If we're going to return errors (no matter how stupid), then we should

test for them!

15 files changed, 70 insertions, 30 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp.h b/crypto/evp/evp.h
index 985ff2f5a9..df54409f10 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp.h
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp.h
@@ -1183,6 +1183,7 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 #define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX				 128
 #define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX			 127
 #define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX			 110
+#define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE				 162
 #define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT				 102
 #define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD				 115
 #define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE			 160
@@ -1262,6 +1263,7 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 #define EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION				 148
 #define EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE				 102
 #define EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE				 120
+#define EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL			 159
 #define EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED			 144
 #define EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS			 103
 #define EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET				 131
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
index 25a8ad7cdc..04485f0162 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/evp/evp_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX),	"EVP_DigestInit_ex"},
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX),	"EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"},
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX),	"EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"},
+{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE),	"EVP_MD_SIZE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT),	"EVP_OpenInit"},
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD),	"EVP_PBE_alg_add"},
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE),	"EVP_PBE_alg_add_type"},
@@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION)     ,"invalid operation"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE)          ,"iv too large"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE)        ,"keygen failure"},
+{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL),"message digest is null"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED)  ,"method not supported"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS)    ,"missing parameters"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET)         ,"no cipher set"},
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
index daccb66820..d815bc6d6f 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
@@ -256,7 +256,10 @@ int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md)
 int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md)
 	{
 	if (!md)
+		{
+		EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE, EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL);
 		return -1;
+		}
 	return md->md_size;
 	}
 
diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
index c6d257fc08..d98455eaad 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
@@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
 	return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, e, pkey, 1);
 	}
 
-
 int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen)
 	{
 	int sctx, r = 0;
@@ -159,13 +158,15 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen)
 		{
 		if (sctx)
 			{
-			if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx(ctx->pctx, 
-						sigret, siglen, ctx) <= 0)
+			if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, ctx) <= 0)
+				return 0;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			int s = EVP_MD_size(ctx->digest);
+			if (s < 0 || EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, NULL, s) <= 0)
 				return 0;
 			}
-		else if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, NULL,
-						EVP_MD_size(ctx->digest)) <= 0)
-			return 0;
 		}
 	return 1;
 	}
@@ -177,6 +178,8 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
 	int r;
 	unsigned int mdlen;
 	int vctx;
+
+	/* FIXME: surely this should test verifyctx? (Ben 29/12/08) */
 	if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx)
 		vctx = 1;
 	else
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
index 9c6e07b706..7ecfa8dad9 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
 	int saltlen, iter;
 	unsigned char *salt;
 	const unsigned char *pbuf;
+	int mdsize;
 
 	/* Extract useful info from parameter */
 	if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
@@ -109,9 +110,12 @@ int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
 	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt, saltlen);
 	PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
 	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_tmp, NULL);
+	mdsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+	if (mdsize < 0)
+	    return 0;
 	for (i = 1; i < iter; i++) {
 		EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_tmp, EVP_MD_size(md));
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_tmp, mdsize);
 		EVP_DigestFinal_ex (&ctx, md_tmp, NULL);
 	}
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
index 70fd48aed0..334379f310 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
 	HMAC_CTX hctx;
 
 	mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+	if (mdlen < 0)
+		return 0;
 
 	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
 	p = out;
@@ -273,8 +275,9 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
 	salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data;
 	saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length;
 	iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter);
-	PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd,
-								keylen, key);
+	if(!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd,
+						   keylen, key))
+		goto err;
 	EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de);
 	OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
 	PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c b/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c
index aff7013b76..985921ca1a 100644
--- a/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c
@@ -157,7 +157,11 @@ static int hmac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
 	{
 	unsigned int hlen;
 	HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx->data;
-	*siglen = EVP_MD_CTX_size(mctx);
+	int l = EVP_MD_CTX_size(mctx);
+
+	if (l < 0)
+		return 0;
+	*siglen = l;
 	if (!sig)
 		return 1;
 
diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
index be9bf5b0f0..415d67e61c 100644
--- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@@ -308,6 +308,8 @@ static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
 			}
 
 		mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+		if (mdlen < 0)
+		    return -1;
 		if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) ||
 		   (cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen))
 			return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
index 9e57eee4a4..b72cf1638b 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_asc(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
 	int ret;
 	unsigned char *unipass;
 	int uniplen;
+
 	if(!pass) {
 		unipass = NULL;
 		uniplen = 0;
@@ -90,6 +91,8 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_asc(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
 	}
 	ret = PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unipass, uniplen, salt, saltlen,
 						 id, iter, n, out, md_type);
+	if (ret <= 0)
+	    return 0;
 	if(unipass) {
 		OPENSSL_cleanse(unipass, uniplen);	/* Clear password from memory */
 		OPENSSL_free(unipass);
@@ -129,6 +132,8 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
 #endif
 	v = EVP_MD_block_size (md_type);
 	u = EVP_MD_size (md_type);
+	if (u < 0)
+	    return 0;
 	D = OPENSSL_malloc (v);
 	Ai = OPENSSL_malloc (u);
 	B = OPENSSL_malloc (v + 1);
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index 70bfef6e5d..9ab740d51f 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
 	HMAC_CTX hmac;
 	unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt;
 	int saltlen, iter;
+	int md_size;
 
 	if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes))
 		{
@@ -87,13 +88,16 @@ int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
 		PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC,PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
 		return 0;
 	}
+	md_size = EVP_MD_size(md_type);
+	if (md_size < 0)
+	    return 0;
 	if(!PKCS12_key_gen (pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID, iter,
-				 EVP_MD_size(md_type), key, md_type)) {
+				 md_size, key, md_type)) {
 		PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC,PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac);
-	HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, key, EVP_MD_size(md_type), md_type, NULL);
+	HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, key, md_size, md_type, NULL);
     	HMAC_Update(&hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data,
 					 p12->authsafes->d.data->length);
     	HMAC_Final(&hmac, mac, maclen);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index 91cd4198c7..cf74343657 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -448,7 +448,6 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
 
 /* Reason codes. */
 #define RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH			 100
-#define RSA_R_BAD_ARGUMENT				 149
 #define RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE				 101
 #define RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT			 102
 #define RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT			 103
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
index a53c5f6bff..cf9f1106b0 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -124,7 +124,6 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[]=
 static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
 	{
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH)    ,"algorithm mismatch"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_ARGUMENT)          ,"bad argument"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE)           ,"bad e value"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT),"bad fixed header decrypt"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT)    ,"bad pad byte count"},
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 3652677a99..70bacf850e 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 
-int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
+static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
 	const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
 
 int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
@@ -76,11 +76,13 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 	   20);
 #endif
 
-	MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	if (MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+		return 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
 		db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
 
-	MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	if (MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+		return 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
 		seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
 
@@ -133,11 +135,13 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 
 	maskeddb = padded_from + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
 
-	MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen);
+	if (MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen))
+		return -1;
 	for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
 		seed[i] ^= padded_from[i];
   
-	MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	if (MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+		return -1;
 	for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
 		db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
 
@@ -188,6 +192,8 @@ int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
 
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
 	mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+	if (mdlen < 0)
+		return -1;
 	for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++)
 		{
 		cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);
@@ -213,7 +219,8 @@ int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
 	return 0;
 	}
 
-int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen)
+static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
+		 long seedlen)
 	{
 	return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1());
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
index 2e44194bdc..775c36114f 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
@@ -81,13 +81,9 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
 	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
 	unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 
-	if (Hash == NULL)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_BAD_ARGUMENT);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
 	hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
+	if (hLen < 0)
+		goto err;
 	/*
 	 * Negative sLen has special meanings:
 	 *	-1	sLen == hLen
@@ -132,7 +128,8 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 		goto err;
 		}
-	PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash);
+	if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash) < 0)
+		goto err;
 	for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++)
 		DB[i] ^= EM[i];
 	if (MSBits)
@@ -183,6 +180,8 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
 	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
 
 	hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
+	if (hLen < 0)
+		goto err;
 	/*
 	 * Negative sLen has special meanings:
 	 *	-1	sLen == hLen
@@ -238,7 +237,8 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
 	/* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */
-	PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash);
+	if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash))
+		goto err;
 
 	p = EM;
 
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
index 6acacac6c1..e1f3b534af 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
@@ -604,7 +604,10 @@ static int TS_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info,
 		}
 
 	/* Compute message digest. */
-	*imprint_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+	length = EVP_MD_size(md);
+	if (length < 0)
+	    goto err;
+	*imprint_len = length;
 	if (!(*imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(*imprint_len))) 
 		{
 		TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);