diff options
author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2011-09-01 14:23:22 +0000 |
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committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2011-09-01 14:23:22 +0000 |
commit | 4c3c975066e6eff0297cd82b8490baeee93f6a7f (patch) | |
tree | 32f28fa545e4f9a8cfe7978508f277991eb2e71e /crypto | |
parent | ec5d74f868965d7a19cc55da0af715f89ee18bf9 (diff) |
make timing attack protection unconditional
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c index c4c3e891bd..7725935610 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c @@ -144,7 +144,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, } while (BN_is_zero(k)); -#ifdef ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME /* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed * bit-length. */ @@ -152,7 +151,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err; if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order)) if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err; -#endif /* def(ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME) */ /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) |