rand: move rand_{unix,vms,vxworks,win}.c without change to preserve history

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11682)

4 files changed, 0 insertions, 1832 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 869c2d04dd..0000000000
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,860 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
-# define _GNU_SOURCE
-#endif
-#include "e_os.h"
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include "rand_local.h"
-#include "crypto/rand.h"
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/dso.h"
-
-#ifdef __linux
-# include <sys/syscall.h>
-# ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
-#  include <sys/shm.h>
-#  include <sys/utsname.h>
-# endif
-#endif
-#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <sys/sysctl.h>
-# include <sys/param.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
-# include <sys/param.h>
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \
-     || defined(__DJGPP__)
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-# include <fcntl.h>
-# include <unistd.h>
-# include <sys/time.h>
-
-static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
-
-/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
-# define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
-
-/*
- * Check for the existence and support of POSIX timers.  The standard
- * says that the _POSIX_TIMERS macro will have a positive value if they
- * are available.
- *
- * However, we want an additional constraint: that the timer support does
- * not require an extra library dependency.  Early versions of glibc
- * require -lrt to be specified on the link line to access the timers,
- * so this needs to be checked for.
- *
- * It is worse because some libraries define __GLIBC__ but don't
- * support the version testing macro (e.g. uClibc).  This means
- * an extra check is needed.
- *
- * The final condition is:
- *      "have posix timers and either not glibc or glibc without -lrt"
- *
- * The nested #if sequences are required to avoid using a parameterised
- * macro that might be undefined.
- */
-# undef OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# if defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) && _POSIX_TIMERS > 0
-#  if defined(__GLIBC__)
-#   if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
-#    if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)
-#     define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-#    endif
-#   endif
-#  else
-#   define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-#  endif
-# endif
-#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS))
-          || defined(__DJGPP__) */
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-/* none means none. this simplifies the following logic */
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) && !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-# error "UEFI only supports seeding NONE"
-#endif
-
-#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) \
-    || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
-    || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
-
-#  ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-#   error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
-#  endif
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
-#   error "Unsupported HP-PA and IA32 at the same time."
-#  endif
-#  if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
-#   error "Must have one of HP-PA or IA32"
-#  endif
-
-/*
- * The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to
- * generate a sequence of unpredictable data.  The algorithm relies upon the
- * uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses,
- * interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large
- * relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which
- * it can be read.  If it is ported to an environment where execution speed
- * is more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
- * clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results
- * would be far more predictable.  This should only be used for legacy
- * platforms.
- *
- * As a precaution, we assume only 2 bits of entropy per byte.
- */
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    short int code;
-    int i, k;
-    size_t bytes_needed;
-    struct timespec ts;
-    unsigned char v;
-#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
-    long duration;
-    extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code);
-#  else
-    long long duration;
-    extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code);
-#  endif
-
-    bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 4 /*entropy_factor*/);
-
-    for (i = 0; i < bytes_needed; i++) {
-        /*
-         * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus
-         * interference, etc.
-         */
-        for (k = 0; k < 99; k++)
-            ts.tv_nsec = random();
-
-#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
-        /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us).  */
-        duration = 1;
-        s$sleep(&duration, &code);
-#  else
-        /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us).  */
-        duration = 1;
-        s$sleep2(&duration, &code);
-#  endif
-
-        /* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */
-        clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
-        v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF);
-        rand_pool_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2);
-    }
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-# else
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD) && \
-        (defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) || !defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
-#   error "Seeding uses EGD but EGD is turned off or no device given"
-#  endif
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) && !defined(DEVRANDOM)
-#   error "Seeding uses urandom but DEVRANDOM is not configured"
-#  endif
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS)
-#   if !defined(DEVRANDOM)
-#    error "OS seeding requires DEVRANDOM to be configured"
-#   endif
-#   define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
-#   define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
-#  endif
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
-#   error "librandom not (yet) supported"
-#  endif
-
-#  if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
-/*
- * sysctl_random(): Use sysctl() to read a random number from the kernel
- * Returns the number of bytes returned in buf on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
-{
-    int mib[2];
-    size_t done = 0;
-    size_t len;
-
-    /*
-     * Note: sign conversion between size_t and ssize_t is safe even
-     * without a range check, see comment in syscall_random()
-     */
-
-    /*
-     * On FreeBSD old implementations returned longs, newer versions support
-     * variable sizes up to 256 byte. The code below would not work properly
-     * when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
-     * multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
-     */
-#if   defined(__FreeBSD__)
-    if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
-        errno = EINVAL;
-        return -1;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    /*
-     * On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
-     * filled in an int, leaving the rest uninitialized. Since NetBSD 4.0
-     * it returns a variable number of bytes with the current version supporting
-     * up to 256 bytes.
-     * Just return an error on older NetBSD versions.
-     */
-#if   defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 400000000
-    errno = ENOSYS;
-    return -1;
-#endif
-
-    mib[0] = CTL_KERN;
-    mib[1] = KERN_ARND;
-
-    do {
-        len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen;
-        if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1)
-            return done > 0 ? done : -1;
-        done += len;
-        buf += len;
-        buflen -= len;
-    } while (buflen > 0);
-
-    return done;
-}
-#  endif
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
-
-#   if defined(__linux) && !defined(__NR_getrandom)
-#    if defined(__arm__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+384)
-#    elif defined(__i386__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    355
-#    elif defined(__x86_64__)
-#     if defined(__ILP32__)
-#      define __NR_getrandom   (__X32_SYSCALL_BIT + 318)
-#     else
-#      define __NR_getrandom   318
-#     endif
-#    elif defined(__xtensa__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    338
-#    elif defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    349
-#    elif defined(__bfin__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    389
-#    elif defined(__powerpc__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    359
-#    elif defined(__mips__) || defined(__mips64)
-#     if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32
-#      define __NR_getrandom   (__NR_Linux + 353)
-#     elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64
-#      define __NR_getrandom   (__NR_Linux + 313)
-#     elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32
-#      define __NR_getrandom   (__NR_Linux + 317)
-#     endif
-#    elif defined(__hppa__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    (__NR_Linux + 339)
-#    elif defined(__sparc__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    347
-#    elif defined(__ia64__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    1339
-#    elif defined(__alpha__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    511
-#    elif defined(__sh__)
-#     if defined(__SH5__)
-#      define __NR_getrandom   373
-#     else
-#      define __NR_getrandom   384
-#     endif
-#    elif defined(__avr32__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    317
-#    elif defined(__microblaze__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    385
-#    elif defined(__m68k__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    352
-#    elif defined(__cris__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    356
-#    elif defined(__aarch64__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    278
-#    else /* generic */
-#     define __NR_getrandom    278
-#    endif
-#   endif
-
-/*
- * syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
- * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
- */
-static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
-{
-    /*
-     * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
-     * get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by
-     *
-     *   2 * RAND_POOL_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^14
-     *
-     * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
-     * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
-     */
-
-    /*
-     * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
-     *
-     * Known OSs that should support this:
-     * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
-     * - Solaris since 11.3
-     * - OpenBSD since 5.6
-     * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
-     * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
-     */
-#  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
-    extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
-
-    if (getentropy != NULL)
-        return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
-#  elif !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
-    union {
-        void *p;
-        int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
-    } p_getentropy;
-
-    /*
-     * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
-     * call this function often.
-     */
-    ERR_set_mark();
-    p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
-    ERR_pop_to_mark();
-    if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
-        return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
-#  endif
-
-    /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
-#  if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
-    return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
-#  elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
-    return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
-#  else
-    errno = ENOSYS;
-    return -1;
-#  endif
-}
-#  endif    /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
-static const char *random_device_paths[] = { DEVRANDOM };
-static struct random_device {
-    int fd;
-    dev_t dev;
-    ino_t ino;
-    mode_t mode;
-    dev_t rdev;
-} random_devices[OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths)];
-static int keep_random_devices_open = 1;
-
-#   if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT) \
-       && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
-static void *shm_addr;
-
-#    if !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
-static void cleanup_shm(void)
-{
-    shmdt(shm_addr);
-}
-#    endif
-
-/*
- * Ensure that the system randomness source has been adequately seeded.
- * This is done by having the first start of libcrypto, wait until the device
- * /dev/random becomes able to supply a byte of entropy.  Subsequent starts
- * of the library and later reseedings do not need to do this.
- */
-static int wait_random_seeded(void)
-{
-    static int seeded = OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID < 0;
-    static const int kernel_version[] = { DEVRANDOM_SAFE_KERNEL };
-    int kernel[2];
-    int shm_id, fd, r;
-    char c, *p;
-    struct utsname un;
-    fd_set fds;
-
-    if (!seeded) {
-        /* See if anything has created the global seeded indication */
-        if ((shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1, 0)) == -1) {
-            /*
-             * Check the kernel's version and fail if it is too recent.
-             *
-             * Linux kernels from 4.8 onwards do not guarantee that
-             * /dev/urandom is properly seeded when /dev/random becomes
-             * readable.  However, such kernels support the getentropy(2)
-             * system call and this should always succeed which renders
-             * this alternative but essentially identical source moot.
-             */
-            if (uname(&un) == 0) {
-                kernel[0] = atoi(un.release);
-                p = strchr(un.release, '.');
-                kernel[1] = p == NULL ? 0 : atoi(p + 1);
-                if (kernel[0] > kernel_version[0]
-                    || (kernel[0] == kernel_version[0]
-                        && kernel[1] >= kernel_version[1])) {
-                    return 0;
-                }
-            }
-            /* Open /dev/random and wait for it to be readable */
-            if ((fd = open(DEVRANDOM_WAIT, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
-                if (DEVRANDM_WAIT_USE_SELECT && fd < FD_SETSIZE) {
-                    FD_ZERO(&fds);
-                    FD_SET(fd, &fds);
-                    while ((r = select(fd + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, NULL)) < 0
-                           && errno == EINTR);
-                } else {
-                    while ((r = read(fd, &c, 1)) < 0 && errno == EINTR);
-                }
-                close(fd);
-                if (r == 1) {
-                    seeded = 1;
-                    /* Create the shared memory indicator */
-                    shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1,
-                                    IPC_CREAT | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        if (shm_id != -1) {
-            seeded = 1;
-            /*
-             * Map the shared memory to prevent its premature destruction.
-             * If this call fails, it isn't a big problem.
-             */
-            shm_addr = shmat(shm_id, NULL, SHM_RDONLY);
-#    ifndef FIPS_MODULE
-            /* TODO 3.0: The FIPS provider doesn't have OPENSSL_atexit */
-            if (shm_addr != (void *)-1)
-                OPENSSL_atexit(&cleanup_shm);
-#    endif
-        }
-    }
-    return seeded;
-}
-#   else /* defined __linux && DEVRANDOM_WAIT && OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM */
-static int wait_random_seeded(void)
-{
-    return 1;
-}
-#   endif
-
-/*
- * Verify that the file descriptor associated with the random source is
- * still valid. The rationale for doing this is the fact that it is not
- * uncommon for daemons to close all open file handles when daemonizing.
- * So the handle might have been closed or even reused for opening
- * another file.
- */
-static int check_random_device(struct random_device * rd)
-{
-    struct stat st;
-
-    return rd->fd != -1
-           && fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1
-           && rd->dev == st.st_dev
-           && rd->ino == st.st_ino
-           && ((rd->mode ^ st.st_mode) & ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) == 0
-           && rd->rdev == st.st_rdev;
-}
-
-/*
- * Open a random device if required and return its file descriptor or -1 on error
- */
-static int get_random_device(size_t n)
-{
-    struct stat st;
-    struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n];
-
-    /* reuse existing file descriptor if it is (still) valid */
-    if (check_random_device(rd))
-        return rd->fd;
-
-    /* open the random device ... */
-    if ((rd->fd = open(random_device_paths[n], O_RDONLY)) == -1)
-        return rd->fd;
-
-    /* ... and cache its relevant stat(2) data */
-    if (fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1) {
-        rd->dev = st.st_dev;
-        rd->ino = st.st_ino;
-        rd->mode = st.st_mode;
-        rd->rdev = st.st_rdev;
-    } else {
-        close(rd->fd);
-        rd->fd = -1;
-    }
-
-    return rd->fd;
-}
-
-/*
- * Close a random device making sure it is a random device
- */
-static void close_random_device(size_t n)
-{
-    struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n];
-
-    if (check_random_device(rd))
-        close(rd->fd);
-    rd->fd = -1;
-}
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
-    size_t i;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++)
-        random_devices[i].fd = -1;
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-    size_t i;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++)
-        close_random_device(i);
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-    if (!keep)
-        rand_pool_cleanup();
-
-    keep_random_devices_open = keep;
-}
-
-#  else     /* !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
-    return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-#  endif    /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */
-
-/*
- * Try the various seeding methods in turn, exit when successful.
- *
- * TODO(DRBG): If more than one entropy source is available, is it
- * preferable to stop as soon as enough entropy has been collected
- * (as favored by @rsalz) or should one rather be defensive and add
- * more entropy than requested and/or from different sources?
- *
- * Currently, the user can select multiple entropy sources in the
- * configure step, yet in practice only the first available source
- * will be used. A more flexible solution has been requested, but
- * currently it is not clear how this can be achieved without
- * overengineering the problem. There are many parameters which
- * could be taken into account when selecting the order and amount
- * of input from the different entropy sources (trust, quality,
- * possibility of blocking).
- */
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-#  else
-    size_t entropy_available;
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
-    {
-        size_t bytes_needed;
-        unsigned char *buffer;
-        ssize_t bytes;
-        /* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
-        int attempts = 3;
-
-        bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-        while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
-            buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-            bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed);
-            if (bytes > 0) {
-                rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
-                bytes_needed -= bytes;
-                attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
-            } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-    if (entropy_available > 0)
-        return entropy_available;
-#   endif
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
-    {
-        /* Not yet implemented. */
-    }
-#   endif
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
-    if (wait_random_seeded()) {
-        size_t bytes_needed;
-        unsigned char *buffer;
-        size_t i;
-
-        bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-        for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths);
-             i++) {
-            ssize_t bytes = 0;
-            /* Maximum number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
-            int attempts = 3;
-            const int fd = get_random_device(i);
-
-            if (fd == -1)
-                continue;
-
-            while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
-                buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-                bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
-
-                if (bytes > 0) {
-                    rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
-                    bytes_needed -= bytes;
-                    attempts = 3; /* reset counter on successful attempt */
-                } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-            if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open)
-                close_random_device(i);
-
-            bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
-        }
-        entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-        if (entropy_available > 0)
-            return entropy_available;
-    }
-#   endif
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC)
-    entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
-    if (entropy_available > 0)
-        return entropy_available;
-#   endif
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU)
-    entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
-    if (entropy_available > 0)
-        return entropy_available;
-#   endif
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD)
-    {
-        static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
-        size_t bytes_needed;
-        unsigned char *buffer;
-        int i;
-
-        bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-        for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
-            size_t bytes = 0;
-            int num;
-
-            buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-            num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i],
-                                       buffer, (int)bytes_needed);
-            if (num == (int)bytes_needed)
-                bytes = bytes_needed;
-
-            rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
-            bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
-        }
-        entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-        if (entropy_available > 0)
-            return entropy_available;
-    }
-#   endif
-
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-#  endif
-}
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \
-     || defined(__DJGPP__)
-int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    struct {
-        pid_t pid;
-        CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
-        uint64_t time;
-    } data;
-
-    /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
-    memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
-    /*
-     * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
-     * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
-     * different process instances.
-     */
-    data.pid = getpid();
-    data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
-    data.time = get_time_stamp();
-
-    return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    struct {
-        int fork_id;
-        CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
-        uint64_t time;
-    } data;
-
-    /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
-    memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
-    /*
-     * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
-     * The fork_id adds some extra fork-safety.
-     * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
-     * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
-     */
-    data.fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
-    data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
-    data.time = get_timer_bits();
-
-    return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Get the current time with the highest possible resolution
- *
- * The time stamp is added to the nonce, so it is optimized for not repeating.
- * The current time is ideal for this purpose, provided the computer's clock
- * is synchronized.
- */
-static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void)
-{
-# if defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
-    {
-        struct timespec ts;
-
-        if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0)
-            return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
-    }
-# endif
-# if defined(__unix__) \
-     || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
-    {
-        struct timeval tv;
-
-        if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
-            return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
-    }
-# endif
-    return time(NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Get an arbitrary timer value of the highest possible resolution
- *
- * The timer value is added as random noise to the additional data,
- * which is not considered a trusted entropy sourec, so any result
- * is acceptable.
- */
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
-{
-    uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
-
-    if (res != 0)
-        return res;
-
-# if defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
-    return gethrtime();
-# elif defined(_AIX)
-    {
-        timebasestruct_t t;
-
-        read_wall_time(&t, TIMEBASE_SZ);
-        return TWO32TO64(t.tb_high, t.tb_low);
-    }
-# elif defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
-    {
-        struct timespec ts;
-
-#  ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
-#   define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_BOOTTIME
-#  elif defined(_POSIX_MONOTONIC_CLOCK)
-#   define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_MONOTONIC
-#  else
-#   define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_REALTIME
-#  endif
-
-        if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_TYPE, &ts) == 0)
-            return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
-    }
-# endif
-# if defined(__unix__) \
-     || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
-    {
-        struct timeval tv;
-
-        if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
-            return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
-    }
-# endif
-    return time(NULL);
-}
-#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS))
-          || defined(__DJGPP__) */
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 6b9fa2c725..0000000000
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,614 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#define __NEW_STARLET 1         /* New starlet definitions since VMS 7.0 */
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "crypto/rand.h"
-#include "rand_local.h"
-#include <descrip.h>
-#include <dvidef.h>
-#include <jpidef.h>
-#include <rmidef.h>
-#include <syidef.h>
-#include <ssdef.h>
-#include <starlet.h>
-#include <efndef.h>
-#include <gen64def.h>
-#include <iosbdef.h>
-#include <iledef.h>
-#include <lib$routines.h>
-#ifdef __DECC
-# pragma message disable DOLLARID
-#endif
-
-#include <dlfcn.h>              /* SYS$GET_ENTROPY presence */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
-#endif
-
-/*
- * DATA COLLECTION METHOD
- * ======================
- *
- * This is a method to get low quality entropy.
- * It works by collecting all kinds of statistical data that
- * VMS offers and using them as random seed.
- */
-
-/* We need to make sure we have the right size pointer in some cases */
-#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
-# pragma pointer_size save
-# pragma pointer_size 32
-#endif
-typedef uint32_t *uint32_t__ptr32;
-#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
-# pragma pointer_size restore
-#endif
-
-struct item_st {
-    short length, code;         /* length is number of bytes */
-};
-
-static const struct item_st DVI_item_data[] = {
-    {4,   DVI$_ERRCNT},
-    {4,   DVI$_REFCNT},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st JPI_item_data[] = {
-    {4,   JPI$_BUFIO},
-    {4,   JPI$_CPUTIM},
-    {4,   JPI$_DIRIO},
-    {4,   JPI$_IMAGECOUNT},
-    {4,   JPI$_PAGEFLTS},
-    {4,   JPI$_PID},
-    {4,   JPI$_PPGCNT},
-    {4,   JPI$_WSPEAK},
-    /*
-     * Note: the direct result is just a 32-bit address.  However, it points
-     * to a list of 4 32-bit words, so we make extra space for them so we can
-     * do in-place replacement of values
-     */
-    {16,  JPI$_FINALEXC},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st JPI_item_data_64bit[] = {
-    {8,   JPI$_LAST_LOGIN_I},
-    {8,   JPI$_LOGINTIM},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st RMI_item_data[] = {
-    {4,   RMI$_COLPG},
-    {4,   RMI$_MWAIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_CEF},
-    {4,   RMI$_PFW},
-    {4,   RMI$_LEF},
-    {4,   RMI$_LEFO},
-    {4,   RMI$_HIB},
-    {4,   RMI$_HIBO},
-    {4,   RMI$_SUSP},
-    {4,   RMI$_SUSPO},
-    {4,   RMI$_FPG},
-    {4,   RMI$_COM},
-    {4,   RMI$_COMO},
-    {4,   RMI$_CUR},
-#if defined __alpha
-    {4,   RMI$_FRLIST},
-    {4,   RMI$_MODLIST},
-#endif
-    {4,   RMI$_FAULTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_PREADS},
-    {4,   RMI$_PWRITES},
-    {4,   RMI$_PWRITIO},
-    {4,   RMI$_PREADIO},
-    {4,   RMI$_GVALFLTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_WRTINPROG},
-    {4,   RMI$_FREFLTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_DZROFLTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_SYSFAULTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_ISWPCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DIRIO},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFIO},
-    {4,   RMI$_MBREADS},
-    {4,   RMI$_MBWRITES},
-    {4,   RMI$_LOGNAM},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPCALLS},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPREAD},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPWRITE},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPCACHE},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPCPU},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPHIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPSPLIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPFAULT},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQNEW},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQCVT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DEQ},
-    {4,   RMI$_BLKAST},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQWAIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQNOTQD},
-    {4,   RMI$_DLCKSRCH},
-    {4,   RMI$_DLCKFND},
-    {4,   RMI$_NUMLOCKS},
-    {4,   RMI$_NUMRES},
-    {4,   RMI$_ARRLOCPK},
-    {4,   RMI$_DEPLOCPK},
-    {4,   RMI$_ARRTRAPK},
-    {4,   RMI$_TRCNGLOS},
-    {4,   RMI$_RCVBUFFL},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQNEWLOC},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQNEWIN},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQNEWOUT},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQCVTLOC},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQCVTIN},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQCVTOUT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DEQLOC},
-    {4,   RMI$_DEQIN},
-    {4,   RMI$_DEQOUT},
-    {4,   RMI$_BLKLOC},
-    {4,   RMI$_BLKIN},
-    {4,   RMI$_BLKOUT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DIRIN},
-    {4,   RMI$_DIROUT},
-    /* We currently get a fault when trying these.  TODO: To be figured out. */
-#if 0
-    {140, RMI$_MSCP_EVERYTHING},   /* 35 32-bit words */
-    {152, RMI$_DDTM_ALL},          /* 38 32-bit words */
-    {80,  RMI$_TMSCP_EVERYTHING}   /* 20 32-bit words */
-#endif
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_PAGCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_HITS},
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_MISSES},
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_EXPCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_ALLOCF},
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_ALLOC2},
-    {4,   RMI$_ACCESS},
-    {4,