diff options
author | Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com> | 2021-02-22 12:55:25 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> | 2021-03-01 10:56:12 +0100 |
commit | b0aae913246af1d07e728d24f53f55028f61c696 (patch) | |
tree | 472478434dd9894a817e00d4eb56dd8197cc717a /crypto | |
parent | d546e8e267bfddc1ca310dfa8b9a72ab4f9aac7c (diff) |
Remove RSA SSLv23 padding mode
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14248)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/build.info | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c | 189 |
6 files changed, 1 insertions, 207 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c index e0f849d236..ae3340395d 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c +++ b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c @@ -1186,7 +1186,6 @@ static int fix_rsa_padding_mode(enum state state, { static const OSSL_ITEM str_value_map[] = { { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" }, - { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" }, { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" }, { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" }, diff --git a/crypto/rsa/build.info b/crypto/rsa/build.info index f0c7668bf2..ad3370db39 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/build.info +++ b/crypto/rsa/build.info @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ $COMMON=rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_pk1.c \ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON\ rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \ - rsa_pmeth.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c rsa_ssl.c + rsa_pmeth.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-0.9.8'} -}] SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=rsa_depr.c ENDIF diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h index 49a0071031..6d3bc05c14 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h @@ -195,9 +195,6 @@ int ossl_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(RSA *rsa, RSA_ACVP_TEST *test, int nbits, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb); -int ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to, - int tlen, const unsigned char *from, - int flen); int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen); diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c index 7964244ab5..1fd0057202 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c @@ -119,11 +119,6 @@ static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, from, flen, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; -#ifndef FIPS_MODULE - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - i = ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(rsa->libctx, buf, num, from, flen); - break; -#endif case RSA_NO_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); break; @@ -278,7 +273,6 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, case RSA_NO_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); break; - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: default: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; @@ -487,11 +481,6 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); break; -#ifndef FIPS_MODULE - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); - break; -#endif case RSA_NO_PADDING: memcpy(to, buf, (r = j)); break; diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c index fc2799af7c..def5641682 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c @@ -604,8 +604,6 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) { pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; - } else if (strcmp(value, "sslv23") == 0) { - pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING; } else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) { pm = RSA_NO_PADDING; } else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) { diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c deleted file mode 100644 index 7cb743d219..0000000000 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,189 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -/* - * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for - * internal use. - */ -#include "internal/deprecated.h" - -#include <stdio.h> -#include "internal/cryptlib.h" -#include <openssl/bn.h> -#include <openssl/rsa.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include "internal/constant_time.h" -#include "rsa_local.h" - -int ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to, - int tlen, const unsigned char *from, - int flen) -{ - int i, j; - unsigned char *p; - - if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); - return 0; - } - - p = (unsigned char *)to; - - *(p++) = 0; - *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */ - - /* pad out with non-zero random data */ - j = tlen - 3 - 8 - flen; - - if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, p, j) <= 0) - return 0; - for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { - if (*p == '\0') - do { - if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, p, 1) <= 0) - return 0; - } while (*p == '\0'); - p++; - } - - memset(p, 3, 8); - p += 8; - *(p++) = '\0'; - - memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen); - return 1; -} - -int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - const unsigned char *from, int flen) -{ - return ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(NULL, to, tlen, from, flen); -} - -/* - * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding - * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also - * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility. - */ -int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num) -{ - int i; - /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */ - unsigned char *em = NULL; - unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row; - int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err; - - if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) - return -1; - - if (flen > num || num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL); - return -1; - } - - em = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (em == NULL) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - /* - * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with - * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s - * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern - * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance. - */ - for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) { - mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen); - flen -= 1 & mask; - from -= 1 & mask; - *--em = *from & mask; - } - - good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); - good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2); - err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02); - mask = ~good; - - /* scan over padding data */ - found_zero_byte = 0; - threes_in_row = 0; - for (i = 2; i < num; i++) { - unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]); - - zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, - i, zero_index); - found_zero_byte |= equals0; - - threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte; - threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3); - } - - /* - * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|. - * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check - * also fails. - */ - good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8); - err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, - RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING); - mask = ~good; - - /* - * Reject if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. Note - * that RFC5246 incorrectly states this the other way around, i.e. reject - * if it is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. However this is - * corrected in subsequent errata for that RFC. - */ - good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8); - err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, - RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK); - mask = ~good; - - /* - * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte - * but in this case we also do not copy the message out. - */ - msg_index = zero_index + 1; - mlen = num - msg_index; - - /* - * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well. - */ - good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen); - err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); - - /* - * Move the result in-place by |num|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left. - * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to |to|. - * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged. - * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of - * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying - * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real - * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern. - * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)). - */ - tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen), - num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen); - for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) { - mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0); - for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < num - msg_index; i++) - em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]); - } - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { - mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen); - to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], to[i]); - } - - OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num); - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, err); - err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good); - - return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1); -} |