Whitespace cleanup in crypto

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)

17 files changed, 23 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_core.c b/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
index ef0fc51d95..69be3d85c7 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
@@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
             rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
                 ROTATE(tp9,24) ^ ROTATE(tpb,8);
 #else
-            rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^ 
+            rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
                 (tp9 >> 8) ^ (tp9 << 24) ^
                 (tpb >> 24) ^ (tpb << 8);
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c b/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
index dd7e905470..95b49bbabc 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
             rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
                 ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
 #else
-            rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^ 
+            rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
                 (tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
                 (tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
 #endif
@@ -910,7 +910,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
            (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
            (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
 
-    /* now do the linear transform using words */ 
+    /* now do the linear transform using words */
     {
         int i;
         u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
             t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
                 ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
 #else
-            t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^ 
+            t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
                 (tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
                 (tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
 #endif
@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
                (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
                (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
 
-    /* now do the linear transform using words */ 
+    /* now do the linear transform using words */
     {
         int i;
         u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
             t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
                 ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
 #else
-            t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^ 
+            t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
                 (tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
                 (tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
index 1e17895f26..4db3df9b8d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
             goto end;
         if (j & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
             const unsigned char *sp = p;
-                
+
             ep = p + len;
             if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
                 goto end;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
index eef1b878c8..0bec12b1c8 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
 # endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
 
 /*-
- * BN_div computes  dv := num / divisor,  rounding towards
+ * BN_div computes  dv := num / divisor, rounding towards
  * zero, and sets up rm  such that  dv*divisor + rm = num  holds.
  * Thus:
  *     dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg  (unless the result is zero)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index d334cf705b..e2f0d5e316 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
     bn_check_top(m);
 
     /*-
-     * For even modulus  m = 2^k*m_odd,  it might make sense to compute
+     * For even modulus  m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
      * a^p mod m_odd  and  a^p mod 2^k  separately (with Montgomery
      * exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
      * reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
index 1039e7630f..e1aac131c5 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
              * i.e.
              *        sign*(Y + D*X)*a  ==  B  (mod |n|).
              *
-             * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign),  we arrive back at
+             * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
              *      -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
              *       sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
              * Note that  X  and  Y  stay non-negative all the time.
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
          * i.e.
          *        sign*(Y + D*X)*a  ==  B  (mod |n|).
          *
-         * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign),  we arrive back at
+         * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
          *      -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
          *       sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
          * Note that  X  and  Y  stay non-negative all the time.
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
index 1c41938fed..8e7f4f5676 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static int probable_prime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, prime_t *mods)
      */
     if (is_single_word) {
         BN_ULONG size_limit;
-        
+
         if (bits == BN_BITS2) {
             /*
              * Shifting by this much has undefined behaviour so we do it a
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
index d01d20e3d4..31f838e0fa 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static CONF_MODULE *module_add(DSO *dso, const char *name,
 static CONF_MODULE *module_find(const char *name);
 static int module_init(CONF_MODULE *pmod, const char *name, const char *value,
                        const CONF *cnf);
-static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, const char *name, 
+static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, const char *name,
                                     const char *value);
 
 /* Main function: load modules from a CONF structure */
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static int module_run(const CONF *cnf, const char *name, const char *value,
 }
 
 /* Load a module from a DSO */
-static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, 
+static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf,
                                     const char *name, const char *value)
 {
     DSO *dso = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index fa74ee7644..c592c067a1 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -284,7 +284,6 @@ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
     } else
         BN_zero(group->cofactor);
 
- 
     /*
      * Some groups have an order with
      * factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
index 33066e8d83..7974b96311 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static long ok_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp)
 {
     long ret = 1;
     BIO *next;
-    
+
     next = BIO_next(b);
 
     if (next == NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
index be1deaa474..0e1ad74615 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
 
             if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
                 return -1;
- 
+
             len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
 
             if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
diff --git a/crypto/modes/ocb128.c b/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
index 54a96b8e98..c3bd13bbe2 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
+++ b/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv,
 
     /*
      * Spec says IV is 120 bits or fewer - it allows non byte aligned lengths.
-     * We don't support  this at this stage
+     * We don't support this at this stage
      */
     if ((len > 15) || (len < 1) || (taglen > 16) || (taglen < 1)) {
         return -1;
diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
index df03694974..be7565753e 100644
--- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
+++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
@@ -2314,11 +2314,11 @@ static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID]={
 {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet",
 	"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet",
 	NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet,7,&(lvalues[5609]),0},
-	
+
 {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet",
 	"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet",
 	NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet,7,&(lvalues[5616]),0},
-	
+
 {"id-GostR3410-94-a","id-GostR3410-94-a",NID_id_GostR3410_94_a,7,
 	&(lvalues[5623]),0},
 {"id-GostR3410-94-aBis","id-GostR3410-94-aBis",
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index 24022416d2..bc6bd30fc3 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
     BIO_free_all(btmp);
     BIO_free_all(etmp);
     BIO_free_all(bio);
-    return  NULL;
+    return NULL;
 }
 
 static BIO *PKCS7_find_digest(EVP_MD_CTX **pmd, BIO *bio, int nid)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index bac7c26a17..efb16a02e6 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     /*
      * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
      * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
-     * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed  memory access
+     * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
      * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
      *
      * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
index 21da8aaa9e..091663686f 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static char *ts_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text)
         TSerr(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return NULL;
     }
-    
+
     for (i = 0, p = result; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
         ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
         length = ASN1_STRING_length(current);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 15920840f9..b400ce4ad6 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -2538,7 +2538,7 @@ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
 
     /*
      * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
-     * further PKIX-?? records,  it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
+     * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
      * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
      */
     if (dane->mdpth >= 0)