Limit the number of AES-GCM keys allowed in TLS. A new error is raised if this

limit is ever reached.

This is a FIPS 140-2 requirement from IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
Requirements from SP 800-38D".

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7129)

3 files changed, 34 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index 2c8572ba64..84e639305b 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_MODULE_INIT:187:int_engine_module_init
 ENGINE_F_OSSL_HMAC_INIT:200:ossl_hmac_init
 EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY:165:aesni_init_key
 EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL:196:aes_gcm_ctrl
+EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER:207:aes_gcm_tls_cipher
 EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY:133:aes_init_key
 EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER:169:aes_ocb_cipher
 EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY:178:aes_t4_init_key
@@ -805,6 +806,7 @@ EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE:158:pkey_set_type
 EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH:109:rc2_magic_to_meth
 EVP_F_RC5_CTRL:125:rc5_ctrl
 EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL:201:s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl
+EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER:208:s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher
 EVP_F_UPDATE:173:update
 KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_CTRL_STR:103:pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str
 KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_DERIVE:102:pkey_hkdf_derive
@@ -2265,6 +2267,7 @@ EVP_R_PKEY_APPLICATION_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED:179:\
 EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:145:private key decode error
 EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR:146:private key encode error
 EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA:106:public key not rsa
+EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS:183:too many records
 EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER:160:unknown cipher
 EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST:161:unknown digest
 EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION:169:unknown option
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
index 61d37a899f..f81ad66029 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ typedef struct {
     int taglen;
     int iv_gen;                 /* It is OK to generate IVs */
     int tls_aad_len;            /* TLS AAD length */
+    uint64_t tls_enc_records;   /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
     ctr128_f ctr;
 } EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
 
@@ -1069,6 +1070,7 @@ typedef struct {
     int kreslen;
 
     int tls_aad_len;
+    uint64_t tls_enc_records;   /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
 } S390X_AES_GCM_CTX;
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -1692,6 +1694,7 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
         buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
         memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
         gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+        gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
 
         len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
         /* Correct length for explicit iv. */
@@ -1791,6 +1794,17 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
     if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
         return -1;
 
+    /*
+     * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+     * Requirements from SP 800-38D".  The requirements is for one party to the
+     * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys.  We do this on the encrypting
+     * side only.
+     */
+    if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
                                      : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
                             EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
@@ -2901,6 +2915,7 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
             return 0;
         memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
         gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+        gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
         {
             unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
             /* Correct length for explicit IV */
@@ -3035,6 +3050,18 @@ static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
     if (out != in
         || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
         return -1;
+    
+    /*
+     * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+     * Requirements from SP 800-38D".  The requirements is for one party to the
+     * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys.  We do this on the encrypting
+     * side only.
+     */
+    if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     /*
      * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
      * buffer.
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
index 3e14a7b509..ec6efb6e97 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY, 0), "aesni_init_key"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, 0), "aes_gcm_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, 0), "aes_gcm_tls_cipher"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY, 0), "aes_init_key"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER, 0), "aes_ocb_cipher"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY, 0), "aes_t4_init_key"},
@@ -148,6 +149,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH, 0), "rc2_magic_to_meth"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_RC5_CTRL, 0), "rc5_ctrl"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL, 0), "s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, 0),
+     "s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_UPDATE, 0), "update"},
     {0, NULL}
 };
@@ -239,6 +242,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR),
     "private key encode error"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA), "public key not rsa"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS), "too many records"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER), "unknown cipher"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION), "unknown option"},