This commits changes to various parts of libcrypto required by the recent

ENGINE surgery. DH, DSA, RAND, and RSA now use *both* "method" and ENGINE
pointers to manage their hooking with ENGINE. Previously their use of
"method" pointers was replaced by use of ENGINE references. See
crypto/engine/README for details.

Also, remove the ENGINE iterations from evp_test - even when the
cipher/digest code is committed in, this functionality would require a
different set of API calls.

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 20 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 83891df316..d82dd15493 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -100,13 +100,11 @@ const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
 	BIGNUM f,ret;
 	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-	meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
 	BN_init(&f);
 	BN_init(&ret);
 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
@@ -172,7 +170,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 			BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
 		}
 		
-	if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
 		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
 
 	/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
@@ -199,13 +197,11 @@ err:
 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
 	BIGNUM f,ret;
 	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-	meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
 	BN_init(&f);
 	BN_init(&ret);
 
@@ -252,10 +248,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
 		(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
 		(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
-		{ if (!meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+		{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
 	else
 		{
-		if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
 		}
 
 	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
@@ -284,14 +280,12 @@ err:
 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
 	BIGNUM f,ret;
 	int j,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-	meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
 	BN_init(&f);
 	BN_init(&ret);
 	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
@@ -334,10 +328,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
 		(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
 		(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
-		{ if (!meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+		{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
 	else
 		{
-		if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
+		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
 			goto err;
 		}
 
@@ -386,14 +380,12 @@ err:
 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
 	BIGNUM f,ret;
 	int i,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
-	meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
 	BN_init(&f);
 	BN_init(&ret);
 	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
@@ -448,7 +440,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 			BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
 		}
 		
-	if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
 		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
 
 	p=buf;
@@ -483,12 +475,10 @@ err:
 
 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
 	{
-	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
 	BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
 	int ret=0;
 	BN_CTX *ctx;
 
-	meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_init(&m1);
 	BN_init(&r1);
@@ -546,11 +536,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
 		}
 		
 	if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-	if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
+	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
 		rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
 
 	if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-	if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
+	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
 		rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
 
 	if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
@@ -575,7 +565,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
 
 	if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
 		{
-		if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
 		/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
 		 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
 		 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
@@ -588,7 +578,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
 			/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
 			 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
 			 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
-			if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+			if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
 		}
 	ret=1;
 err: