diff options
author | Pauli <pauli@openssl.org> | 2021-05-31 16:31:18 +1000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Pauli <pauli@openssl.org> | 2021-06-01 18:13:56 +1000 |
commit | 28cab20916731c188180628330de27f6ce5f684e (patch) | |
tree | f85f272ab8aba403ab10401af29deeda217f0138 /crypto | |
parent | dfefa4c16424cb3628b2a75b53c11e0be5247baa (diff) |
crypto: updates to pass size_t to RAND_bytes_ex()
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15540)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ec_err.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/err/openssl.txt | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ffc/ffc_params_generate.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c | 3 |
10 files changed, 28 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c index d16fb8cfe3..162e31d7ba 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv_ex(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) { X509_ALGOR *scheme = NULL, *ret = NULL; - int alg_nid, keylen; + int alg_nid, keylen, ivlen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL; @@ -66,11 +66,11 @@ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv_ex(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter, goto merr; /* Create random IV */ - if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) { + ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); + if (ivlen > 0) { if (aiv) - memcpy(iv, aiv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)); - else if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher), - 0) <= 0) + memcpy(iv, aiv, ivlen); + else if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, iv, ivlen, 0) <= 0) goto err; } diff --git a/crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c b/crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c index 21808d014b..5641bee65a 100644 --- a/crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c +++ b/crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, size_t slen, */ if ((salt = OPENSSL_malloc(slen)) == NULL) goto err; - if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, salt, (int)slen, 0) <= 0) { + if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, salt, slen, 0) <= 0) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_FAILURE_OBTAINING_RANDOM); goto err; } diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c index 9e21968499..9dc143c2ac 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_INVALID_GENERATOR), "invalid generator"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER), "invalid group order"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_INVALID_KEY), "invalid key"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_INVALID_LENGTH), "invalid length"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_INVALID_NAMED_GROUP_CONVERSION), "invalid named group conversion"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH), diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c index 4a676c37ad..5c70b2d678 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c @@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_s390x_nistp_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, } if (r == NULL || kinv == NULL) { + if (len < 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_INVALID_LENGTH); + goto ret; + } /* * Generate random k and copy to param param block. RAND_priv_bytes_ex * is used instead of BN_priv_rand_range or BN_generate_dsa_nonce @@ -180,7 +184,7 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_s390x_nistp_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, * internally implementing counter-measures for RNG weakness. */ if (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(eckey->libctx, param + S390X_OFF_RN(len), - len, 0) != 1) { + (size_t)len, 0) != 1) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED); goto ret; } diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt index 48d1175bce..eb0ace5474 100644 --- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt +++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt @@ -555,6 +555,7 @@ EC_R_INVALID_FORM:104:invalid form EC_R_INVALID_GENERATOR:173:invalid generator EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER:122:invalid group order EC_R_INVALID_KEY:116:invalid key +EC_R_INVALID_LENGTH:117:invalid length EC_R_INVALID_NAMED_GROUP_CONVERSION:174:invalid named group conversion EC_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH:161:invalid output length EC_R_INVALID_P:172:invalid p @@ -1152,6 +1153,7 @@ RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER:137:invalid header RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR:171:invalid keypair RSA_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH:173:invalid key length RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL:160:invalid label +RSA_R_INVALID_LENGTH:181:invalid length RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH:131:invalid message length RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD:156:invalid mgf1 md RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS:174:invalid modulus diff --git a/crypto/ffc/ffc_params_generate.c b/crypto/ffc/ffc_params_generate.c index 3c6f789c3e..85ae524015 100644 --- a/crypto/ffc/ffc_params_generate.c +++ b/crypto/ffc/ffc_params_generate.c @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static int generate_q_fips186_4(BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *q, const EVP_MD *evpmd, /* A.1.1.2 Step (5) : generate seed with size seed_len */ if (generate_seed - && RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, seed, (int)seedlen, 0) < 0) + && RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, seed, seedlen, 0) < 0) goto err; /* * A.1.1.2 Step (6) AND @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int generate_q_fips186_2(BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *q, const EVP_MD *evpmd, if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)) goto err; - if (generate_seed && RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, seed, (int)qsize, 0) <= 0) + if (generate_seed && RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, seed, qsize, 0) <= 0) goto err; memcpy(buf, seed, qsize); diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c index 041711d7d4..be4ed16ab7 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c @@ -259,8 +259,10 @@ int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, } p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen; if (!salt) { + if (saltlen < 0) + return 0; if (RAND_bytes_ex(p12->authsafes->ctx.libctx, p12->mac->salt->data, - saltlen, 0) <= 0) + (size_t)saltlen, 0) <= 0) return 0; } else memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen); diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c index 85bee965fc..269971c07b 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR), "invalid keypair"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH), "invalid key length"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL), "invalid label"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_LENGTH), "invalid length"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH), "invalid message length"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD), "invalid mgf1 md"}, diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c index 5068057fd1..00646648c7 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c @@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, mgf1md = md; mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); + if (mdlen <= 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_LENGTH); + return 0; + } /* step 2b: check KLen > nLen - 2 HLen - 2 */ if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) { diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c index 9094b1ac50..f1eabf177c 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c @@ -128,6 +128,9 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return 0; + } else if (flen < 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_LENGTH); + return 0; } p = (unsigned char *)to; |