diff options
author | Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 2020-07-22 22:55:00 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 2020-08-24 10:02:26 +0200 |
commit | 34b80d0622924d112b145fd36bfaad18616f2546 (patch) | |
tree | f80e34178246e6114674817080d9dbff149a8a03 /crypto/store/store_result.c | |
parent | 4fd397821139723fd4e51a03e92df33e9a9fadcc (diff) |
STORE: Modify to support loading with provider based loaders
This adds the needed code to make the OSSL_STORE API functions handle
provided STORE implementations.
This also modifies OSSL_STORE_attach() for have the URI, the
library context and the properties in the same order as
OSSL_STORE_open_with_libctx().
The most notable change, though, is how this creates a division of
labor between libcrypto and any storemgmt implementation that wants to
pass X.509, X.509 CRL, etc structures back to libcrypto. Since those
structures aren't directly supported in the libcrypto <-> provider
interface (asymmetric keys being the only exception so far), we resort
to a libcrypto object callback that can handle passed data in DER form
and does its part of figuring out what the DER content actually is.
This also adds the internal x509_crl_set0_libctx(), which works just
like x509_set0_libctx(), but for X509_CRL.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12512)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/store/store_result.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/store/store_result.c | 594 |
1 files changed, 594 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/store/store_result.c b/crypto/store/store_result.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..74aeaf543b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/store/store_result.c @@ -0,0 +1,594 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include "e_os.h" +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/core.h> +#include <openssl/core_names.h> +#include <openssl/core_object.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/pkcs12.h> +#include <openssl/provider.h> +#include <openssl/decoder.h> +#include <openssl/store.h> +#include "internal/provider.h" +#include "internal/passphrase.h" +#include "crypto/evp.h" +#include "crypto/x509.h" +#include "store_local.h" + +#ifndef OSSL_OBJECT_PKCS12 +/* + * The object abstraction doesn't know PKCS#12, but we want to indicate + * it anyway, so we create our own. Since the public macros use positive + * numbers, negative ones should be fine. They must never slip out from + * this translation unit anyway. + */ +# define OSSL_OBJECT_PKCS12 -1 +#endif + +/* + * ossl_store_handle_load_result() is initially written to be a companion + * to our 'file:' scheme provider implementation, but has been made generic + * to serve others as well. + * + * This result handler takes any object abstraction (see provider-object(7)) + * and does the best it can with it. If the object is passed by value (not + * by reference), the contents are currently expected to be DER encoded. + * If an object type is specified, that will be respected; otherwise, this + * handler will guess the contents, by trying the following in order: + * + * 1. Decode it into an EVP_PKEY, using OSSL_DECODER. + * 2. Decode it into an X.509 certificate, using d2i_X509 / d2i_X509_AUX. + * 3. Decode it into an X.509 CRL, using d2i_X509_CRL. + * 4. Decode it into a PKCS#12 structure, using d2i_PKCS12 (*). + * + * For the 'file:' scheme implementation, this is division of labor. Since + * the libcrypto <-> provider interface currently doesn't support certain + * structures as first class objects, they must be unpacked from DER here + * rather than in the provider. The current exception is asymmetric keys, + * which can reside within the provider boundary, most of all thanks to + * OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_load(), which allows loading the key material by + * reference. + */ + +DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509) + +struct extracted_param_data_st { + int object_type; + const char *data_type; + const char *utf8_data; + const void *octet_data; + size_t octet_data_size; + const void *ref; + size_t ref_size; + const char *desc; +}; + +static int try_name(struct extracted_param_data_st *, OSSL_STORE_INFO **); +static int try_key(struct extracted_param_data_st *, OSSL_STORE_INFO **, + OSSL_STORE_CTX *, const OSSL_PROVIDER *, + OPENSSL_CTX *, const char *); +static int try_cert(struct extracted_param_data_st *, OSSL_STORE_INFO **, + OPENSSL_CTX *, const char *); +static int try_crl(struct extracted_param_data_st *, OSSL_STORE_INFO **, + OPENSSL_CTX *, const char *); +static int try_pkcs12(struct extracted_param_data_st *, OSSL_STORE_INFO **, + OSSL_STORE_CTX *, OPENSSL_CTX *, const char *); + +int ossl_store_handle_load_result(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *arg) +{ + struct ossl_load_result_data_st *cbdata = arg; + OSSL_STORE_INFO **v = &cbdata->v; + OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx = cbdata->ctx; + const OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = + OSSL_STORE_LOADER_provider(ctx->fetched_loader); + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = ossl_provider_library_context(provider); + const char *propq = ctx->properties; + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + struct extracted_param_data_st helper_data; + + memset(&helper_data, 0, sizeof(helper_data)); + helper_data.object_type = OSSL_OBJECT_UNKNOWN; + + if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_OBJECT_PARAM_TYPE)) != NULL + && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &helper_data.object_type)) + return 0; + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_OBJECT_PARAM_DATA_TYPE); + if (p != NULL + && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string_ptr(p, &helper_data.data_type)) + return 0; + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_OBJECT_PARAM_DATA); + if (p != NULL + && !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string_ptr(p, &helper_data.octet_data, + &helper_data.octet_data_size) + && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string_ptr(p, &helper_data.utf8_data)) + return 0; + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_OBJECT_PARAM_REFERENCE); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string_ptr(p, &helper_data.ref, + &helper_data.ref_size)) + return 0; + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_OBJECT_PARAM_DESC); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string_ptr(p, &helper_data.desc)) + return 0; + + /* + * The helper functions return 0 on actual errors, otherwise 1, even if + * they didn't fill out |*v|. + */ + if (!try_name(&helper_data, v) + || !try_key(&helper_data, v, ctx, provider, libctx, propq) + || !try_cert(&helper_data, v, libctx, propq) + || !try_crl(&helper_data, v, libctx, propq) + || !try_pkcs12(&helper_data, v, ctx, libctx, propq)) + return 0; + + return (*v != NULL); +} + +static int try_name(struct extracted_param_data_st *data, OSSL_STORE_INFO **v) +{ + if (data->object_type == OSSL_OBJECT_NAME) { + char *newname = NULL, *newdesc = NULL; + + if (data->utf8_data == NULL) + return 0; + if ((newname = OPENSSL_strdup(data->utf8_data)) == NULL + || (data->desc != NULL + && (newdesc = OPENSSL_strdup(data->desc)) == NULL) + || (*v = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_NAME(newname)) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(newname); + OPENSSL_free(newdesc); + return 0; + } + OSSL_STORE_INFO_set0_NAME_description(*v, newdesc); + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * For the rest of the object types, the provider code may not know what + * type of data it gave us, so we may need to figure that out on our own. + * Therefore, we do check for OSSL_OBJECT_UNKNOWN everywhere below, and + * only return 0 on error if the object type is known. + */ + +static EVP_PKEY *try_key_ref(struct extracted_param_data_st *data, + OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx, + const OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; + EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt = NULL; + void *keydata = NULL; + + /* If we have an object reference, we must have a data type */ + if (data->data_type == NULL) + return 0; + + keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(libctx, data->data_type, propq); + if (keymgmt != NULL) { + /* + * There are two possible cases + * + * 1. The keymgmt is from the same provider as the loader, + * so we can use evp_keymgmt_load() + * 2. The keymgmt is from another provider, then we must + * do the export/import dance. + */ + if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt) == provider) { + keydata = evp_keymgmt_load(keymgmt, data->ref, data->ref_size); + } else { + struct evp_keymgmt_util_try_import_data_st import_data; + OSSL_FUNC_store_export_object_fn *export_object = + ctx->fetched_loader->p_export_object; + + import_data.keymgmt = keymgmt; + import_data.keydata = NULL; + import_data.selection = OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL; + + if (export_object != NULL) { + /* + * No need to check for errors here, the value of + * |import_data.keydata| is as much an indicator. + */ + (void)export_object(ctx->loader_ctx, + data->ref, data->ref_size, + &evp_keymgmt_util_try_import, + &import_data); + } + + keydata = import_data.keydata; + } + } + if (keydata != NULL) + pk = evp_keymgmt_util_make_pkey(keymgmt, keydata); + EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt); + + return pk; +} + +static EVP_PKEY *try_key_value(struct extracted_param_data_st *data, + OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx, + OSSL_PASSPHRASE_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; + OSSL_DECODER_CTX *decoderctx = NULL; + BIO *membio = + BIO_new_mem_buf(data->octet_data, (int)data->octet_data_size); + + if (membio == NULL) + return 0; + + decoderctx = OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_by_EVP_PKEY(&pk, "DER", libctx, propq); + (void)OSSL_DECODER_CTX_set_passphrase_cb(decoderctx, cb, cbarg); + + /* No error if this couldn't be decoded */ + (void)OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(decoderctx, membio); + + OSSL_DECODER_CTX_free(decoderctx); + BIO_free(membio); + + return pk; +} + +typedef OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info_new_fn(EVP_PKEY *); + +static EVP_PKEY *try_key_value_legacy(struct extracted_param_data_st *data, + store_info_new_fn **store_info_new, + OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx, + OSSL_PASSPHRASE_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; + const unsigned char *der = data->octet_data, *derp; + long der_len = (long)data->octet_data_size; + + /* Try PUBKEY first, that's a real easy target */ + derp = der; + pk = d2i_PUBKEY_ex(NULL, &derp, der_len, libctx, propq); + if (pk != NULL) + *store_info_new = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PUBKEY; + + /* Try private keys next */ + if (pk == NULL) { + unsigned char *new_der = NULL; + X509_SIG *p8 = NULL; + PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8info = NULL; + + /* See if it's an encrypted PKCS#8 and decrypt it */ + derp = der; + if ((p8 = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &derp, der_len)) != NULL) { + char pbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; + size_t plen = 0; + + if (!cb(pbuf, sizeof(pbuf), &plen, NULL, cbarg)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OSSL_STORE, + OSSL_STORE_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); + } else { + const X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL; + const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct = NULL; + int len = 0; + + X509_SIG_get0(p8, &alg, &oct); + + /* + * No need to check the returned value, |new_der| + * will be NULL on error anyway. + */ + PKCS12_pbe_crypt(alg, pbuf, plen, + oct->data, oct->length, + &new_der, &len, 0); + der_len = len; + der = new_der; + } + X509_SIG_free(p8); + } + + /* + * If the encrypted PKCS#8 couldn't be decrypted, + * |der| is NULL + */ + if (der != NULL) { + /* Try to unpack an unencrypted PKCS#8, that's easy */ + derp = der; + p8info = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &derp, der_len); + if (p8info != NULL) { + pk = evp_pkcs82pkey_int(p8info, libctx, propq); + PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8info); + } + + /* + * It wasn't PKCS#8, so we must try the hard way. + * However, we can cheat a little bit, because we know + * what's not yet fully supported in out decoders. + * TODO(3.0) Eliminate these when we have decoder support. + */ + if (pk == NULL) { + derp = der; + pk = d2i_PrivateKey_ex(EVP_PKEY_SM2, NULL, + &derp, der_len, + libctx, NULL); + } + } + + if (pk != NULL) + *store_info_new = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PKEY; + + OPENSSL_free(new_der); + der = data->octet_data; + der_len = (long)data->octet_data_size; + } + + /* + * Last, we try parameters. We cheat the same way we do for + * private keys above. + * TODO(3.0) Eliminate these when we have decoder support. + */ + if (pk == NULL) { + derp = der; + pk = d2i_KeyParams(EVP_PKEY_SM2, NULL, &derp, der_len); + if (pk != NULL) + *store_info_new = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PARAMS; + } + + return pk; +} + +static int try_key(struct extracted_param_data_st *data, OSSL_STORE_INFO **v, + OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) +{ + store_info_new_fn *store_info_new = NULL; + + if (data->object_type == OSSL_OBJECT_UNKNOWN + || data->object_type == OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY) { + EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; + + /* Prefer key by reference than key by value */ + if (data->object_type == OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY && data->ref != NULL) { + pk = try_key_ref(data, ctx, provider, libctx, propq); + + /* + * If for some reason we couldn't get a key, it's an error. + * It indicates that while decoders could make a key reference, + * the keymgmt somehow couldn't handle it, or doesn't have a + * OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_load function. + */ + if (pk == NULL) + return 0; + } else if (data->octet_data != NULL) { + OSSL_PASSPHRASE_CALLBACK *cb = ossl_pw_passphrase_callback_dec; + void *cbarg = &ctx->pwdata; + + pk = try_key_value(data, ctx, cb, cbarg, libctx, propq); + + /* + * Desperate last maneuver, in case the decoders don't support + * the data we have, then we try on our own to at least get a + * legacy key. + * This is the same as der2key_decode() does, but in a limited + * way and within the walls of libcrypto. + * + * TODO Remove this when #legacy keys are gone + */ + if (pk == NULL) + pk = try_key_value_legacy(data, &store_info_new, ctx, + cb, cbarg, libctx, propq); + } + + if (pk != NULL) { + data->object_type = OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY; + + if (store_info_new == NULL) { + /* + * We determined the object type for OSSL_STORE_INFO, which + * makes an explicit difference between an EVP_PKEY with just + * (domain) parameters and an EVP_PKEY with actual key + * material. + * The logic is that an EVP_PKEY with actual key material + * always has the public half. + */ + if (evp_keymgmt_util_has(pk, OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY)) + store_info_new = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PKEY; + else if (evp_keymgmt_util_has(pk, + OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY)) + store_info_new = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PUBKEY; + else + store_info_new = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PARAMS; + } + *v = store_info_new(pk); + } + + if (*v == NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + } + + return 1; +} + +static int try_cert(struct extracted_param_data_st *data, OSSL_STORE_INFO **v, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) +{ + if (data->object_type == OSSL_OBJECT_UNKNOWN + || data->object_type == OSSL_OBJECT_CERT) { + X509 *cert; + + /* + * In most cases, we can try to interpret the serialized + * data as a trusted cert (X509 + X509_AUX) and fall back + * to reading it as a normal cert (just X509), but if + * |data_type| (the PEM name) specifically declares it as a + * trusted cert, then no fallback should be engaged. + * |ignore_trusted| tells if the fallback can be used (1) + * or not (0). + */ + int ignore_trusted = 1; + + /* If we have a data type, it should be a PEM name */ + if (data->data_type != NULL + && (strcasecmp(data->data_type, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0)) + ignore_trusted = 0; + + cert = d2i_X509_AUX(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&data->octet_data, + data->octet_data_size); + if (cert == NULL && ignore_trusted) + cert = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&data->octet_data, + data->octet_data_size); + + if (cert != NULL) + /* We determined the object type */ + data->object_type = OSSL_OBJECT_CERT; + + if (cert != NULL && !x509_set0_libctx(cert, libctx, propq)) { + X509_free(cert); + cert = NULL; + } + + if (cert != NULL) + *v = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CERT(cert); + if (*v == NULL) + X509_free(cert); + } + + return 1; +} + +static int try_crl(struct extracted_param_data_st *data, OSSL_STORE_INFO **v, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) +{ + if (data->object_type == OSSL_OBJECT_UNKNOWN + || data->object_type == OSSL_OBJECT_CRL) { + X509_CRL *crl; + + crl = d2i_X509_CRL(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&data->octet_data, + data->octet_data_size); + if (crl != NULL) + /* We determined the object type */ + data->object_type = OSSL_OBJECT_CRL; + + if (crl != NULL && !x509_crl_set0_libctx(crl, libctx, propq)) { + X509_CRL_free(crl); + crl = NULL; + } + + if (crl != NULL) + *v = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CRL(crl); + if (*v == NULL) + X509_CRL_free(crl); + } + + return 1; +} + +static int try_pkcs12(struct extracted_param_data_st *data, OSSL_STORE_INFO **v, + OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx, + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) +{ + /* There is no specific object type for PKCS12 */ + if (data->object_type == OSSL_OBJECT_UNKNOWN) { + /* Initial parsing */ + PKCS12 *p12; + + if ((p12 = d2i_PKCS12(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&data->octet_data, + data->octet_data_size)) != NULL) { + char *pass = NULL; + char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE]; + size_t tpass_len; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + X509 *cert = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + + data->object_type = OSSL_OBJECT_PKCS12; + + if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0) + || PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) { + pass = ""; + } else { + static char prompt_info[] = "PKCS12 import pass phrase"; + OSSL_PARAM pw_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_PASSPHRASE_PARAM_INFO, + prompt_info, + sizeof(prompt_info) - 1), + OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + + if (!ossl_pw_get_passphrase(tpass, sizeof(tpass), &tpass_len, + pw_params, 0, &ctx->pwdata)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OSSL_STORE, + OSSL_STORE_R_PASSPHRASE_CALLBACK_ERROR); + goto p12_end; + } + pass = tpass; + if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, strlen(pass))) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OSSL_STORE, + OSSL_STORE_R_ERROR_VERIFYING_PKCS12_MAC); + goto p12_end; + } + } + + if (PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, &pkey, &cert, &chain)) { + STACK_OF(OSSL_STORE_INFO) *infos = NULL; + OSSL_STORE_INFO *osi_pkey = NULL; + OSSL_STORE_INFO *osi_cert = NULL; + OSSL_STORE_INFO *osi_ca = NULL; + int ok = 1; + + if ((infos = sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_null()) != NULL) { + if (pkey != NULL) { + if ((osi_pkey = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PKEY(pkey)) != NULL + /* clearing pkey here avoids case distinctions */ + && (pkey = NULL) == NULL + && sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_push(infos, osi_pkey) != 0) + osi_pkey = NULL; + else + ok = 0; + } + if (ok && cert != NULL) { + if ((osi_cert = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CERT(cert)) != NULL + /* clearing cert here avoids case distinctions */ + && (cert = NULL) == NULL + && sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_push(infos, osi_cert) != 0) + osi_cert = NULL; + else + ok = 0; + } + while (ok && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) { + X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); + + if ((osi_ca = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CERT(ca)) != NULL + && sk_X509_shift(chain) != NULL + && sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_push(infos, osi_ca) != 0) + osi_ca = NULL; + else + ok = 0; + } + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + X509_free(cert); + sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); + OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(osi_pkey); + OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(osi_cert); + OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(osi_ca); + if (!ok) { + sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_pop_free(infos, OSSL_STORE_INFO_free); + infos = NULL; + } + ctx->cached_info = infos; + } + } + p12_end: + PKCS12_free(p12); + *v = sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_shift(ctx->cached_info); + } + + return 1; +} |