diff options
author | Ulf Möller <ulf@openssl.org> | 1999-04-09 16:24:32 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ulf Möller <ulf@openssl.org> | 1999-04-09 16:24:32 +0000 |
commit | a8da89186c447932b9f5abced708330a3bff313b (patch) | |
tree | 0a2db3e074643271b2300dbd19fc0c93f86fd9d9 /crypto | |
parent | dae08db4a0d8bb972315988150187c9f091c557e (diff) |
Separate DSA functionality from ASN.1 encoding.
New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
the raw DSA values.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/Makefile.ssl | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/dsa.err | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/dsa.h | 28 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c | 102 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c | 91 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c | 92 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/dsa/dsatest.c | 8 |
8 files changed, 246 insertions, 99 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/Makefile.ssl b/crypto/dsa/Makefile.ssl index 382473a8a5..d45501a11c 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/Makefile.ssl +++ b/crypto/dsa/Makefile.ssl @@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ TEST=dsatest.c APPS= LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a -LIBSRC= dsa_gen.c dsa_key.c dsa_lib.c dsa_vrf.c dsa_sign.c $(ERRC).c -LIBOBJ= dsa_gen.o dsa_key.o dsa_lib.o dsa_vrf.o dsa_sign.o $(ERRC).o +LIBSRC= dsa_gen.c dsa_key.c dsa_lib.c dsa_asn1.c dsa_vrf.c dsa_sign.c $(ERRC).c +LIBOBJ= dsa_gen.o dsa_key.o dsa_lib.o dsa_asn1.o dsa_vrf.o dsa_sign.o $(ERRC).o SRC= $(LIBSRC) @@ -84,6 +84,16 @@ $(ERRC).c: $(ERR).err # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. +dsa_asn1.o: ../../include/asn1.h ../../include/asn1_mac.h ../../include/bio.h +dsa_asn1.o: ../../include/blowfish.h ../../include/bn.h ../../include/buffer.h +dsa_asn1.o: ../../include/cast.h ../../include/des.h ../../include/dh.h +dsa_asn1.o: ../../include/e_os.h ../../include/err.h ../../include/evp.h +dsa_asn1.o: ../../include/idea.h ../../include/md2.h ../../include/md5.h +dsa_asn1.o: ../../include/mdc2.h ../../include/objects.h ../../include/pkcs7.h +dsa_asn1.o: ../../include/rc2.h ../../include/rc4.h ../../include/rc5.h +dsa_asn1.o: ../../include/ripemd.h ../../include/rsa.h ../../include/sha.h +dsa_asn1.o: ../../include/stack.h ../../include/x509.h ../../include/x509_vfy.h +dsa_asn1.o: ../cryptlib.h ../crypto.h ../opensslv.h dsa.h dsa_err.o: ../../include/bn.h ../../include/err.h dsa.h dsa_gen.o: ../../include/bio.h ../../include/bn.h ../../include/buffer.h dsa_gen.o: ../../include/e_os.h ../../include/err.h ../../include/rand.h diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa.err b/crypto/dsa/dsa.err index 1131e9fa74..e20449b711 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa.err +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa.err @@ -10,6 +10,11 @@ #define DSA_F_DSA_SIGN 106 #define DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP 107 #define DSA_F_DSA_VERIFY 108 +#define DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW 109 +#define DSA_F_D2I_DSA_SIG 110 +#define DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG 111 +#define DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN 112 +#define DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY 113 /* Reason codes. */ #define DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE 100 diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa.h b/crypto/dsa/dsa.h index a231c199b7..d531efbb04 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa.h +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa.h @@ -97,6 +97,12 @@ typedef struct dsa_st int references; } DSA; +typedef struct DSA_SIG_st + { + BIGNUM *r; + BIGNUM *s; + } DSA_SIG; + #define DSAparams_dup(x) (DSA *)ASN1_dup((int (*)())i2d_DSAparams, \ (char *(*)())d2i_DSAparams,(char *)(x)) #define d2i_DSAparams_fp(fp,x) (DSA *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())DSA_new, \ @@ -110,6 +116,15 @@ typedef struct dsa_st #ifndef NOPROTO +DSA_SIG * DSA_SIG_new(void); +void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *a); +int i2d_DSA_SIG(DSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp); +DSA_SIG * d2i_DSA_SIG(DSA_SIG **v, unsigned char **pp, long length); + +DSA_SIG * DSA_do_sign(unsigned char *dgst,int dlen,DSA *dsa); +int DSA_do_verify(unsigned char *dgst,int dgst_len, + DSA_SIG *sig,DSA *dsa); + DSA * DSA_new(void); int DSA_size(DSA *); /* next 4 return -1 on error */ @@ -146,6 +161,14 @@ int DSA_is_prime(BIGNUM *q,void (*callback)(),char *cb_arg); #else +DSA_SIG * DSA_SIG_new(); +void DSA_SIG_free(); +int i2d_DSA_SIG(); +DSA_SIG * d2i_DSA_SIG(); + +DSA_SIG * DSA_do_sign(); +int DSA_do_verify(); + DSA * DSA_new(); int DSA_size(); int DSA_sign_setup(); @@ -189,6 +212,11 @@ int DSA_print_fp(); #define DSA_F_DSA_SIGN 106 #define DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP 107 #define DSA_F_DSA_VERIFY 108 +#define DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW 109 +#define DSA_F_D2I_DSA_SIG 110 +#define DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG 111 +#define DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN 112 +#define DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY 113 /* Reason codes. */ #define DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE 100 diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b7fa7eda4f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include "cryptlib.h" +#include "dsa.h" +#include "asn1.h" +#include "asn1_mac.h" + +DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void) +{ + DSA_SIG *ret; + + ret = Malloc(sizeof(DSA_SIG)); + if (ret == NULL) + { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return(NULL); + } + ret->r = NULL; + ret->s = NULL; + return(ret); +} + +void DSA_SIG_free(r) +DSA_SIG *r; +{ + if (r == NULL) return; + if (r->r) BN_clear_free(r->r); + if (r->s) BN_clear_free(r->s); + Free(r); +} + +int i2d_DSA_SIG(v,pp) +DSA_SIG *v; +unsigned char **pp; +{ + int t=0,len; + ASN1_INTEGER rbs,sbs; + unsigned char *p; + + rbs.data=Malloc(BN_num_bits(v->r)/8+1); + if (rbs.data == NULL) + { + DSAerr(DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return(0); + } + rbs.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER; + rbs.length=BN_bn2bin(v->r,rbs.data); + sbs.data=Malloc(BN_num_bits(v->s)/8+1); + if (sbs.data == NULL) + { + Free(rbs.data); + DSAerr(DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return(0); + } + sbs.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER; + sbs.length=BN_bn2bin(v->s,sbs.data); + + len=i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&rbs,NULL); + len+=i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&sbs,NULL); + + if (pp) + { + p=*pp; + ASN1_put_object(&p,1,len,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); + i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&rbs,&p); + i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&sbs,&p); + } + t=ASN1_object_size(1,len,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + Free(rbs.data); + Free(sbs.data); + return(t); +} + +DSA_SIG *d2i_DSA_SIG(a,pp,length) +DSA_SIG **a; +unsigned char **pp; +long length; +{ + int i=ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR; + ASN1_INTEGER *bs=NULL; + M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a,DSA_SIG *,DSA_SIG_new); + + M_ASN1_D2I_Init(); + M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence(); + M_ASN1_D2I_get(bs,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER); + if ((ret->r=BN_bin2bn(bs->data,bs->length,ret->r)) == NULL) + goto err_bn; + M_ASN1_D2I_get(bs,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER); + if ((ret->s=BN_bin2bn(bs->data,bs->length,ret->s)) == NULL) + goto err_bn; + ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(bs); + M_ASN1_D2I_Finish_2(a); + +err_bn: + i=ERR_R_BN_LIB; +err: + DSAerr(DSA_F_D2I_DSA_SIG,i); + if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret))) DSA_SIG_free(ret); + if (bs != NULL) ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(bs); + return(NULL); +} diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c index 4cb58a8951..c3a4f4d73b 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c @@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_functs[]= {ERR_PACK(0,DSA_F_DSA_SIGN,0), "DSA_sign"}, {ERR_PACK(0,DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,0), "DSA_sign_setup"}, {ERR_PACK(0,DSA_F_DSA_VERIFY,0), "DSA_verify"}, +{ERR_PACK(0,DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW,0), "DSA_SIG_new"}, +{ERR_PACK(0,DSA_F_D2I_DSA_SIG,0), "d2i_DSA_SIG"}, +{ERR_PACK(0,DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG,0), "i2d_DSA_SIG"}, +{ERR_PACK(0,DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN,0), "DSA_do_sign"}, +{ERR_PACK(0,DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,0), "DSA_do_verify"}, {0,NULL}, }; diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c index f43d023433..92098e2149 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c @@ -65,30 +65,22 @@ #include "rand.h" #include "asn1.h" -/* data has already been hashed (probably with SHA or SHA-1). */ -/* DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN,DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); */ - -int DSA_sign(type,dgst,dlen,sig,siglen,dsa) -int type; +DSA_SIG * DSA_do_sign(dgst,dlen,dsa) unsigned char *dgst; int dlen; -unsigned char *sig; /* out */ -unsigned int *siglen; /* out */ DSA *dsa; { - BIGNUM *kinv=NULL,*r=NULL; + BIGNUM *kinv=NULL,*r=NULL,*s=NULL; BIGNUM m; - BIGNUM xr,s; + BIGNUM xr; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - unsigned char *p; - int i,len=0,ret=0,reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB; - ASN1_INTEGER rbs,sbs; - MS_STATIC unsigned char rbuf[50]; /* assuming r is 20 bytes +extra */ - MS_STATIC unsigned char sbuf[50]; /* assuming s is 20 bytes +extra */ + int i,reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB; + DSA_SIG *ret=NULL; BN_init(&m); BN_init(&xr); - BN_init(&s); + s=BN_new(); + if (s == NULL) goto err; i=BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ if ((dlen > i) || (dlen > 50)) @@ -116,44 +108,51 @@ DSA *dsa; /* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr,dsa->priv_key,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;/* s = xr */ - if (!BN_add(&s, &xr, &m)) goto err; /* s = m + xr */ - if (BN_cmp(&s,dsa->q) > 0) - BN_sub(&s,&s,dsa->q); - if (!BN_mod_mul(&s,&s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - - /* - * Now create a ASN.1 sequence of the integers R and S. - */ - rbs.data=rbuf; - sbs.data=sbuf; - rbs.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER; - sbs.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER; - rbs.length=BN_bn2bin(r,rbs.data); - sbs.length=BN_bn2bin(&s,sbs.data); - - len =i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&rbs,NULL); - len+=i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&sbs,NULL); - - p=sig; - ASN1_put_object(&p,1,len,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); - i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&rbs,&p); - i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&sbs,&p); - *siglen=(p-sig); - ret=1; + if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) goto err; /* s = m + xr */ + if (BN_cmp(s,dsa->q) > 0) + BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q); + if (!BN_mod_mul(s,s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; + + ret=DSA_SIG_new(); + if (ret == NULL) goto err; + ret->r = r; + ret->s = s; + err: - if (!ret) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN,reason); - -#if 1 /* do the right thing :-) */ - if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv); - if (r != NULL) BN_clear_free(r); -#endif + if (!ret) + { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN,reason); + BN_free(r); + BN_free(s); + } if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(&m); BN_clear_free(&xr); - BN_clear_free(&s); return(ret); } +/* data has already been hashed (probably with SHA or SHA-1). */ + +int DSA_sign(type,dgst,dlen,sig,siglen,dsa) +int type; +unsigned char *dgst; +int dlen; +unsigned char *sig; /* out */ +unsigned int *siglen; /* out */ +DSA *dsa; + { + DSA_SIG *s; + s=DSA_do_sign(dgst,dlen,dsa); + if (s == NULL) + { + *siglen=0; + return(0); + } + *siglen=i2d_DSA_SIG(s,&sig); + DSA_SIG_free(s); + return(1); + } + int DSA_sign_setup(dsa,ctx_in,kinvp,rp) DSA *dsa; BN_CTX *ctx_in; diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c index 37e8781dd6..3b74c81a57 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ -/* Origional version from Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov> */ +/* Original version from Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov> */ #include <stdio.h> #include "cryptlib.h" @@ -66,57 +66,34 @@ #include "asn1.h" #include "asn1_mac.h" -/* data has already been hashed (probably with SHA or SHA-1). */ -/* returns - * 1: correct signature - * 0: incorrect signature - * -1: error - */ -int DSA_verify(type,dgst,dgst_len,sigbuf,siglen, dsa) -int type; +int DSA_do_verify(dgst,dgst_len,sig,dsa) unsigned char *dgst; int dgst_len; -unsigned char *sigbuf; -int siglen; +DSA_SIG *sig; DSA *dsa; { - /* The next 3 are used by the M_ASN1 macros */ - long length=siglen; - ASN1_CTX c; - unsigned char **pp= &sigbuf; BN_CTX *ctx; - BIGNUM r,u1,u2,t1; - ASN1_INTEGER *bs=NULL; + BIGNUM u1,u2,t1; BN_MONT_CTX *mont=NULL; int ret = -1; if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - BN_init(&u1); BN_init(&u2); - BN_init(&r); BN_init(&t1); - M_ASN1_D2I_Init(); - M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence(); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(bs,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER); - if ((BN_bin2bn(bs->data,bs->length,&r)) == NULL) goto err_bn; - M_ASN1_D2I_get(bs,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER); - if ((BN_bin2bn(bs->data,bs->length,&u1)) == NULL) goto err_bn; - if (!asn1_Finish(&c)) goto err; - /* Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q * save W in u2 */ - if ((BN_mod_inverse(&u2,&u1,dsa->q,ctx)) == NULL) goto err_bn; + if ((BN_mod_inverse(&u2,sig->s,dsa->q,ctx)) == NULL) goto err; /* save M in u1 */ - if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dgst_len,&u1) == NULL) goto err_bn; + if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dgst_len,&u1) == NULL) goto err; /* u1 = M * w mod q */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1,&u1,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err_bn; + if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1,&u1,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; /* u2 = r * w mod q */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2,&r,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err_bn; + if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2,sig->r,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; if ((dsa->method_mont_p == NULL) && (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P)) { @@ -133,42 +110,59 @@ DSA *dsa; BN_init(&t2); /* v = ( g^u1 * y^u2 mod p ) mod q */ /* let t1 = g ^ u1 mod p */ - if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t1,dsa->g,&u1,dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err_bn; + if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t1,dsa->g,&u1,dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err; /* let t2 = y ^ u2 mod p */ - if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t2,dsa->pub_key,&u2,dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err_bn; + if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t2,dsa->pub_key,&u2,dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err; /* let u1 = t1 * t2 mod p */ if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1,&t1,&t2,dsa->p,ctx)) goto err_bn; BN_free(&t2); } /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ - if (!BN_mod(&u1,&u1,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err_bn; + if (!BN_mod(&u1,&u1,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; #else { if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(&t1,dsa->g,&u1,dsa->pub_key,&u2,dsa->p,ctx,mont)) - goto err_bn; + goto err; /* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */ /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ - if (!BN_mod(&u1,&t1,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err_bn; + if (!BN_mod(&u1,&t1,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; } #endif /* V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be * equal to R. */ - ret=(BN_ucmp(&u1, &r) == 0); - if (0) - { -err: /* ASN1 error */ - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_VERIFY,c.error); - } - if (0) - { -err_bn: /* BN error */ - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_VERIFY,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - } + ret=(BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0); + + err: + if (ret != 1) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,ERR_R_BN_LIB); if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); - BN_free(&r); BN_free(&u1); BN_free(&u2); BN_free(&t1); - if (bs != NULL) ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(bs); + return(ret); + } + +/* data has already been hashed (probably with SHA or SHA-1). */ +/* returns + * 1: correct signature + * 0: incorrect signature + * -1: error + */ +int DSA_verify(type,dgst,dgst_len,sigbuf,siglen,dsa) +int type; +unsigned char *dgst; +int dgst_len; +unsigned char *sigbuf; +int siglen; +DSA *dsa; + { + DSA_SIG *s; + int ret=-1; + + s = DSA_SIG_new(); + if (s == NULL) return(ret); + if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&sigbuf,siglen) == NULL) goto err; + ret=DSA_do_verify(dgst,dgst_len,s,dsa); +err: + DSA_SIG_free(s); return(ret); } diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsatest.c b/crypto/dsa/dsatest.c index 39bb712c4a..924380a44b 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsatest.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsatest.c @@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ char **argv; int counter,ret=0,i,j; unsigned char buf[256]; unsigned long h; + unsigned char sig[256]; + int siglen; if (bio_err == NULL) bio_err=BIO_new_fp(stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE); @@ -178,8 +180,10 @@ char **argv; BIO_printf(bio_err,"g value is wrong\n"); goto end; } - - ret=1; + DSA_generate_key(dsa); + DSA_sign(0, "12345678901234567890", 20, sig, &siglen, dsa); + if (DSA_verify(0, "12345678901234567890", 20, sig, siglen, dsa) == 1) + ret=1; end: if (!ret) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); |