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authorMark J. Cox <mark@openssl.org>2006-09-05 08:58:03 +0000
committerMark J. Cox <mark@openssl.org>2006-09-05 08:58:03 +0000
commitb79aa05e3babdbab92c6356f6e51f7bb43c41576 (patch)
tree1963310ff2983ec5cba1330c9a58b343f6e0b232 /crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
parent500b5a181df0e8e442e4cbf954213ff886b29df3 (diff)
Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
(CVE-2006-4339) Submitted by: Ben Laurie, Google Security Team Reviewed by: bmoeller, mjc, shenson
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c17
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index e5a015d1a6..e1b1714210 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -193,6 +193,23 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
if (sig == NULL) goto err;
+
+ /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
+ if(p != s+i)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
+ create forgeries */
+ if(sig->algor->parameter
+ && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);