(kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_ITER,
+                         atoi(value));
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
+        return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "pkcs5") == 0)
+        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl,
+                            EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE, value);
+    return -2;
+}
+
+static int kdf_pbkdf2_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
+                             size_t keylen)
+{
+    if (impl->pass == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (impl->salt == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return pbkdf2_derive((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len,
+                         impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->iter,
+                         impl->md, key, keylen, impl->lower_bound_checks);
+}
+
+const EVP_KDF pbkdf2_kdf_meth = {
+    EVP_KDF_PBKDF2,
+    kdf_pbkdf2_new,
+    kdf_pbkdf2_free,
+    kdf_pbkdf2_reset,
+    kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl,
+    kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str,
+    NULL,
+    kdf_pbkdf2_derive
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key
+ * derivation function PBKDF2. SHA1 version verified against test vectors
+ * posted by Peter Gutmann to the PKCS-TNG mailing list.
+ *
+ * The constraints specified by SP800-132 have been added i.e.
+ *  - Check the range of the key length.
+ *  - Minimum iteration count of 1000.
+ *  - Randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least 128 bits.
+ */
+static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+                         const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+                         const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
+                         size_t keylen, int lower_bound_checks)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
+    int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
+    unsigned long i = 1;
+    HMAC_CTX *hctx_tpl = NULL, *hctx = NULL;
+
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+    if (mdlen <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * This check should always be done because keylen / mdlen >= (2^32 - 1)
+     * results in an overflow of the loop counter 'i'.
+     */
+    if ((keylen / mdlen) >= KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (lower_bound_checks) {
+         if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
+             KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
+             return 0;
+         }
+         if (saltlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
+             KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
+            return 0;
+         }
+         if (iter < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS) {
+             KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
+             return 0;
+         }
+    }
+
+    hctx_tpl = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (hctx_tpl == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    p = key;
+    tkeylen = keylen;
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (hctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    while (tkeylen) {
+        if (tkeylen > mdlen)
+            cplen = mdlen;
+        else
+            cplen = tkeylen;
+        /*
+         * We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!) but
+         * just in case...
+         */
+        itmp[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
+        itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
+        itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
+        itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
+        if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl))
+            goto err;
+        if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, salt, saltlen)
+                || !HMAC_Update(hctx, itmp, 4)
+                || !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL))
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
+        for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) {
+            if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl))
+                goto err;
+            if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
+                    || !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL))
+                goto err;
+            for (k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
+                p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
+        }
+        tkeylen -= cplen;
+        i++;
+        p += cplen;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+err:
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/providers/common/kdfs/scrypt.c b/providers/common/kdfs/scrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..29ceeb3ad9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/providers/common/kdfs/scrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "kdf_local.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
+static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
+static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result);
+static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+                      const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+                      uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
+                      unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
+
+struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+    unsigned char *pass;
+    size_t pass_len;
+    unsigned char *salt;
+    size_t salt_len;
+    uint64_t N;
+    uint32_t r, p;
+    uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
+};
+
+/* Custom uint64_t parser since we do not have strtoull */
+static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result)
+{
+    uint64_t value = 0;
+
+    while (*nptr) {
+        unsigned int digit;
+        uint64_t new_value;
+
+        if ((*nptr < '0') || (*nptr > '9')) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+        digit = (unsigned int)(*nptr - '0');
+        new_value = (value * 10) + digit;
+        if ((new_value < digit) || ((new_value - digit) / 10 != value)) {
+            /* Overflow */
+            return 0;
+        }
+        value = new_value;
+        nptr++;
+    }
+    *result = value;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_scrypt_new(void)
+{
+    EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+
+    impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
+    if (impl == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
+    return impl;
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+    kdf_scrypt_reset(impl);
+    OPENSSL_free(impl);
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
+    memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
+    kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
+}
+
+static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+    /* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
+     * original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
+     * for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
+     */
+    impl->N = 1 << 20;
+    impl->r = 8;
+    impl->p = 1;
+    impl->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
+}
+
+static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
+                             const unsigned char *new_buffer,
+                             size_t new_buflen)
+{
+    if (new_buffer == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
+
+    if (new_buflen > 0) {
+        *buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
+    } else {
+        *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+    }
+    if (*buffer == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *buflen = new_buflen;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
+{
+    return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+{
+    uint64_t u64_value;
+    uint32_t value;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    size_t len;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
+        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
+        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
+        return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
+        p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
+        len = va_arg(args, size_t);
+        return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N:
+        u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
+        if ((u64_value <= 1) || !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
+            return 0;
+
+        impl->N = u64_value;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R:
+        value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
+        if (value < 1)
+            return 0;
+
+        impl->r = value;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P:
+        value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
+        if (value < 1)
+            return 0;
+
+        impl->p = value;
+        return 1;
+
+    case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES:
+        u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
+        if (u64_value < 1)
+            return 0;
+
+        impl->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return -2;
+    }
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
+                                  const char *value)
+{
+    int int_value = atoi(value);
+
+    if (int_value < 0 || (uint64_t)int_value > UINT32_MAX) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT32, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, (uint32_t)int_value);
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
+                                  const char *value)
+{
+    uint64_t u64_value;
+
+    if (!atou64(value, &u64_value)) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT64, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, u64_value);
+}
+
+static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
+                               const char *value)
+{
+    if (value == NULL) {
+        KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
+        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
+                            value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
+        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
+                            value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
+        return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
+                            value);
+
+    if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
+        return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scry