Add ossl_rsa symbols

Partial fix for #12964

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14473)

11 files changed, 66 insertions, 63 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_acvp_test_params.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_acvp_test_params.c
index c1d07cb334..908f605934 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_acvp_test_params.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_acvp_test_params.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
 #include "rsa_local.h"
 
-int rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_new(OSSL_PARAM **dst, const OSSL_PARAM src[])
+int ossl_rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_new(OSSL_PARAM **dst, const OSSL_PARAM src[])
 {
     const OSSL_PARAM *p, *s;
     OSSL_PARAM *d, *alloc = NULL;
@@ -53,16 +53,16 @@ int rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_new(OSSL_PARAM **dst, const OSSL_PARAM src[])
         }
     }
     if (ret == 0) {
-        rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(alloc);
+        ossl_rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(alloc);
         alloc = NULL;
     }
     if (*dst != NULL)
-        rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(*dst);
+        ossl_rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(*dst);
     *dst = alloc;
     return ret;
 }
 
-void rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(OSSL_PARAM *dst)
+void ossl_rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(OSSL_PARAM *dst)
 {
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 
@@ -76,13 +76,13 @@ void rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(OSSL_PARAM *dst)
     OPENSSL_free(dst);
 }
 
-int rsa_acvp_test_set_params(RSA *r, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int ossl_rsa_acvp_test_set_params(RSA *r, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     RSA_ACVP_TEST *t;
     const OSSL_PARAM *p;
 
     if (r->acvp_test != NULL) {
-        rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test);
+        ossl_rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test);
         r->acvp_test = NULL;
     }
 
@@ -118,11 +118,11 @@ int rsa_acvp_test_set_params(RSA *r, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     r->acvp_test = t;
     return 1;
 err:
-    rsa_acvp_test_free(t);
+    ossl_rsa_acvp_test_free(t);
     return 0;
 }
 
-int rsa_acvp_test_get_params(RSA *r, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int ossl_rsa_acvp_test_get_params(RSA *r, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     RSA_ACVP_TEST *t;
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int rsa_acvp_test_get_params(RSA *r, OSSL_PARAM params[])
     return 1;
 }
 
-void rsa_acvp_test_free(RSA_ACVP_TEST *t)
+void ossl_rsa_acvp_test_free(RSA_ACVP_TEST *t)
 {
     if (t != NULL) {
         BN_free(t->Xp1);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index 6be5a908af..9e9366757d 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -493,8 +493,8 @@ static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
     switch (op) {
     case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
         if (pkey->pkey.rsa->pss != NULL) {
-            if (!rsa_pss_get_param(pkey->pkey.rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md,
-                                   &min_saltlen)) {
+            if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(pkey->pkey.rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md,
+                                        &min_saltlen)) {
                 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                 return 0;
             }
@@ -537,11 +537,11 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
             return NULL;
     }
 
-    return rsa_pss_params_create(sigmd, mgf1md, saltlen);
+    return ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(sigmd, mgf1md, saltlen);
 }
 
-RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd,
-                                      const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen)
+RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd,
+                                           const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen)
 {
     RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
 
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ int ossl_rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx,
     /* Decode PSS parameters */
     pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg);
 
-    if (!rsa_pss_get_param(pss, &md, &mgf1md, &saltlen)) {
+    if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(pss, &md, &mgf1md, &saltlen)) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -686,8 +686,8 @@ static int rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
     return 1;
 }
 
-int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
-                      const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen)
+int ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
+                           const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen)
 {
     /*
      * Callers do not care about the trailer field, and yet, we must
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ static int rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa)
          * to even read a key with invalid values, making it hard to test
          * a bad situation.
          *
-         * Other routines use rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will be
+         * Other routines use ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will be
          * checked, eventually.
          */
         if (!rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md,
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ static int rsa_sig_info_set(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
         return 0;
     /* Decode PSS parameters */
     pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg);
-    if (!rsa_pss_get_param(pss, &md, &mgf1md, &saltlen))
+    if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(pss, &md, &mgf1md, &saltlen))
         goto err;
     mdnid = EVP_MD_type(md);
     /*
@@ -965,7 +965,8 @@ static int rsa_int_import_from(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *vpctx,
             const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
             const EVP_MD *mgf1md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mgf1mdnid);
 
-            if ((rsa->pss = rsa_pss_params_create(md, mgf1md, saltlen)) == NULL)
+            if ((rsa->pss = ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(md, mgf1md,
+                                                       saltlen)) == NULL)
                 goto err;
         }
         break;
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
index d1e1470d37..c5799d8e4d 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int rsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
             /* not a multi-prime key, skip */
             return 1;
         }
-        return (rsa_multip_calc_product((RSA *)*pval) == 1) ? 2 : 0;
+        return (ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product((RSA *)*pval) == 1) ? 2 : 0;
     }
     return 1;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
index 30b16f25c6..8c16a56db5 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ int ossl_rsa_todata(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
     /* The acvp test results are not meant for export so check for bld == NULL */
     if (bld == NULL)
-        rsa_acvp_test_get_params(rsa, params);
+        ossl_rsa_acvp_test_get_params(rsa, params);
 #endif
     ret = 1;
  err:
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
index 0c32e01426..0596d129c1 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static int rsa_validate_keypair_multiprime(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb)
     if (key->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
         ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(key->prime_infos);
         if (ex_primes <= 0
-                || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(BN_num_bits(key->n))) {
+                || (ex_primes + 2) > ossl_rsa_multip_cap(BN_num_bits(key->n))) {
             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY);
             return 0;
         }
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index a2192df575..07a3a7800e 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || primes > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) {
+    if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || primes > ossl_rsa_multip_cap(bits)) {
         ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
         goto err;
@@ -154,13 +154,14 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
             goto err;
         if (rsa->prime_infos != NULL) {
             /* could this happen? */
-            sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(rsa->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
+            sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(rsa->prime_infos,
+                                       ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
         }
         rsa->prime_infos = prime_infos;
 
         /* prime_info from 2 to |primes| -1 */
         for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
-            pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
+            pinfo = ossl_rsa_multip_info_new();
             if (pinfo == NULL)
                 goto err;
             (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
index dfc74ec951..89cd4da527 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
@@ -163,12 +163,12 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r)
     BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
 
 #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
-    rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test);
+    ossl_rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
-    sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
+    sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
 #endif
     BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
     BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa)
         /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */
         int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos);
 
-        if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits))
+        if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > ossl_rsa_multip_cap(bits))
             return 0;
     }
 #endif
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
         old = r->prime_infos;
 
     for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
-        pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
+        pinfo = ossl_rsa_multip_info_new();
         if (pinfo == NULL)
             goto err;
         if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) {
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
             BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
             BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
         } else {
-            rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
+            ossl_rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
             goto err;
         }
         (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
 
     r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
 
-    if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
+    if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
         r->prime_infos = old;
         goto err;
     }
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
          * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
          * with other *set0* functions: just free it...
          */
-        sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free);
+        sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
     }
 
     r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
     return 1;
  err:
     /* r, d, t should not be freed */
-    sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
+    sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
     return 0;
 }
 #endif
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
             if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL))
                 goto err;
 
-            /* Using rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */
+            /* Using ossl_rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */
             if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL) {
                 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                 goto err;
@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
 
         r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
 
-        if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
+        if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
             r->prime_infos = old_infos;
             goto err;
         }
@@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
          * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
          * with other *set0* functions: just free it...
          */
-        sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
+        sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
     }
 #endif
 
@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
  err:
     /* r, d, t should not be freed */
-    sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
+    sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
     return 0;
 #endif
 }
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
index 3a8d6fe286..73f7f91804 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
@@ -157,16 +157,16 @@ struct rsa_meth_st {
 #define pkey_is_pss(pkey) (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
 #define pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx) (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
 
-RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd,
-                                      const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen);
-int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
-                      const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen);
+RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd,
+                                           const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen);
+int ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
+                           const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen);
 /* internal function to clear and free multi-prime parameters */
-void rsa_multip_info_free_ex(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
-void rsa_multip_info_free(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
-RSA_PRIME_INFO *rsa_multip_info_new(void);
-int rsa_multip_calc_product(RSA *rsa);
-int rsa_multip_cap(int bits);
+void ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
+void ossl_rsa_multip_info_free(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
+RSA_PRIME_INFO *ossl_rsa_multip_info_new(void);
+int ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(RSA *rsa);
+int ossl_rsa_multip_cap(int bits);
 
 int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(int nbits, int strength);
 int ossl_rsa_check_pminusq_diff(BIGNUM *diff, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_mp.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_mp.c
index f385a589cf..410dc690cf 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_mp.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_mp.c
@@ -12,23 +12,23 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include "rsa_local.h"
 
-void rsa_multip_info_free_ex(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo)
+void ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo)
 {
     /* free pp and pinfo only */
     BN_clear_free(pinfo->pp);
     OPENSSL_free(pinfo);
 }
 
-void rsa_multip_info_free(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo)
+void ossl_rsa_multip_info_free(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo)
 {
     /* free a RSA_PRIME_INFO structure */
     BN_clear_free(pinfo->r);
     BN_clear_free(pinfo->d);
     BN_clear_free(pinfo->t);
-    rsa_multip_info_free_ex(pinfo);
+    ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex(pinfo);
 }
 
-RSA_PRIME_INFO *rsa_multip_info_new(void)
+RSA_PRIME_INFO *ossl_rsa_multip_info_new(void)
 {
     RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ RSA_PRIME_INFO *rsa_multip_info_new(void)
 }
 
 /* Refill products of primes */
-int rsa_multip_calc_product(RSA *rsa)
+int ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(RSA *rsa)
 {
     RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
     BIGNUM *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL;
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int rsa_multip_calc_product(RSA *rsa)
     return rv;
 }
 
-int rsa_multip_cap(int bits)
+int ossl_rsa_multip_cap(int bits)
 {
     int cap = 5;
 
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
index 203612503b..6e7e7a27e1 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -225,9 +225,9 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
                 memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
         } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
             size_t sltmp;
-            ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
-                                 NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
-                                 sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+            ret = ossl_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+                                  NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
+                                  sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
             if (ret <= 0)
                 return 0;
             ret = sltmp;
@@ -711,8 +711,9 @@ static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
     /* If all parameters are default values don't set pss */
     if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && rctx->saltlen == -2)
         return 1;
-    rsa->pss = rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
-                                     rctx->saltlen == -2 ? 0 : rctx->saltlen);
+    rsa->pss = ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+                                          rctx->saltlen == -2
+                                          ? 0 : rctx->saltlen);
     if (rsa->pss == NULL)
         return 0;
     return 1;
@@ -818,7 +819,7 @@ static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
     if (rsa->pss == NULL)
         return 1;
     /* Get and check parameters */
-    if (!rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
+    if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
         return 0;
 
     /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 5664394114..39a90bb244 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -328,9 +328,9 @@ err:
  *
  * It returns one on successful verification or zero otherwise.
  */
-int int_rsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-                   unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
-                   const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+int ossl_rsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+                    unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
+                    const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
 {
     int len, ret = 0;
     size_t decrypt_len, encoded_len = 0;
@@ -453,5 +453,5 @@ int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
     if (rsa->meth->rsa_verify != NULL)
         return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
 
-    return int_rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
+    return ossl_rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
 }