diff options
author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2018-05-16 09:58:27 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2018-05-17 17:11:41 +0100 |
commit | 7e5292ba04deb0fb01e5628bf2e3b32c7d19977d (patch) | |
tree | 7a0c23884e3734409cc30f1abbfa074facf80fd7 /crypto | |
parent | fe4fe67139bc1e1abb62035d9eb0992f614bf645 (diff) |
Make BN_GF2m_mod_arr more constant time
Experiments have shown that the lookup table used by BN_GF2m_mod_arr
introduces sufficient timing signal to recover the private key for an
attacker with access to cache timing information on the victim's host.
This only affects binary curves (which are less frequently used).
No CVE is considered necessary for this issue.
The fix is to replace the lookup table with an on-the-fly calculation of
the value from the table instead, which can be performed in constant time.
Thanks to Youngjoo Shin for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6270)
(cherry picked from commit b336ce57f2d5cca803a920d2a9e622b588cead3c)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c | 32 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c index 2c61da1109..e86b8d2411 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c @@ -103,30 +103,32 @@ */ # define MAX_ITERATIONS 50 -static const BN_ULONG SQR_tb[16] = { 0, 1, 4, 5, 16, 17, 20, 21, - 64, 65, 68, 69, 80, 81, 84, 85 -}; +# define SQR_nibble(w) ((((w) & 8) << 3) \ + | (((w) & 4) << 2) \ + | (((w) & 2) << 1) \ + | ((w) & 1)) + /* Platform-specific macros to accelerate squaring. */ # if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) # define SQR1(w) \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 60 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 56 & 0xF] << 48 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 52 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 48 & 0xF] << 32 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 44 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 40 & 0xF] << 16 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 36 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 32 & 0xF] + SQR_nibble((w) >> 60) << 56 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 56) << 48 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 52) << 40 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 48) << 32 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 44) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 40) << 16 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 36) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 32) # define SQR0(w) \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 48 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] << 32 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF] + SQR_nibble((w) >> 28) << 56 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 24) << 48 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 20) << 40 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 16) << 32 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 12) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 8) << 16 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 4) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) ) # endif # ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT # define SQR1(w) \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 16 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] + SQR_nibble((w) >> 28) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 24) << 16 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 20) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 16) # define SQR0(w) \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF] + SQR_nibble((w) >> 12) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 8) << 16 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 4) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) ) # endif # if !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m) |